N. Korea Talks May Be a Last Chance

When the United States, North Korea and four other nations return to the negotiating table Tuesday to resume long-stalled talks on ending the Pyongyang government’s nuclear weapons program, it might well be their last chance for a breakthrough.

Three previous rounds of discussions in Beijing dating back to 2003 were heavy on posturing and light on engagement. The last, in June 2004, ended without progress, and it has taken more than a year of intense diplomacy to lure North Korea back to negotiations.

In the meantime, the reclusive communist country has declared unequivocally that it possesses nuclear weapons, deepening international concern about its arsenal. Some officials in Washington began talking about taking the issue to the United Nations Security Council or finding other coercive means to deal with the matter.

So this time, many analysts say, both Pyongyang and Washington sense that much more is at stake. In the run-up to the talks, both have been signaling a willingness to be more flexible.

Success, experts believe, will hinge on two main factors: whether the envoys at the talks can really negotiate, and whether the parties can agree on the order of disarmament steps and rewards for North Korea.

“The question is sequencing,” said Bonnie Glaser, senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “What has to be done first? We have to see the political will on both sides.”

In the past, Washington has rejected the idea of benefits for North Korea until it dismantles its nuclear program. Pyongyang -- which wants security guarantees, energy assistance and other aid -- has demanded incremental rewards as it takes steps to disarm.

In recent weeks, North Korea has said that denuclearizing the Korean peninsula was the dying wish of the nation’s founder, Kim Il Sung. Some analysts see that as a sign that Pyongyang is prepared to compromise.

In another step that several experts saw as positive, North Korea said Friday that one way to end the standoff would be for the U.S. to normalize relations with it and sign a peace treaty to replace the cease-fire that ended the Korean War five decades ago.

“This was clearly North Korea’s effort to shape the next round of talks,” Glaser said, “not torpedo it.”

Paik Hak Soon, a North Korea expert at the Sejong Institute in South Korea, agreed.

“By announcing the importance of the peace treaty, North Korea has already begun the agenda-setting process for the fourth round of the six-party talks,” he said. “North Korea is worried that once the U.S. achieves denuclearization, it may not be interested in the peace treaty or the normalization process. They want to remind the United States the discussion of the peace treaty issue is an integral part of the denuclearization process.”

Though normalizing relations with North Korea is not out of the question for the U.S., some analysts believe it can’t be a starting point for negotiations because Washington isn’t convinced that Pyongyang has decided to give up nuclear arms.

“The fundamental question is whether North Korea’s decision to return to the table is a strategic decision, that they are prepared to abandon their nuclear program. Or if it’s a tactical choice, to put off growing pressure and moves to the U.N. Security Council and seek as many inducements as possible,” said L. Gordon Flake, executive director of the Mansfield Foundation in Washington.

“This is most likely a tactical move that will not bear result,” he said. “But the door is left open. North Korea may be convinced to pursue the strategic move.”

Others, however, believe Pyongyang is committed to dismantlement and that it’s up to the U.S. to do more.

The North Koreans “have made a strategic decision,” said Selig S. Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy in Washington. “If the U.S. normalizes relations, they’ll give up their nuclear weapons. The problem is we haven’t made a strategic decision. The hard-liners in Washington believe North Korea is not willing to give up its nuclear weapons and we ultimately have to force them to.”

Regardless, Bush administration officials have curbed their anti-Pyongyang rhetoric recently and repeated pledges that they have no intention of attacking North Korea.

Besides discerning a more cordial tone, observers of the talks say some procedural changes being considered for this round could boost chances of a breakthrough.

Whereas prior sessions have devoted long hours to canned speeches and little time to back-and-forth discussions, the prepared remarks may be curtailed this time. And instead of ending the talks after a set number of days, usually three, some participants in this round have called for an open-ended time frame.

One key to luring North Korea back to the negotiations -- which also include China, Russia, Japan and South Korea -- was Seoul’s recent offer to send 2 million kilowatts of energy across the border to the impoverished North if it gave up its nuclear arms program. But the plan could pose a wrinkle at the talks, some observers say, because Pyongyang might seek to modify it so that Seoul would not control the switches to North Korea’s power supply.

Harrison said North Korea may propose a broader energy cooperation plan, such as a natural gas pipeline from the North to the South, to make the two Koreas more mutually dependent.

Another potential obstacle in the negotiations could come from Japan, which has threatened to raise the issue of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Pyongyang has warned that doing so could disrupt talks over the nuclear issue.

Still, the main focus is expected to be on disarmament and security guarantees. The resolution of the Korean War could be key to the discussions.

Because a peace pact was never concluded as fighting ended in 1953, the two Koreas are technically still at war. Hundreds of thousands of troops guard their border, and more than 30,000 U.S. troops remain stationed in South Korea, a legacy of the war. North Korea has repeatedly said it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against “hostile” U.S. policy.

“They have genuine security concerns,” said Peter Hays Gries, director of the Sino-American Security Exchange at the University of Colorado. “We fought a war with North Korea. That war is essential to what it means to be Korean. It’s the forgotten war in the U.S. It’s not the forgotten war in North Korea.”

While North Korea fears hostility from the United States, Washington worries that Pyongyang will cheat on any disarmament agreement. A 1994 pact designed to freeze North Korea’s nuclear programs collapsed in 2002 when the U.S. accused Pyongyang of violating the deal. Now, Washington wants strict verification procedures to be part of any agreement.

“They want security assurances; we want them to stop the nuclear program,” Gries said. “The problem is this issue is so charged and heated up. You need minimal trust. There’s just too little trust on both sides.”

The U.S. and North Korea have the most to lose if the talks collapse. But China may also pay a significant price.

As host of the talks, Beijing has been praised as a constructive international player and has won friends in Washington and Asia. But if negotiations fall apart, China’s relationship with the United States could suffer. Beijing could be blamed for not doing more to encourage Pyongyang to negotiate.

Sino-U.S. relations have been strained recently, as the United States is increasingly concerned about China’s economic rise and military expansion.

“Given the recent trend, China will feel considerable pressure to appear to be helpful,” Gries said. “But there’s a tendency to overestimate what the Chinese can do. There is this unrealistic expectation that Beijing is the Big Brother of North Korea and it can always get what it wants from Pyongyang.”