Will Tuesday Be Super for Jesse Jackson?

Jesse Jackson’s mainstream campaign is working. Although his total white support remains low, the early primaries and caucuses demonstrate that he is winning more of the white vote in 1988 than in 1984. In three states, Jackson beat three white male candidates--former Arizona Gov. Bruce Babbitt, former Colorado Sen. Gary Hart and Tennessee Sen. Albert Gore Jr. That a black candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination could have such appeal among whites would have been unthinkable even four years ago.

Out of Super Tuesday’s 20 primaries and caucuses, in the 14 scheduled in Southern and border states he should do even better. Recent surveys indicate that the lion’s share of the black vote will go again to Jackson. In addition, if Southern white conservatives desert the Democratic Party to vote in this year’s competitive Republican primaries and caucuses (as an Atlanta Constitution poll shows a substantial number might), then black voters would be even more influential in Democratic results. Finally, more important for Jackson’s chances in the South than his expanded white support in Iowa, New Hampshire and Minnesota is the fact that all of the primaries and caucuses held to date have left no clear Democratic front-runner.

This means that at least three white candidates (Gov. Michael S. Dukakis of Massachusetts, Rep. Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri and Gore) will still be viable in the eyes of the electorate and may end up splitting the white vote. In such a scenario, Jackson could win the plurality of votes in most of the deep South states--maybe even a majority in Mississippi--and come second in several border states. Thus Super Tuesday raises the stakes for the potential impact of black voters in 1988, in all likelihood to Jackson’s benefit.

Nevertheless, the real contest is not over winning slim pluralities in a number of statewide results; the name of the game is winning delegates. And even with massive black support, the battle might not go all that well for Jackson.

The rules of delegate allocation are the key. In most states, delegates are allocated by congressional districts, not a candidate’s statewide tally. Given the heavy concentration of blacks in some districts and their slim representation or virtual absence in others, Jackson could win a plurality of the popular vote and not end up with a plurality of delegates in that state. That happened in 1984 in both Mississippi and Virginia.

As important as the black vote will be this Tuesday, it may do much more for building a burst of momentum for a candidate--especially if it is Jackson--and bringing him a shower of media attention, than be decisive in the actual delegate count. The overall winning Democratic candidate on Super Tuesday, as elsewhere, is likely to be the one who demonstrates that he can consistently attract both black and white votes.

But if we are talking about actual nomination politics, the candidate to watch is probably not Jesse Jackson. The basic reason is that he won’t get enough white support. Whites tend to say this is because Jackson is too radical and not experienced in holding public office. Blacks, most commonly, say it is Jackson’s racial identification.

To be sure, Jackson is to the left of the other Democratic contenders, especially vis-a-vis foreign policy and the defense budget. Indeed, it is not at all clear that a white candidate who embraced Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat and Cuban President Fidel Castro would even be in major party competition in the United States in 1988. But, like the other Democratic and Republican candidates in the race, Jackson has modified his political views and behavior. He speaks far less about the Third World in general in 1988 than he did in 1984 and argues that his earlier behavior revolved around an attempt to open up much needed lines of communication.

Whether this is opportunism or ingenious excuses, it is nonetheless true that black candidates, despite their political views, are often viewed as exceptionally liberal or radical simply by the fact they are black. The case of former Wayne County executive Bill Lucas is instructive. Lucas ran as a Reaganite Republican nominee for governor in Michigan; yet polls kept showing that whites thought he was a liberal like Detroit’s Democratic Mayor Coleman Young.

Jackson is also quick to point out that the lack of officeholding experience did not keep Dwight D. Eisenhower from being elected President and that only a few blacks have been able to get experience even in the House of Representatives; only one black has been a member of the U.S. Senate in the 20th Century, and none has won a governor’s office. The reasons here too seem to be race-related. Since there are no states that are majority black, and most black candidates for higher office have found it difficult to win white votes, blacks usually lose in statewide contests. In short, both the view of Jackson as a radical and his inexperience in public office are themselves factors inextricably linked to race.

Thus it is probable that Jackson’s Southern white support will remain at best at the level he has won in the early primary and caucus states--roughly 8% to 10%--and will come as it did in those states not predominantly from poor farmers or blue-collar workers, but from younger whites in academic centers. That proportion of the white vote coupled even with massive black support will not be enough to propel him into a sustainable front-runner status. Meanwhile the 20% or so of Southern blacks who said they remain undecided in late January polls might very well go to some other candidate or candidates.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Jackson is a major factor in Democratic politics in 1988. Super Tuesday will make Jackson and his supporters a force to be reckoned with at the Democratic convention; and his siphoning off votes from white candidates has the probability of leaving the Democratic race so muddled that it could produce a brokered convention.

In this latter possibility, there are obviously two scenarios--one of the leading white candidates bargains with Jackson, or they bargain with each other. The bargaining in both instances would probably involve the vice presidency, the more than 106,000 presidential appointments, the platform and the delegate selection rules for 1992.

The danger in bargaining with Jackson is that for the Democrats it may bring back the charge of caving in to “special interests”; the danger in not bargaining with him is that it may lead to an exodus of black voters from the Democratic Party. Blacks may decide to vote with their bottoms--stay at home, that is, on the day of the general election; or a substantial minority may support the Republicans or third-party candidates if they view Jackson as being mistreated. Either of the first or second outcomes--alienating whites or alienating blacks--may well doom the Democrats in November, for it is no more likely that they can win in 1988 without keeping their substantial majority of black voters than they can win without getting at least 40% to 45% of the white vote.

What appears probable is that Jackson will be the wild card if the Democratic party is brokered; he could make or break it for either of the leading candidates. Gore is also a wild card--but after skipping Iowa and New Hampshire--only the lowest wild card in a hole; he depends on what’s in the other players’ hands. Simon is an outside straight--the long shot in the race whose fortunes depend, like Gore’s, on the cards in the other players’ hands; and Dukakis and Gephardt are trying to get a full house.

Super Tuesday may decide little, but it will dramatically influence how the game finally shapes up.