For China, the Revolution of Modernization Is Just Beginning

May 17, 1989, the day the general population joined the students to take Tian An Men Square, will go down in history as a date that changed the course of Chinese political development, much as the taking of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, changed the history of France.

The fundamental question of who will control China’s economic and political future--the Communist Party elders or the people--is being decided in the streets by students, workers and professionals.

The popular protests have been effective because they address a deep division among China’s leaders. Ever since Deng Xiaoping removed most central government controls on agriculture in the 1980s, with great success in boosting output, there have been debates at the highest level over how fast to decontrol the industrial and urban sector, including prices, education, journalism and industrial plant management.

In the past year party hard-liners, fearing a loss of control, have succeeded in stopping the freeing-up of the urban economy. Reformers in government--including former General Secretary Hu Yaobang (who died April 15) and his successor, Zhao Ziyang--who wanted to continue on the progressive path were either ousted or overruled.

However, there are many officials who still seek reform and sympathize with the students, from Zhao down to middle-level bureaucrats, including officers in the police and the military. These internal divisions have prevented the government from responding decisively to the protests.

While the government has been divided, the population has united around the student protesters. Many Chinese saw economic growth as a result of reform and believe that the way to continue growth is through more decontrol, not less.

Many also believe--not without some reason--that the conservative leadership is clinging to control in order to protect special privileges and hidden income.

Therefore, when the factory, office and professional workers support the students’ demands for “democracy,” what they really are saying is: “We want more economic growth and an end to corruption.” Democracy, by breaking the control of the conservative faction in the government, is desired not only for itself, but as a means to achieve these ends.

Last summer I attended an international conference in which I discussed with leading Chinese scholars the problem of revolution in history. I was astonished to hear the Chinese say that, despite the Communist victory in 1949, China had not yet had a “true” revolution.

By this, they meant that China was still a backward, pre-modern society that needed to be “revolutionized” in order to catch up with the West. They were consumed by the problem of how to remove the “obstacles to modernization.”

The success of Deng’s reforms, after three decades of failure to keep pace with the West, had already led to widespread disillusionment with central party control. Deng had much support as long as his reforms seemed to be bringing China into the modern world. But in the last few months, as it became clear that Deng was supporting hard-liners who sought to slow the pace of reform, he gained a reputation as an enemy, rather than a friend, of Chinese modernization. The tragedy for Deng is that he and Premier Li Peng are now identified as being the chief obstacles to modernization. It is for this reason that they have lost the support of much of the army, government officials, professionals and ordinary Chinese.

Restoring order will require Deng and Li to persuade the Chinese people that they no longer are such “obstacles” or defenders of corruption. Li will likely resign, and leadership will be passed to the reform faction in the government.

However, this change in leadership will not lead to restoration of business as usual. The key points of contention--the pace of reform, and a means of implementing decontrol and democratization--will remain. It may take months or years before this is fully resolved. In that time, recurrent demonstrations, further divisions in the government and armed forces, attempted coups and increased violence are all likely.

We should remember that 1789 marked the beginning, not the end, of the French Revolution. Much the same will be said for 1989 in the People’s Republic of China.

There is an old curse in China: “May you live in interesting times.” For China’s leaders, these are indeed interesting times. Yet China’s workers and students hope these times provide not a curse, but a cure, for China’s past economic and political stagnation.