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Americans should be concerned about the fine print on Trump’s new oil deal

Fishermen pass an oil tanker in the Gulf of Venezuela off the shore of Punta Cardon.
Fishermen pass an oil tanker in the Gulf of Venezuela off the shore of Punta Cardon.
(Matias Delacroix / Associated Press)
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So, it was a war for oil after all.

On social media Friday, President Trump announced that the United States and Venezuela have struck an agreement for “THE BIGGEST OIL DEAL IN WORLD HISTORY.”

The whole thing is appalling, starting with the all-caps.

I have no love for the Venezuelan regime, run by, in Trump’s words, “the Highly Respected Interim President” Delcy Rodriguez. But this is a “deal” that Rodriguez couldn’t refuse. We invaded her country, abducted her criminal-dictator boss, Nicolás Maduro, and made her our satrap.

According to the Wall Street Journal, Venezuela and the U.S. will work through two intermediaries to get the oil flowing. The Venezuelan partner is Alejandro Betancourt, head of North American Blue Energy Partners. He’s been investigated, though not charged, for money laundering in Spain and Switzerland. He’s also one of the most famous “Bolichicos,” a nickname for the young businessmen who’ve gotten rich from their ties to the socialist, murderous, criminal dictatorship (it’s a portmanteau of “Bolivarian” and “Bourgeois”).

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And who is the American partner? Well, the Pentagon, of course. Trump couldn’t get American oil companies to invest billions in Venezuela’s decrepit oil industry. (At a White House meeting in January, Darren Woods, the chief executive of Exxon Mobil infuriated the president by describing Venezuela as “un-investable.”) So, the commander in chief tapped the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital to take a 35% stake in Betancourt’s firm, securing the right to buy 20% of all production “at cost.” Created in 2022, the OSC was intended to use loans and loan guarantees to help develop vital industries. Now, it’s the primary backer of the “history’s biggest oil deal.”

We’ll see how legal this is. You can be sure someone will be going to court over it. After all, the U.S. government will be working with a criminal regime, under implausible statutory authority, to buy oil at below-market rates while undermining our own oil producers.

I won’t shed many tears for the oil companies, even if the administration pulls this off. Then again, I don’t think they will, at least not any time soon. Trump boasts that this will help lower gas prices. Maybe. Someday. But even this scheme’s biggest boosters acknowledge that if it all goes swell, it will still take years to get the relevant oil fields producing, and years to retrofit American refineries to take Venezuela’s subpar oil. So, if Trump thinks prices at the pump are coming down before the midterms, or even during his presidency, he should think again.

But my primary objections to this imperial smash-and-grab are constitutional and moral. The constitutional problem is pretty straightforward. Trump lied to Congress and to the public about this scheme from the get-go. He claimed Operation Absolute Resolve was a mission by law enforcement to capture Nicolás Maduro. The same indictment for Maduro and his wife included members of the regime. We left them in place, because law enforcement was a pretext.

Roughly 11 hours after apprehending Maduro, Trump boasted that the U.S. was going to “run the country” by working with the criminal regime. Did Congress authorize that? Congress definitely didn’t authorize the Pentagon to get into the oil business.

Trump has a long, long history of claiming that America should “take the oil” from countries we go to war with. And months before this deal, he bragged that oil revenue from Venezuela has “paid for the attack many times over…. I always used to say, ‘To the victor belong the spoils.’”

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Ironically, this phrase comes from a defense of the corrupt spoils system in U.S. politics, not some time-(dis)honored rule of war.

The Constitution does not empower the president to unilaterally launch wars, even brief ones, for the purpose of seizing or extorting a nation’s wealth. It’s worth noting that although the fighting in Venezuela was brief, the Iran war is dragging on. And that was his plan for Iran too.

“If I had my choice, what would I like to do? Take the oil. Because it’s there for the taking,” Trump told reporters in April. He also posted on social media: “With a little more time, we can easily OPEN THE HORMUZ STRAIT, TAKE THE OIL, & MAKE A FORTUNE.”

Then there’s the whole democracy thing. The administration vowed to restore Venezuelan democracy, eventually. We were supposed to be liberators bringing Venezuela freedom, according to the White House. Now, we’ve signed a “century-long” agreement with a corrupt, unelected, murderous regime. Do you think Trump is going to be in any kind of hurry to bring democracy to Venezuela now?

