-
Click here to listen to this article - Share via
See more from the L.A. Times in Google Search. Set us as preferred
As the Trump administration weighs a diplomatic settlement with Iran, it would do well to pay close attention to the Houthis. Monday was a case in point: Responding to escalation between Israel and Hizbollah in Lebanon and the resumed exchange of fire between Israel and Iran, the Houthis fired missiles at Israel and threatened to target Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea.
Until now, Yemen’s Houthis have remained largely on the war’s sidelines, firing only a few symbolic shots at Israel. The Houthis have thus far held in reserve their most potent weapon: the ability to swiftly disrupt commercial shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a maritime chokepoint between Yemen and the Horn of Africa that carries upward of 10% of global shipping trade.
Washington should not mistake restraint for passivity. If fighting between the United States, Israel and Iran resumes in force, the Houthis could quickly enter the fray to help their Iranian partners — which would dramatically worsen the economic fallout from the war and could further pressure President Trump to sue for peace. Their threat to target Israeli-affiliated ships is a significant step in this direction.
The Houthis will also closely study any potential deal Tehran extracts from its de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz, and may well seek to replicate it in the Bab al-Mandeb.
In some respects, Houthi restraint is puzzling, echoing Sherlock Holmes’s interest in the dog that didn’t bark. After all, the Houthis are Iran’s most powerful regional partner still standing after Israel’s devastating blows against Hizbollah and Hamas. As self-described members of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” the Houthis have a vested interest in Iran’s and Hizbollah’s survival — and a proven track record of coordinating with Iran and its proxies to oppose the U.S. and Israel.
During the Gaza war, the Houthis launched more than 250 attacks on ships moving through the Red Sea, claiming to act in defense of the Palestinians. They also tried, with limited success, to impose administrative control and, reportedly, to extract fees from transiting ships. Despite U.S. and Israeli military strikes in 2024 and 2025, Houthi leadership remains intact, and the group could resume attacks on shipping at any time.
Still, the Houthis have had four strong reasons to hold their fire since the U.S. and Israel began bombing Iran in late February.
First, the Houthis do not want to invite renewed U.S. military action. During last year’s Operation Rough Rider, Washington spent 52 days striking Houthi targets and degrading the group’s military capabilities. The campaign ended with an Omani-brokered truce that still holds. Israel’s strikes were even more damaging, killing key Houthi commanders and pushing the group’s leadership underground. For now, the Houthis appear focused on rearming and rebuilding.
Second and more important are Yemen’s domestic political realities. The Houthis remain intent on securing a deal with Saudi Arabia to end the Yemeni civil war on terms favorable to them politically and financially. Before the Houthis’ campaign against Red Sea shipping began in 2023, a Saudi-backed deal appeared within reach. Riyadh continues to hold out that possibility and is likely playing a key role in discouraging the Houthis from jeopardizing such a deal by joining the war on Iran’s side.
Third, the Houthis are mindful of public opinion. Mobilizing Yemenis in support of Palestine amid the Gaza war is far easier than rallying them to defend Iran or Hizbollah.
Finally, the Houthis may also have concluded, either independently or in coordination with Tehran, that closing the Bab al-Mandeb was simply unnecessary. The group’s leaders may believe that the Iranian regime has never been close to collapse and that the pressure on Trump generated by Iran’s threats to the Strait of Hormuz has been enough. As such, they are saving their strongest card for a future U.S.-Iran confrontation.
What could spur the Houthis to play their ace? Before the U.S.-Iran ceasefire in April, Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree identified three somewhat vague triggers for military action: other actors joining the fight (probably referring to the Gulf states); U.S. or Israeli operations in the Red Sea; and further escalation against Iran and the axis.
As fighting in Lebanon and between Israel and Iran resumes, those thresholds remain relevant. Last week, the group’s leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, said they were ready for escalation and remained in “full coordination” with their regional allies. Then came their threat to attack Israeli-linked ships.
