Diplomatic Victory at Sea?

A month ago, as President Bush told it, he was looking forward to a little get-acquainted chat with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev; nothing heavy, he took pains to emphasize, just two guys putting their feet up, swapping some stories, taking each other’s measure. In fact, so casual would things be that the talks shouldn’t even be called a summit. So said George Bush at the beginning of November. But by yesterday, as the President prepared to depart for Malta, he was hailing the “historic opportunity” that now lies before him and the Soviet leader.

What a difference a month makes!

Foreseen or not, there’s going to be plenty of substance on the table this weekend, placed there by fast-moving events in Eastern Europe, by compelling budget-driven needs in both countries to make major cuts in military spending and by an evolving sense that both superpowers would benefit if regional conflicts could be damped down. The United States and the Soviet Union now agree that they share a growing number of interests. Not least among these, as the Bush Administration’s increasingly expansive endorsements of perestroika show, is seeing Gorbachev’s efforts to reform Soviet economic and political life succeed.

Here are some areas in which both Presidents should seek agreement during the summit-at-sea:

--In Eastern Europe, where Gorbachev has been both midwife and cheerleader for reform, the two countries ought to make explicit their mutual interest in seeing steady, non-destabilizing change proceed. The Soviet Union, with its now-famous Sinatra Doctrine of letting the Eastern Europeans do things their way, has said that it won’t interfere in the process of change as long as its security isn’t threatened. The United States, as Secretary of State James A. Baker III said this week, has let the Soviets know that “we will not seek unilateral advantage” by trying to replace the Soviets as a dominant political influence. Both positions are realistic and prudent, even honorable.

--On arms reduction, it should be possible to reach agreement on the objectives, if not yet the mechanics of achieving bigger cuts in conventional forces and weapons in Europe and, down the road, of further shrinking strategic weapons arsenals. The United States, as Bush has properly emphasized, will enter into no agreements affecting the military balance in Europe without first consulting and getting the approval of its NATO allies. But a clearer understanding on superpower goals should not be an impossible or untoward achievement at Malta.

--For the past 15 years, because of the Soviet Union’s discriminatory emigration polices, Congress has denied it the Most-Favored-Nation trading status that would let its exports enter at low tariffs. Soviet emigration policy has lately been liberalized, though a formal change still awaits legislative action in Moscow. If Gorbachev promises Bush that he’ll prod his Parliament on that reform, the United States should suspend its denial of MFN status. The symbolic boost to perestroika and to Gorbachev’s own domestic political fortunes could be considerable.

--Working together to calm or at least stop stoking regional conflicts won’t be easy. Both countries have made heavy political investments in behalf of one or another state or movement. Beyond this, the hatreds and ambitions that fuel regional disputes exist independent of outside support. Nonetheless, some progress ought to be possible. There is every incentive to cut back or even eliminate military and political support in a number of areas. This weekend could bring a start.

The President’s earlier assessment that this would be a summit of little substance or consequence was wrong. His latest assessment--that it is a potentially historic opportunity--could prove a lot more closer to the mark. It seems that the irresistible force of change will transform a sea-going get-together into something necessarily far more consequential.