After Palisades fire hydrants went dry, LAFD faced costly delays in getting more water
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- A newly released LAFD report shows water tanker trucks faced delays and couldn’t get escort vehicles during the Palisades fire.
- LAFD didn’t pre-position resources despite extreme weather warnings, and the Santa Ynez Reservoir was empty when the fire erupted.
When fire hydrants ran dry in the first hours of the Palisades fire, firefighters faced confusion and costly delays in getting vital water trucks into the area to help fight the destructive blaze, new city documents revealed.
It took some time for officials to secure so-called tender trucks and when they finally arrived, the fire was so intense they needed escorts to get to the front lines, according to the Los Angeles Fire Department’s after-action report released this week.
“Engineers were needed to shuttle water from further locations, further delaying suppression efforts,” the report said.
The revelations underscore how scarce water supplies hampered the Palisades fire fight.
As the inferno consumed homes Jan. 7, some hydrants ran dry in high-elevation areas, The Times has reported. The 117-million gallon Santa Ynez Reservior — long seen as a lifeline for the Palisades — was empty and undergoing repairs.
Rick Crawford, a former LAFD battalion chief who retired from the agency in 2024, said if the fire department had spoken with the Department of Water and Power after the wind forecast came in, the agency likely would have known firefighters would face water issues in the Palisades. Then they could have prepared, he said.
“They had ample opportunity to have these discussions and implement their water tender strategy,” Crawford said. “None of this was done.”
The California fires erupted amid extremely dry conditions. UCLA scientists say extreme heat linked to climate change was a factor in the fires’ intensity.
The water pressure from the hydrants fell as the fire burned. Firefighters tried to turn off water to several homes to conserve. Multiple firefighting divisions requested water tenders, both from the city and private sources. But there was a delay in asking for the city Emergency Management Department’s support getting the trucks, the report states.
Instead, the Incident Command Post looked for specialized tanker trucks that can also fight fire, known as tactical water tenders, through the Interagency Resource Ordering Capability system, which in turn puts the call out across Southern California. Crawford said that process takes much longer than relying on local resources.
Crews eventually learned that city water tanker trucks were available, and those were dispatched. But they’re not operated by emergency personnel, so they need firefighting escorts to drive safely into the fire zone. That wasn’t immediately available, according to the report.
An earler Times investigation found that LAFD officials did not deploy any engines to the Palisades before the flames erupted, despite warnings that extreme weather was coming. The fire officials also did not require firefighters to stay for an additional shift.
The report suggests that LAFD consider purchasing more tactical water tenders and train personnel from other city departments to operate tankers so they can more quickly and safely get into a fire area.
Crawford argued that if officials had prepared appropriately before fire broke out and the winds became extreme, firefighters could have learned earlier about the empty Santa Ynez Reservoir and readied resources ahead of time.
“They could strategically place water tenders nearby, and they wouldn’t have the situation that created them running out of water, which exacerbated the response to the fire,” he said.
Crawford said the agency also could have moved “pumpkin” storage tanks into places where the natural supply might be low.
Firefighters in Pacific Palisades and Altadena have repeatedly been hampered by low water pressure and dry hydrants, revealing limitations in local water systems designed to supply neighborhoods.
LAFD has two water tanker trucks that are usually kept at fire stations in Sun Valley and Sherman Oaks.
It is not clear when these were deployed to the Palisades. LAFD did not immediately respond to an email seeking comment on Friday.
The LAFD report also highlights some crews’ use of people’s backyard pools, calling it “highly effective” in protecting homes. Personnel should be trained on how to get water from alternative sources like this, particularly when hydrants aren’t working, the report states.
“Multiple pools remained filled following the containment of the Palisades fire,” the report states. “Although this tactic may not have saved every residence, it would have significantly improved the situation within the affected area.”
Federal prosecutors this week charged Jonathan Rinderknecht, 29, with intentionally starting a fire in the Palisades on Jan. 1. Embers from that blaze, called the Lachman fire, continued to smolder for days underground before being released amid hurricane-force winds, becoming the Palisades fire.
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It killed 12 people and destroyed 6,800 structures, revealing the limitations of Southern California’s urban water systems, which are designed to fight house fires, not wildfires that rage through entire neighborhoods.
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power said in a July report that the Palisades fire’s swift spread “led to extraordinary demands” on a part of the system called the Westgate Trunk Line, as firefighters used water and residents left sprinklers and hoses running. In addition, as homes burned, damaged pipes gushed water, contributing to the rapid loss of pressure.
For a while, water continued to flow down from three storage tanks, but they soon ran out. DWP now faces lawsuits filed by hundreds of homeowners, who argue the utility failed to prepare for and respond to the fire.
DWP has said its crews and water system were prepared for emergency situations, but that “no urban water system is designed to combat a massive, wind-driven wildfire of the speed and scale” of the Palisades fire. In a written statement earlier this year, DWP said the water system in the Pacific Palisades “met and continues to meet all fire codes for urban development and housing and was built to exceed those standards.”
The department said it’s necessary and normal to take reservoirs offline for repairs, and it’s also crucial for maintaining safe drinking water standards.
Researchers at UCLA’s Luskin Center for Innovation, working with DWP, held a workshop in June with more than 100 engineers, public officials and scientists to discuss ways of improving water and power infrastructure. In a report, the researchers recommended burying power lines underground so they can’t spark fires, building backup reservoirs or even laying new lines to draw water from the ocean.
The L.A. Department of Water and Power says the Santa Ynez Reservoir, which was empty at the time of the Palisades fire, is now back online after lengthy repairs to its floating cover.
The UCLA researchers also discussed ways of improving coordination between water utilities and fire departments, such as “providing firefighters with real-time information on pressure levels in parts of the distribution system, down to the level of specific hydrants.”
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