Iraqi Council’s Path Diverges From U.S. Plan

Cracks are emerging in the relationship between the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council, suggesting that as the Iraqis gain more power they may pursue policies that could undercut coalition efforts to install a democratic government here.

The unelected council members, appointed in consultation with the coalition, have begun approving measures and publicly floating proposals without discussing them first with coalition leaders. Topics include ridding the government of many former members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, remaking the nation’s security forces, outlining the criteria for Iraqi citizenship and prodding Americans to hand over power more quickly.

One proposal likely to be approved by the council envisions combining the militias of various factions as well as some members of the old regime’s police and military into a paramilitary force controlled by the Iraqi Interior Ministry -- a move that coalition officials worry could create a host of problems.

“We know there is concern about the security situation -- a concern the coalition shares,” said Dan Senor, a spokesman for and advisor to coalition administrator L. Paul Bremer III.

“But we also have to ensure that when we leave Iraq, the security structure has a proper vetting process so that former Baathists and dead-enders and Mukhabarat [members of Hussein’s dreaded security force] don’t figure out a way to weasel back into the security structure,” Senor said. “We also have to make sure that there is respect for human rights and a high standard of professionalism.”

Some also fear that a paramilitary force composed of fighters loyal to different political factions would attempt to divide power and territory across the country.

Such a force, as opposed to the Iraqi army being trained by international experts, could lead “to the fragmentation of the country, warlordism and civil war,” said Gary Samore, director of studies for the London-based Institute for International Strategic Studies.

Under international law, the Governing Council’s recommendations must be approved by occupation officials before they go into effect, and Bremer has the power to veto the council’s proposals. But because the American goal is to hand over power to the interim council, it has been in Bremer’s interest to assent as much as possible to its proposals, and he has publicly said he expected he would never have to use his veto.

However, he has not yet approved the security initiative.

The council’s growing independence puts the Americans in a corner. Coalition officials are eager to prove to the world that they are sincere about giving Iraqis real power over their government, but they also want to ensure that the policies adopted are roughly compatible with those of a democratic government and the rule of law.

“The U.S. is in fact interested in handing over power, but they are concerned that the current contenders for power are not likely to be able to run the country effectively or democratically,” Samore said.

The council members’ bid for power comes at a time when the Americans can ill afford to confront them. France and Germany are pushing the United States to hand over control to Iraqis quickly to win U.N. financial support and diplomatic backing for Iraq’s reconstruction -- help the U.S. sorely needs.

Although many Governing Council members’ proposals are still in the formative stage, most have the backing of the five most powerful members of the body -- those who represent established political organizations.

It is those five groups -- the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi National Accord, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq -- that have moved most aggressively on the security front, pushing to take responsibility from the Americans, a change that also would hugely augment their own power.

Those council members are aware of the pressure on the United States to give the Iraqis power and avoid confrontation, and are capitalizing on it, one coalition official said.

If an idea can gain enough currency before it reaches Bremer, it is harder for him to oppose it, especially with a U.N. debate on Iraq set to begin Tuesday.

For instance, on Sunday, the council approved a new law on de-Baathification and announced it publicly before reviewing the details with Bremer. The measure would not only remove a number of Iraqis from their jobs because they formerly held positions in the Baath Party -- the organization through which Hussein maintained tight control over the nation -- but also revoke exceptions made by Bremer in the de-Baathification order he issued in May. The new rules were announced this week by a spokesman for the council’s president, Ahmed Chalabi.

De-Baathification, the term used for the process of ridding government ministries and institutions of former Baath Party members, is a controversial policy. Although many people support the idea, there also are many Iraqis who became Baathists only to be able to feed their families. They feel such policies have unfairly punished them.

Bremer, a strong supporter of de-Baathification in general, is now in the difficult position of trying to soften the proposal for practical reasons. He is limited in the changes he can make without giving the impression that he is second-guessing the council’s authority over a clearly internal Iraqi political matter.

Bremer’s concern, according to some officials close to the council, is that under the council-authored de-Baathification plan, many teachers would lose their jobs, making it difficult to reopen schools two weeks from now, said Saad Shakir, a top advisor to council member Adnan Pachachi.

“Bremer asked only that we take into consideration that if we go ahead, half of the teachers will not be able to come to their post in two weeks,” Shakir said.

The biggest fight on the horizon is over the council’s effort to take responsibility for security from the Americans. Security is the most important issue to most Iraqis and is the key to power in a country where nearly every household has weapons.

Under a proposal now being discussed by the council’s security committee, which includes the five key political parties, a paramilitary force, supplied with helicopters, tanks and other equipment, would act as a quick reaction force when there are problems but also would take preemptive steps to stop crimes before they happened, said Safeen Dizayee, the chief representative on foreign relations for the Kurdish Democratic Party.

He described the new force as a sort of “gendarmerie” that initially would be made up of “people from the major [political] groups that have their own units that they can contribute.”

The advantage, he said, is that with U.S. soldiers being attacked every day while on patrol, an Iraqi security force could quickly serve as a replacement for protecting the country.

The more Iraqi faces on the streets, Dizayee said, “the more the coalition can return to its barracks.”

At the same time, a paramilitary force is also an attractive option to the Iraqi political parties because by incorporating their military wings into the government, they would be in a better position to maintain some power as they compete for political control over Iraq in coming years. In past Iraqi governments, the Interior Ministry was a key power base, and a paramilitary force would ensure that the parties have people loyal to them firmly planted there. By contrast, the national military and police would be loyal to Iraq’s leader.

Three of the parties on the Governing Council already have militias -- the two Kurdish groups and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shiite Muslim group. The Iraqi National Congress has small cadres of armed men, and the Iraqi National Accord, which has long been backed by the CIA, according to Bush administration officials, is thought to be able to muster some armed men.

Recently appointed Interior Minister Nouri Badran, a Shiite, is an official of the Iraqi National Accord.

Dizayee said he thought the groups would work together well, but others on the council worry that such a force would undermine the role of the national police and military.

“I don’t agree with any kind of militia because it will divide the people; we should have one police force, one power structure,” Shakir said.

How the coalition copes with the latest efforts by the council’s major parties to augment their power remains to be seen, but it appears all but certain that the next several months will be a constant struggle between the council and the coalition.

“Bremer is trying to give them authority ... but he doesn’t want to lose control,” said Rachel Bronson, director of Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “There’s a natural power struggle built into the relationship, but the coalition also knows that if you transfer too quickly to local power, you end up with factions fighting over power-sharing rather than having a debate about how to rebuild the country.”