Shiites and Sunnis -- centuries of strife

THE BOMBING of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest sites for Shiites, has raised the threat of civil war in Iraq.

But sectarian strife is nothing new in Islamic history, and battles between Shiites and Sunnis have erupted periodically since Hussein challenged the Umayyad claim to the caliphate and raised the banner of revolt in AD 680. In the late 13th century, for instance, the Sunni Mamluks of Egypt were as anxious about Shiite expansion as that of the Crusaders, who were still in the coastal and northern parts of Syria. They sent expeditions to check the spread of Shiism in the mountain region of Kisrawan, which overlooks the coastal area north of Beirut. The Mamluk expeditions, sanctioned by the respected Sunni jurist Ibn Taymiya, forced Shiites in Kisrawan to conceal their identity during the 14th century.

In modern times, sectarian tensions have again been exacerbated by foreign interventions as well as by economic downturns and political upheavals in Muslim lands. In the Arab world, the advent of secular ideologies -- nationalism and communism -- during the first half of the 20th century muted tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. But in the last four decades, tensions have resurfaced and taken on overt religious overtones amid Islam’s rise as the dominant sociopolitical force in the Middle East.

Following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, religion became more visible in Iraq’s public life. In response, the secularist Baath Party encouraged Sunni Islamist groups, including Salafis with Wahhabi inclinations, to organize as a counter to Shiite Islamists. By the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003, sectarianism had come to dominate political relations between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, leading some Iraqis to compare it to a disease that impeded the development of pluralism and just government.

As in Iraq, where a Sunni minority held sway over a Shiite majority for 82 years, in Bahrain, the Sunni Khalifa ruling family has dominated the Shiite majority since its conquest of the islands in 1783. The tension between the ruling family and the Shiites has historical roots in their class and cultural differences. With the rise of Shiite clerics as community leaders during the 1990s, and the increasing power of the Sunni Muslim Brothers in the Islah Society, these differences have assumed a clear religious dimension.

More recently, the ruling family’s efforts to block the development of an elected parliament that might give Shiites some influence in Bahrain’s affairs have intensified political and sectarian tensions. In protest, leading Shiite Islamist groups boycotted the 2002 elections, an act that resulted in Sunni Islamists winning two-thirds of the seats in the elected house.

In Saudi Arabia, the religious-ideological divide has played a decisive role in shaping relations between the Saud ruling family, backed by the state’s clerical establishment, and the Shiite minority concentrated mainly in the Hasa region, site of the country’s oil. The rulers’ adoption of Wahhabi-Hanbali Islam as the state’s religious ideology has meant an inferior status for Shiites, whom the Wahhabis view as infidels. Shiites regard themselves as second- and even third-class citizens within the kingdom. The religious divide has prevented the development of a state based on a partnership among Saudi Arabia’s diverse communities and blocked Shiites from joining forces with other groups to push for citizenship and minority rights.

An outburst of sectarian strife in Iraq is especially dangerous because it could spread to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, feed tension between Shiite Iran and the Sunni-dominated oil monarchies and destabilize the Persian Gulf region. Iraqis and their neighbors have good reason to fear a regional conflict, which should increase their incentive to push for political compromise in Iraq.

In the absence of a strong political leader who can unite Iraqis, Shiite and Sunni clerics have assumed the role of community leaders. To reduce the prospect of civil war, they need to project authority and work to mitigate religious radicalism. One clerical leader who has exemplified this approach is Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who has been a force for moderation among his Shiite followers.

Clerical figures in Saudi Arabia and the larger Arab world, as well as in Iran, bear similar responsibility. Sunni and Shiite clerics should denounce sectarian strife in much the same way they condemned the publication of cartoon images of the prophet Muhammad. They should urge their followers to stop funding Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias and call for a peaceful resolution in Iraq to avoid a regional conflict.

Until the bombing of the Golden Mosque, the rulers of Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-dominated monarchies in the Persian Gulf seldom condemned targeted killings of Shiites. Nor did they push Iraqi Sunnis to compromise out of a fear that a Shiite-led Iraq would embolden their own Shiite populations. This view may change, however, in light of the danger of civil war in Iraq.

Iraq’s neighbors need not fear the rise of the Shiites as the politically dominant group in post-Baath Iraq. In contrast to the growing militancy among Sunni groups, Shiites in the Arab world have been moving away from violence since the 1990s. They have sought to carve out a political space for themselves and reach accommodation with the West and other members of their societies. The overall restraint of Iraqi Shiites until the bombing of their shrine, an act attributed to Sunni jihadists, testifies to this.

The rise of the Shiites as a force that could potentially spur reform in the Middle East does not pose a threat to the survival of Sunni rulers. To the contrary, it would encourage rulers, such as Saudi Arabia’s Saud family, to introduce serious reforms and grant minority rights to Shiites. This in turn would bolster their legitimacy and reduce the prospects of sectarian strife at home.