Renewed Houthi attacks on shipping would have swift economic consequences. Today, approximately 13% of world trade and 5% of seaborne oil trade pass through the Bab al-Mandeb. Closing this critical chokepoint amid the Hormuz crisis would compound pressure on an already fragile global economy and an already stressed U.S. administration.
Even the threat of resumed attacks will likely have a chilling effect on Red Sea traffic. After all, during the Gaza war the Houthis initially claimed to target only Israeli-linked ships, but they shot at vessels with little to no connection to Israel.
Regional states would bear the greatest costs of a renewed Houthi Red Sea campaign, including Egypt through loss of its Suez revenue and Saudi Arabia by cutting its vital lifeline of oil exports through the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, which exports approximately 5 million barrels of oil per day.
Unsurprisingly, Gulf states — particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar — are leading efforts to de-escalate the conflict. A wider war that draws in the Houthis would increase economic costs, deepen tensions with Washington and strengthen incentives for Gulf states to seek their own accommodation with Tehran.
None of this serves Washington’s interests. Facing uncertain military options, greater economic disruption and growing strains with his key regional partners, Trump is right to pursue a negotiated settlement. But any agreement must preserve the bedrock principle of freedom of navigation and avoid rewarding maritime coercion. If Iran wins direct financial concessions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz or imposes fees or tolls on it, groups like the Houthis will draw the obvious lesson: threatening global trade pays.
April Longley Alley is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute and a former senior political advisor to the U.N. special envoy to Yemen.
Insights
L.A. Times Insights delivers AI-generated analysis on Voices content to offer all points of view. Insights does not appear on any news articles.
Viewpoint
Perspectives
The following AI-generated content is powered by Perplexity. The Los Angeles Times editorial staff does not create or edit the content.
Ideas expressed in the piece
The piece argues that the United States cannot treat a prospective diplomatic settlement with Iran in isolation from Yemen, because the Houthis possess a powerful yet underused lever over global trade: their ability to disrupt shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a chokepoint that carries a significant share of the world’s seaborne oil and commercial traffic.[2]
It contends that recent Houthi missile launches toward Israel and threats against Israeli-linked vessels in the Red Sea mark a potentially dangerous shift: the group is edging closer to fully entering the Iran war on Tehran’s side, which could dramatically magnify the conflict’s economic fallout by combining disruptions at both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb.[2]
The article emphasizes that the Houthis’ current restraint is deliberate, not passive, and identifies four main reasons: a desire to avoid renewed U.S. and Israeli strikes after Operation Rough Rider and earlier Israeli attacks; an overriding priority to secure a favorable Saudi-backed settlement to Yemen’s civil war; sensitivity to Yemeni public opinion, which is easier to mobilize for Palestine than for Iran or Hezbollah; and a strategic judgment that closing Bab al-Mandeb has not yet been necessary because Iran’s pressure at Hormuz has been sufficient.[2]
It further notes that Houthi leaders have already articulated triggers that could push them to escalate — such as Gulf states entering the fight, U.S. or Israeli operations in the Red Sea, or deeper attacks on Iran and its allies — and argues that renewed fighting between Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah now brings those thresholds closer to being crossed.
The column warns that a renewed Red Sea campaign would have fast, global economic effects: even the threat of attacks chills shipping, previous Houthi operations in 2023–25 forced major detours around Africa, and a closure of Bab al-Mandeb on top of Hormuz would sharply raise energy prices and transit costs, squeezing an already fragile world economy.[1][2]
It stresses that regional states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar would incur especially heavy losses from a Bab al-Mandeb crisis — from reduced Suez Canal income to disrupted oil flows — and therefore have strong incentives to de-escalate and to press Washington toward a negotiated outcome rather than prolonged military confrontation.
