Terror Suspects Still at Large

Al Qaeda detainees have helped the CIA identify at least 86 individuals that the terror organization “deemed suitable” for attacks in the United States or Europe, but more than half of them remain at large, according to documents released Wednesday by the Bush administration.

That was just one of many disclosures contained in a raft of formerly classified documents released by the White House to accompany President Bush’s announcement that he was transferring 14 high-value Al Qaeda detainees from CIA custody to the prison facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to face trial.

Taken together, Bush’s speech, documents released by the director of national intelligence and briefings by administration officials provided a sweeping overview of a CIA program that had been one of the government’s most carefully guarded secrets. They also provided some unsettling details about Al Qaeda’s sophisticated operation and its plots against the United States and its allies overseas.

In his speech, Bush described a cascading effect in which the capture of key prisoners led to the identification and capture of other terrorism suspects.

In particular, he said senior Al Qaeda operative Abu Zubeida identified one of the key accomplices in the Sept. 11 attacks, Ramzi Binalshibh, and provided information that led to his capture.

In turn, information from 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed led to other terrorist suspects, including affiliates of the Jemaah Islamiah organization in Southeast Asia. And some of them ultimately named Hambali, the head of Jemaah Islamiah who also acted as Al Qaeda’s top coordinator in that region.

When confronted with the news that 17 of his operatives had been captured, Hambali acknowledged that the men were being groomed at Mohammed’s request for more attacks inside the United States, probably using airplanes.

During questioning, Mohammed also provided many details of other plots to kill Americans.

For example, he described the design of planned attacks on buildings inside the United States, and how operatives were directed to carry them out.

“He told us the operatives had been instructed to ensure that the explosives went off at a point that was high enough to prevent the people trapped above from escaping out the windows,” Bush said.

Terrorist suspects held in CIA custody have provided information that helped stop a planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa. The operatives, Bush said, were going to use an explosive-laden water tanker.

Most of the details of these plots did not make it into the president’s 37-minute speech at the White House, but they were eye-opening just the same.

The detainees also provided details about Al Qaeda’s specially trained travel facilitators and forgers, whose role was to crank out falsified documents to aid operatives on their terrorist missions around the world.

Some of them spent most of their time -- and a lot of Al Qaeda’s money -- trying to help get operatives into the United States for attacks under the direct supervision of Mohammed.

One of them was a relative of Mohammed known as Ammar al-Baluchi, who has been accused of delivering funds to the Sept. 11 hijackers. What hadn’t been disclosed was that Al-Baluchi went so far as to marry an Al Qaeda operative named Aafia Siddiqui and send her to the United States to help one of Al Qaeda’s soldiers slip into the country.

Siddiqui, a U.S.-educated neuroscientist, remains on the loose and is one of the FBI’s most wanted suspected terrorists. But her connections to Al Qaeda, and especially to Mohammed and the terror network’s inner circle, had never been disclosed.

The administration also released details about the man that Siddiqui allegedly helped infiltrate the United States in preparation for attack, Majid Khan. Khan had links to top Al Qaeda operatives, including Mohammed, who assigned him to conduct research on poisoning U.S. water reservoirs. The Pakistani national, also known as Yusif, attended high school in Baltimore in the late 1990s.

Additional information about the 14 CIA detainees was released Wednesday, including:

* Abu Faraj Libbi, a Libyan, was the former No. 3 leader of Al Qaeda and the most wanted man in Pakistan. He allegedly masterminded two attempts to assassinate Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. But as Al Qaeda’s “general manager” he also was heavily involved in financially supporting not only Al Qaeda operatives but their families as well.

* Abu Zubeida, a Palestinian raised in Saudi Arabia, was believed to be a link between Osama bin Laden and many Al Qaeda cells around the world. But he also was believed to be organizing an attack on Israel at the time of his capture in 2002, using at least $50,000 from donors in Saudi Arabia. And in November 2001, Zubeida helped smuggle Abu Musab Zarqawi, the now-deceased leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and some 70 other Arab fighters out of Afghanistan and into Iran.

* Walid bin Attash, better known as Khallad, was an alleged Al Qaeda operative accused of serving as a bodyguard for Osama bin Laden and as a mastermind of the U.S. destroyer Cole bombing. But he also played an important role after Sept. 11, helping prepare Al Qaeda’s defenses around Tora Bora. After that, he fled to Pakistan and served as a communications link between Al Qaeda’s senior leadership and its network in Saudi Arabia. He also assisted in the movement of operatives between South and Southeast Asia and the Arabian Peninsula.

* Abd al Rahim al Nashiri was known as a suspected mastermind of the Cole bombing. But he was also said to be getting funding together for other Al Qaeda attacks. Among them: a plot to crash a small plane into the bridge of a Western navy vessel in Port Rashid, United Arab Emirates; a car bomb attack against a Saudi military installation aimed at killing U.S. personnel; attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Gibraltar and Western warships passing through the Port of Dubai; and other attacks on land-based targets in Morocco and Qatar.

