Pyongyang’s game

NORTH KOREA’S decision Tuesday to return to six-nation nuclear talks is a big diplomatic victory for Washington, and a bigger one for Beijing. Yet there are good reasons to be skeptical about Pyongyang’s motives.

Kim Jong Il is a master at the art of weakening the resolve of diplomatic coalitions, and his decision to engage in talks once again may be nothing more than an attempt to stave off aggressive enforcement of U.N. Security Council sanctions. China and South Korea have in the past hesitated to embrace meaningful sanctions, but Kim faces a more united coalition in the aftermath of his nuclear test. The North Korean dictator may be hoping that his willingness to restart talks will erode Chinese and South Korean determination to stand firm and enforce the sanctions.

Such behavior is typical of rogue states eager to buy time or to capitalize on frictions within opposing coalitions. Saddam Hussein was adept at this game too, and nowadays Iran and Sudan seem to be mimicking Kim. The object is to feign flexibility and a willingness to negotiate in good faith -- without actually giving anything up -- so that those foreign powers most queasy about violating your sovereignty give up the fight to punish you. That’s exactly what North Korea did last year, when it signed a broad framework calling for an end to its nuclear program in exchange for economic incentives, then refuted the agreement almost before the ink was dry.

China’s support of sanctions in the aftermath of the nuclear test was a welcome departure from its usual nonintervention posture, though its power to influence its neighbor remains unclear. Much has been made, for example, of the fact that China substantially cut exports of heating oil to North Korea in September, widely seen as retaliation for a missile test in July. Yet that same month, China’s exports of gasoline and other fuels rose, and the oil cutoff doesn’t seem to have had any effect on Kim; he went ahead with his first nuclear test Oct. 9.

It is unquestionably better to hold talks, even with a suspect partner, than not to hold them at all. But no one -- particularly the South Koreans, who have so far refused to join the U.S. effort to interdict ships containing potential materials for weapons of mass destruction -- should take the agreement as a reason to avoid tough enforcement of existing sanctions. It’s now abundantly clear that the South’s attempt to woo Kim’s regime with economic incentives and engagement has failed. Strong pressure combined with negotiations constitute the only practical way to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.