There’s No Point in Flailing at This Pinata

Mexico is eager for the U.S. to liberalize its immigration policy but sees no reason to change its own. With as much as $20 billion flowing into the country from migrants working in the U.S. this year -- money that supports more than one of five Mexican households -- why should it? It is not a lack of capacity but a lack of will that prevents Mexico from policing its border with the U.S.

So goes the conventional wisdom in Washington and in the anti-immigration lobby, which leads to mindless Mexico-bashing -- mindless because even if the Mexican government were 100% committed to restricting the movement of its nationals and putting Mexican people-smugglers out of business, it would not make a discernible difference in illegal crossings.

The U.S. job market provides an irresistible magnet. A bi-national research team under my direction interviewed more than 600 migrants who had returned to their hometowns in central Mexico last January, and 82% said opportunities in the U.S., rather than conditions in Mexico, caused them to go north. Among those who planned to return to the U.S. this year, 77% expected to have a prearranged job.

The desire for family reunification also drives hundreds of thousands of Mexicans to migrate annually. Three of five Mexicans have relatives living in the United States. In the high-emigration towns we surveyed, 92% of first-time migrants during the last decade had a family connection in the U.S. Eventually, many of these bi-national families will reunify in the U.S., regardless of what Washington and Mexico City does. By making it more costly and risky for heads of families to visit their dependents in Mexico, tougher U.S. border enforcement since 1993 has only strengthened the family-reunification incentive.

Many members of Congress routinely chastise Mexican authorities for not dismantling the people-smuggling operations that organize more than 80% of illegal migration to the U.S. They assume that taking out a few large-scale smuggling organizations would sharply reduce illegal crossings.

But there is no evidence that a handful of criminal syndicates dominate the smuggling industry. The business remains highly decentralized, with Mom-and-Pop coyote operations serving the vast majority of aspiring migrants. In our study in central Mexico, we found that nearly two-thirds of migrants secured a smuggler for their most recent trip north through relatives living in the U.S., or relatives and neighbors in their hometown -- not by searching for one in a Mexican border city. Because it’s easy to get into the business, and demand for border-crossing assistance is so strong, eliminating reputed smuggling kingpins would have a negligible effect on migrant flow.

Governments are better at starting international migration flows than shutting them off. Labor recruiters dispatched to Mexico by U.S. railroads and agribusiness sparked large-scale Mexican migration in the 1880s, and U.S. and Mexican authorities simply looked on. Migrant traffic north gained momentum during World Wars I and II, when the U.S. government organized programs to recruit Mexican agricultural labor. The “bracero” contract labor program launched in 1942 continued until 1964, when it became too politically controversial in the U.S. The young men and women migrating here today are mostly descendants of the workers who were welcomed in this country three, four or five generations ago. U.S. politicians may find it expedient to ignore the multigenerational tradition of Mexican migration -- and its origins -- but it is patently unrealistic to assume that we can turn back the clock.

In the short term, the only government intervention that might significantly deter Mexicans from migrating north would be to clamp down on the employers who hire them. But the political and economic costs of turning off the jobs magnet would be extremely high, which is why this approach is not on the table in Congress.

Legalizing a portion of the current illegal flow through some type of guest-worker program, perhaps coupled with an increase in permanent resident visas for Mexican nationals, is the option most likely to gain traction.

But the number of opportunities for legal entry would have to be quite large to slow unauthorized immigration. In 2004, the Border Patrol apprehended 741,000 migrants illegally crossing the border, and our study in central Mexico found that one-third of those who attempt illegal entry are never detected.

Another option is setting up economic development programs in migrant-sending regions that would create incentives to stay at home. Unfortunately, neither the U.S. nor the Mexican governments has taken this approach to immigration control seriously, largely because it would take at least 10 to 15 years to produce results. But only when U.S.-Mexican wage differentials are narrowed will the current calculus favoring migration be overturned.

Hammering the Mexican government in the meantime for its failure to control unauthorized emigration is an empty political exercise that excites border vigilantes and anti-Mexican xenophobes. It will never lead to a sound U.S. immigration policy.