* Gouled Hassan Dourad allegedly headed a Mogadishu-based network for Al Qaeda fighters in Somalia. He allegedly cased a U.S. military base in Djibouti for possible attack and helped create a haven for Al Qaeda in Somalia, including locating safehouses and procuring weapons. He also was privy to many previously undisclosed Al Qaeda plots in Africa, including shooting down an Ethiopian jetliner landing at a Somalia airport in 2003 and kidnapping Western workers as a way of raising money.

* Mohd Farik Bin Amin, a Malaysian best known as Zubair, was one of two Jemaah Islamiah members chosen to be suicide operatives in an Al Qaeda attack on a Los Angeles skyscraper. The other was a Malaysian known as Mohammed Nazir bin Lep. The thwarted attack has been reported, but no names had been attached to it.

*

josh.meyer@latimes.com

Times staff writer Greg Miller contributed to this report.

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Facing trial

Among the high-value terrorism suspects transferred from CIA custody to Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba are these 11 men:

Ali Abdul Aziz Ali

Age 29, born in Baluchistan and raised in Kuwait. Pakistan-based, Al Qaeda-affiliated nephew of presumed Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, for whom he allegedly served as a key lieutenant in the plot. Cousin of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, his chief mentor, who is in prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani

Born about 1974 in Tanzania.

Al Qaeda document forger and travel facilitator. Indicted for his alleged role in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa. After moving to Afghanistan, became a cook for Osama bin Laden before moving to a forgery office in Kandahar.

Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi

The Saudi is believed to be one of two key financial facilitators entrusted by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to manage funding for the hijackings. Reports suggest direct ties to several of the hijackers and to other operatives. Worked in the Al Qaeda media center in Afghanistan from 2000 until he left for the United Arab Emirates in 2001. Hid in Pakistan until his capture in 2003.

Lillie

Malaysian-born key lieutenant for Hambali, the jailed operative from Jemaah Islamiah, an Al Qaeda-linked group in Southeast Asia. Allegedly facilitated the transfer of Al Qaeda funds used for the JW Marriott hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia, in 2003. Was said to be particularly interested in the ideas of martyrdom and slated to be a suicide operative for an

Al Qaeda “second wave” attack targeting Los Angeles.

Majid Khan

Before his 2003 capture, the Pakistani national was an Al Qaeda operative with U.S. connections. Moved with his family to Baltimore in 1996, becoming involved in local Islamic organizations before returning to Pakistan in 2002. His uncle and cousin, both suspected Al Qaeda operatives, introduced him to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who was impressed with Khan’s English skills and knowledge of the United States and selected him as an operative for a possible attack in the U.S. Khan allegedly researched poisoning U.S. reservoirs and was considered for an operation to kill Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.

Abd al Rahim al Nashiri

Born in 1965, Saudi national of Yemeni descent. Was Al Qaeda’s operations chief in the Arabian Peninsula until his capture in 2002. Led cells in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Convicted by a Yemeni court of being the mastermind and local manager of the 2000 bombing of the U.S. destroyer Cole off Yemen.

Abu Faraj Libbi

Libyan paramilitary commander took on more direct operational responsibilities after the arrest in 2003 of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Was the organization’s general manager, subordinate only to Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, beginning in mid-2003. Was a conduit for communications between Al Qaeda managers and Bin Laden from August 2003 until his capture in 2005.

Abu Zubeida

Palestinian raised in Saudi Arabia. Was a leading extremist facilitator who operated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region from the mid-1990s. Recruited by Bin Laden to be one of Al Qaeda’s senior travel facilitators. Three of the Sept. 11 hijackers received basic training at Al Qaeda’s Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, which Abu Zubeida oversaw. Established a document forgery network in Pakistan that supported Al Qaeda and other extremist groups.

Zubair

Malaysian member of Jemaah Islamiah served directly under Hambali, suspected of assisting in planning attacks until his capture in 2003. Was allegedly tapped in November 2001 to be a suicide operative for an Al Qaeda attack targeting Los Angeles. Said to have played a role in transferring funds used to finance terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to Hambali.

Walid bin Attash

Yemeni born and raised in Saudi Arabia. Was a key Al Qaeda operative from 1998 until his capture in 2003. The 27-year-old is the scion of a reputedly prominent terrorist family: His father was close to Bin Laden, and several brothers who went to Afghanistan to train and fight in the 1990s. After training at a number of camps in the mid-1990s, he alternated between serving as a bodyguard for Bin Laden and participating in combat against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Was reportedly chosen by Bin Laden to become a hijacker in the Sept. 11 attack, but was arrested in Yemen in April 2001 while trying to obtain a U.S. visa. After his brief imprisonment, helped Bin Laden select additional hijackers and supervised training at a terrorist camp in Afghanistan.

Gouled Hassan Dourad

Born in Somalia in 1974. Was head of a Mogadishu-based facilitation network that allegedly supported Al Qaeda members in Somalia. His responsibilities are said to have included locating safe houses, helping transfer funds and procuring weapons, explosives and other supplies. Was allegedly privy to several terrorist plots under consideration by his Somalia cell, including shooting down an Ethiopian jetliner landing in Somalia in 2003.

Source: The White House