Forget Vietnam -- History Deflates Guerrilla Mystique

The defeat of the Taliban should have shattered for all time the mystique of the guerrilla. But apparently it did not. The whole world is in an uproar over the vicious hit-and-run tactics employed by Saddam Hussein’s thugs to resist coalition forces. Instead of being taken as a sign of weakness, the scattershot attacks of guerrilla fighters have been inexplicably seen as evidence of the regime’s strength. Already, agitated commentators are invoking comparisons with Vietnam and warning that even after the formal end of hostilities, allied occupiers will never be safe.

Such a nightmare scenario cannot be dismissed out of hand -- a good general must prepare for every contingency -- but if the historical record is anything to judge by, the paramilitary troops are unlikely to pose much of a long-term threat. The United States, along with most Western nations, has a long record of defeating guerrillas all over the world. And the conditions that were present the only time the U.S. suffered a serious defeat -- in Vietnam -- are missing in Iraq today.

The primary job of the U.S. Army until 1890 was fighting guerrillas -- American Indians, to be exact, the finest irregular warriors in the world. Defeating them was a slow and arduous process, with some famous setbacks like the Battle of Little Bighorn. But in the end, dogged generals like Nelson Miles and George Crook managed to capture the last holdouts, including the Apache leader Geronimo and the great Sioux chief Sitting Bull.

Much of the historiography of the Indian wars focuses on the Army’s excesses, such as the massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. But the Army’s ultimate victory was predicated not on brutality but on the essentials of good counterinsurgency strategy: cutting off the guerrillas from their population base by herding tribes onto reservations; utilizing friendly Indians for scouting and intelligence; and relentlessly pursuing hostile braves.

Similar strategies were used, with similar success, by the Army in its campaign to stamp out resistance to U.S. rule in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. That war was long and ugly. It lasted from 1899 to 1902, with sporadic resistance thereafter, and it cost the lives of 4,200 U.S. soldiers. But its success was sealed through a daring commando raid undertaken by Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston. He dressed a unit of native allies in insurrecto uniforms and pretended to be their prisoner in order to capture the rebel chief, Emilio Aguinaldo, in his mountain lair.

Important as this coup was, it was not enough to assure the long-term acceptance of a U.S. presence in the Philippines. To win the hearts and minds of Filipinos, U.S. troops vaccinated children, set up schools and repaired roads. Later, the U.S. granted the Philippines growing autonomy well ahead of other colonies in Asia. Nationalist leader Manuel Quezon was driven to complain: “Damn the Americans! Why don’t they tyrannize us more?”

America went on to wage many more counterinsurgency campaigns in the years after 1898, mainly in the Caribbean, where U.S. troops occupied Panama, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and other places for varying lengths of time.

The bulk of the fighting was done by local enlisted men led by U.S. officers in constabulary units like the Haitian Gendarmerie or the Nicaraguan National Guard. This is an important point to keep in mind: Although U.S. forces possess superior training and firepower, they lack the local knowledge essential to root out wily opponents. This gap can be bridged only by local allies, whether serving informally alongside U.S. forces (as with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan or the Kurds in northern Iraq) or in a more formal military structure (as with free Iraqis who are working for U.S. Army civil affairs units).

Though U.S. troops openly fought guerrillas before World War II, after 1945 the emphasis switched to covert operations, with Washington supplying arms and expertise to friendly governments battling communist insurgencies. This approach failed spectacularly in China, which was taken over by the communists in 1949, but it worked elsewhere. A small sample of the victories: Between 1945 and 1949, Greece defeated the communist Democratic Army with U.S. help provided under the Truman Doctrine. Between 1946 and 1954, the Philippine government, advised by the “Quiet American,” Edward Lansdale, put down the Hukbalahap rebellion. And between 1980 and 1992, El Salvador, with U.S. aid provided under the Reagan Doctrine, defeated the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.

In all these instances, the U.S. strategy called for carrots and sticks -- aggressive military operations against the rebels combined with liberalizing reforms to win over the uncommitted populace. And in all these cases, the U.S. and its allies won.

The glaring exception is Vietnam. America’s defeat there stemmed from many factors, including a ham-handed military campaign that ignored successful counterinsurgency techniques of the past. But the ultimate problem was that the communist forces operating in South Vietnam had a “deep rear” in North Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. The U.S. was loath to take decisive military action against any of these states for fear of widening the war. As a result, the insurgents always had a safe base of operations across the border and steady supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Even so, the Viet Cong did not win the war. They merely softened up the enemy for the conventional invasion that North Vietnam mounted in 1975.

The question today is: Does Iraq more closely resemble Vietnam or the numerous places where U.S. counterinsurgency strategies prevailed? The answer is the latter. In the first place, Vietnam’s topography, with jungles, mountains and swamps, is much more favorable to guerrilla operations than the deserts and towns of Iraq. Tarik Aziz, Iraq’s deputy prime minister, has suggested that urban warfare was the answer: “Let our cities be our swamps and our buildings be our jungles.” The Viet Cong tried that tactic. They were able to stage periodic terrorist attacks in urban areas, but their attempts to take over Saigon, Hue and other cities were repulsed during the 1968 Tet Offensive. It is doubtful that, once the initial battles are concluded, the Baathists will have any better luck organizing a large-scale guerrilla campaign in cities held by coalition forces -- especially if they lack outside bases and support.

And, unlike in Vietnam, it is doubtful that any neighboring country will want to give long-term support to a Baathist guerrilla campaign against coalition forces. Although Syria and Iran, which share long borders with Iraq, are not friendly to the U.S., they do not have particularly warm feelings for Hussein either. In any case, neither state enjoys superpower patronage, so they would be at the mercy of U.S. forces if they fomented a wave of terrorist attacks against the occupation authorities.

Such a campaign has been going strong recently because Hussein’s ruthless security apparatus has continued to control most urban areas. But there is little doubt that the Baathist regime will be overthrown in the end. Hussein’s appeal in the Arab world, which depends on successfully defying the “crusaders,” will be shattered. Already, many Iraqis, in liberated towns like Najaf, are turning against the regime. Once the war is over, the democratic reforms promised by Washington should win over the bulk of the Iraqi population -- or at least prevent a repeat of Chechnya, where Russia’s brutal counterinsurgency tactics created lasting enmity.

If civilians are the sea in which guerrillas must swim, as Mao famously said, then the Baathists are likely to find Iraq an arid place before long.