Mideast Peace, Step by Step

Anyone who seriously hopes for a quick return to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations should take a deep breath and lie down until the feeling passes. What’s needed at the moment is something completely different, a whole new kind of approach that puts the Oslo process in the past and focuses instead on cautious but credible unilateral steps.

To their credit, both Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas seemed to understand that at their recent meeting in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt. Their agenda reflected the triumph of the achievable over the desirable, of the probable over the possible. Their unspoken motto: Think small.

I worked on the Arab-Israeli peace process at the State Department for most of the last two decades, and I am gratified by the fact that Oslo’s most important legacy -- the mutual recognition between political Zionism and Palestinian nationalism -- endures to this day. But that’s just about all that remains.

The Oslo process was in many respects a religion for believers, blinding its adherents to its flaws. In retrospect it is clear that Oslo over-idealized and sentimentalized an excruciatingly difficult process and created an expectations gap that could not be closed by negotiations alone. The process elevated negotiation to an almost sacred level of importance. Then, when those negotiations failed between 1993 and 2000 to create a real partnership or a change in the situation on the ground, the parties -- under U.S. auspices -- rushed into last-minute talks for a final deal that they were neither willing nor able to consummate.

The process launched at Sharm el Sheik last week, on the other hand, was a business proposition for pragmatists. Driven by four years of bloody conflict and disappointment, it is nurtured by a deep but healthy skepticism about what is possible and what is not. Indeed, unlike Oslo, the expectations gap now separating Israelis and Palestinians about what each side can do is narrower than ever. Neither side is focused on the endgame; even more encouraging, Sharon and Abbas appear to appreciate each other’s political constraints. This kind of partnership is of inestimable value; it may constrain each side from pushing too far too soon.

For Abbas, the focus is on prisoner releases and the Israeli commitment to stop killing leaders of Hamas and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; this is critical to building his legitimacy with Palestinians and to his efforts to co-opt the armed opposition.

He is also hoping for greater freedom of movement for the Palestinians, an economic recovery in the West Bank and Gaza, and Israeli redeployment from Palestinian cities; these show that his way -- rather than the Hamas way -- can work.

For Sharon, Abbas’ willingness to focus on security and not political negotiation is the sine qua non for any movement.

Both sides appear willing, for the moment, to bend to the other side’s political needs. Sharon, for instance, very much wants an end to violence by the militant groups, but he appears ready to give Abbas the time and political space to reform his security services, fire ineffective security commanders and disarm militias.

Similarly, the Palestinians have not made an immediate settlement freeze, which would be politically difficult for Sharon, a condition for further progress.

Instead of negotiations, both sides are concentrating for the moment on unilateral actions -- cessation of violence, prisoner releases, reform of security services -- that do not depend entirely on the other’s actions. That these unilateral steps are being coordinated through quiet bilateral contacts is even better. The preeminent example of this approach -- Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, slated for July -- will be the real test of whether this coordinated unilateralism can work.

The Bush administration can strengthen this process by helping the Palestinians reform and equip their security services and offering economic assistance to make certain that Abbas -- and not Hamas -- gets credit for improvements in Palestinian life. Moreover, the administration must be ready to call out either side when it doesn’t perform. At some point, most likely late this year, it should consider laying out (without forcing negotiations) the elements of a permanent status agreement. Such a move would send an unmistakable signal that we still believe in the possibility of a comprehensive final deal.

Coordinated unilateralism turns on its head four decades of Arab-Israeli negotiated agreements. It is not perfect and probably not sustainable over the long term. But after four years of nonstop misery and violence -- and in light of the current lack of trust -- it may well be the best approach and a first step in getting Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table.