X: @JonahDispatch

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Ideas expressed in the piece

  • First, the column portrays the agreement as the culmination of a long-professed desire by Trump to “take the oil,” arguing that Operation Absolute Resolve was less about law enforcement or liberation and more about securing Venezuelan crude as spoils of war.
  • Moreover, the piece contends that the arrangement effectively turns Delcy Rodríguez into a U.S.-backed satrap: Washington removes Nicolás Maduro, leaves much of the regime intact, then relies on that unelected leadership to sign a “century-long” oil deal that entrenches a corrupt, murderous government rather than restoring democracy.
  • In addition, the article argues that the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital venturing into equity-style stakes in a private oil enterprise marks an alarming expansion of military power into commercial energy markets, blurring the line between national security and profit-seeking and raising questions about whether the OSC is being used far beyond its original mandate of loans and guarantees.
  • The column further warns that by partnering with Alejandro Betancourt, a businessman closely linked to Venezuela’s previous authoritarian system and reportedly investigated for money laundering, the United States is entrenching oligarchic beneficiaries of the old order instead of empowering genuine democratic or civil-society actors.
  • At the constitutional level, the piece maintains that Trump misled Congress and the public by selling the operation as a narrow mission to capture Maduro while secretly planning to “run the country” and leverage its oil, thereby sidestepping Congress’ war powers and any explicit authorization to seize or exploit a foreign nation’s resources.
  • The article also questions the legality of using dubious statutory authority to have the Pentagon take a large stake in a private oil venture and secure the right to buy a fixed share of production at below-market prices, suggesting courts are likely to scrutinize whether such a move exceeds the executive branch’s powers and distorts energy markets.
  • Economically, the column is skeptical that the deal will deliver lower gasoline prices on any politically meaningful timeline, noting that rehabilitating Venezuela’s decrepit oil fields and retrofitting U.S. refineries for its heavy crude will take years, making Trump’s promises of quick relief at the pump implausible.
  • Finally, the piece warns that by locking in a “century-long” arrangement with an unelected regime and tying U.S. policy to long-term oil revenue, Washington is giving itself a powerful incentive to delay or sideline Venezuelan democratization, undermining the stated promise that U.S. intervention would bring freedom rather than a new form of imperial control.

Different views on the topic

  • Supporters of the agreement emphasize that it would give the United States majority control over roughly 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan reserves through a joint venture, dramatically expanding access to oil within the Western Hemisphere and, in Trump’s telling, more than doubling U.S. oil reserves while strengthening energy security.[2][3]
  • In parallel, administration officials and allies argue that channeling production through a Pentagon-linked structure with at-cost purchase rights will provide a stable stream of discounted crude to refill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and supply the U.S. military, insulating national defense from future price shocks or embargoes.[2][3]
  • Proponents in Washington have also framed the deal as a win for Venezuelan reconstruction, pointing to projections of around $100 billion in private investment and more than $200 billion in tax revenue for Caracas over time, which interim authorities say could fund jobs, infrastructure and economic recovery after years of collapse.[2][3]
  • Furthermore, defenders of the policy in the administration contend that the arrangement comes at “no cost to the American taxpayer,” because the U.S. stake is structured through warrants or similar instruments rather than large upfront cash outlays, while still securing preferential access to a significant share of output.[1][2][4]
  • Energy-focused commentary describing Operation Absolute Resolve notes that removing Maduro and normalizing relations with an interim government under U.S. oversight could end Venezuela’s status as a pariah producer and unlock the world’s largest proven oil reserves for global markets, a shift some analysts expect to put downward pressure on long-term crude prices.[5][6]
  • At the same time, administration figures such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio have argued that majority U.S. control, combined with heavy oversight of the joint venture, will prevent rival powers from dominating Venezuelan energy, anchoring the country firmly in the U.S. orbit and reinforcing a modern Monroe Doctrine in the hemisphere.[3][5]
  • Some legal and policy defenders suggest that using the Office of Strategic Capital or similar channels to shepherd defense-oriented investments in critical supply chains fits within a broader trend of industrial policy, and that existing authorities for loans, guarantees and transaction structuring can be interpreted to cover creative arrangements that bolster national security even when they blur traditional lines between public and private roles.[1][4]
  • Finally, officials and sympathetic commentators maintain that, despite criticism of its democratic credentials, the Rodriguez-led interim government represents a necessary transitional authority after a sudden regime change, and that the promised influx of oil revenue and international investment will create conditions that ultimately make a negotiated, stable democratic settlement more feasible rather than less.[2][3][6]

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