The piece maintains that a wider war that pulls the Houthis fully into the fight would heighten Gulf states’ economic and security anxieties, increase strains in their relations with Washington, and ultimately push them to cut their own deals with Tehran, weakening U.S. leverage and regional influence.[2]
It concludes that the Trump administration is right to pursue a negotiated settlement with Iran but insists that any deal must uphold freedom of navigation and avoid granting Iran direct financial concessions, tolls, or other rewards for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, because such visible gains from maritime coercion would almost certainly encourage the Houthis to replicate the model in Bab al-Mandeb.[2]
Different views on the topic
Some analysts emphasize that while the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is indeed a critical chokepoint, the Houthis have so far refrained from fully joining Iran’s regional economic warfare, suggesting that their escalation calculus is more restrained and cautious than the article implies.[2][5] These assessments argue that the group is balancing its desire to support Iran with concerns about overextending itself and provoking a broader regional response.
In contrast to the article’s focus on avoiding “rewards” for Iran through diplomacy, a number of experts argue that the most effective way to blunt the Houthi maritime threat is not primarily through the Iran track but through a targeted interdiction and deterrence campaign aimed directly at Houthi capabilities and supply lines. A Middle East Institute analysis, for example, calls for a sustained maritime interdiction regime to block Iranian weapons flows, training, and targeting support to the Houthis, and to deny them the means to endanger international shipping.[3]
Some U.S. security commentators contend that airstrikes and kinetic measures should remain central, not just auxiliary, tools. They argue that previous U.S. campaigns significantly degraded Houthi capabilities and that a willingness to strike decisively — combined with tighter interdiction — is necessary to restore deterrence at sea, even if this risks short-term escalation.[3][4] This view places more weight on military pressure than on the article’s preferred emphasis on negotiated settlement with Iran.
Other analysts underline that the Houthis are driven first and foremost by domestic political and ideological agendas and are better described as Iran’s “informal partner” than a proxy that will mechanically follow Tehran’s lead.[2] From this perspective, the risk that Tehran’s gains at Hormuz would automatically translate into copycat coercion at Bab al-Mandeb is seen as less direct; the argument is that local Yemeni dynamics, internal legitimacy, and the balance of power with Saudi Arabia may constrain Houthi behavior even if Iran benefits from leveraging maritime chokepoints.[2]
Some regional and U.S. experts argue that the most sustainable way to reduce Houthi leverage over Bab al-Mandeb is to prioritize a comprehensive political settlement to Yemen’s civil war, including power-sharing and economic arrangements that bring the movement into a recognized state framework.[2] From this vantage point, the article’s focus on linking Iran diplomacy to navigation rights is seen as too narrow; the counterargument maintains that unless Yemen’s internal conflict is resolved, the Houthis will retain both the motive and opportunity to weaponize Red Sea shipping regardless of what is agreed with Tehran.
A further strand of analysis holds that intensified pressure on Iran — rather than concessions — could itself weaken the Houthi threat by degrading Tehran’s ability to supply advanced missiles, drones, and intelligence to Yemen.[2] This view suggests that a harder line against Iran may ultimately be a more effective way to constrain Houthi maritime coercion than the negotiated, incentive-avoiding settlement the article advocates.
More From the Los Angeles Times
Podcasts
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recently approved California’s request to extend housing assistance to survivors of the Eaton and Palisades fires. But more than 18 months after those January 2025 fires, survivors are still waiting on an additional $16 billion in federal disaster relief from the federal government, which was revised down earlier this year from nearly $34 billion.
The Hillside Strangler murders terrorized Los Angeles in the late 1970s. The killers were a pair of sadistic cousins. One confessed. The other was set to stand trial—until L.A. prosecutors flinched.
Modern LA earned its first smoggy nickname 450 years ago, as the “bay of smokes.” At the La Brea tar pits, we take a short walk through a long history with curator Regan Dunn, who explains how and why the first Angelenos would have set fires that filled the broad bowl of LA and foretold the curse of smog.
