Seeking Black Unity in South Africa

In recent weeks there has been intense speculation that Nelson Mandela, the jailed leader of the African National Congress, will be freed in the foreseeable future, perhaps next year. One of Mandela’s immediate political tasks upon his release would be to forge black unity in the struggle against apartheid.

Without coming together, the various apartheid factions--Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi’s Inkatha movement, the ANC, the United Democratic Front and the Pan African Congress--which collectively represent the aspirations of the black majority, cannot begin to effectively combat apartheid. Worse, persistent black disunity threatens South Africa’s future. In the event of black majority rule, the animosities between the sundry partisans would be certain to precipitate internecine wars similar to those now ravaging Mozambique, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Zaire.

One reason many whites fear black rule is this likelihood of black civil war. Over the last three years, in the province of Natal, Buthelezi’s 1-million-strong Inkatha movement has been involved in a bloody turf war against the now-banned UDF, the country’s largest multiracial anti-apartheid group.

No doubt black disunity is largely the result of the South African government’s divide-and-rule tactics. An obvious example of that has been the co-option of numerous black leaders by dispersing them throughout the tribal homeland and town council systems. But the attitudes of the different apartheid groups toward each other are also to blame. For instance, many in the ANC and in the internal anti-apartheid movement dislike Buthelezi and are suspicious of his motives. His decision to work for change from within the apartheid system, by going along with Pretoria’s self-serving concept of a Zulu homeland, his rejection of an armed struggle as a means of ending apartheid, and his persistent opposition to economic sanctions and divestment all have alienated Buthelezi from black leaders like Bishop Desmond Tutu, the Rev. Allan Boesak and Oliver Tambo, head of the ANC. These leaders totally reject the homeland system. They consider an armed struggle against the Pretoria regime as a legitimate mode of self-defense (although Tutu and Boesak abjure violence). And they see the imposition of sanctions as a necessary evil if apartheid is to be ended peacefully and the South African government brought to the negotiation table.

The rift is also ideological, and centers largely on the nature of a post-apartheid South Africa. Buthelezi, an ardent admirer of the free-enterprise system, contends that radicals in the ANC are bent on violent revolution in order to set up a communist state. Buthelezi believes that the conservative approach holds the only hope for a viable, realistic solution because no government has ever committed suicide. Perhaps he ought to reflect on Mikhail Gorbachev’s repudiation of Stalinist Russia as an example that government can undergo radical change.

Buthelezi is convinced that if the Afrikaners see no way out of the apartheid mess but a total surrender of power, they will cling to their present ways until the bitter end. And given the country’s awesome military strength, its relative economic self-sufficiency and the West’s reluctance to implement biting sanctions, that bitter end may be a long time coming--if it ever does come. As a pragmatist, Buthelezi is therefore willing to compromise.

This is where he and Mandela appear to have found common ground, despite the fact that Mandela’s views are closer to those of Tutu, Boesak and Tambo. Though in his early days Mandela evinced a proclivity for communism, once he recognized that system’s inapplicability as a solution to the complex problems of South Africa, he began to advocate “a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities.”

A growing number of enlightened whites have started publicly using similar words to describe a future South Africa. One hopes that the ranks will increase substantially to enable them to form a majority coalition with moderate blacks to counter white and black extremism. One of the least-appreciated facts about apartheid in the West is the reality of black moderation. Yet history shows that blacks have been overwhelmingly conciliatory, patient and nonviolent, and have taken pains to direct their anger and hatred at the institution of apartheid rather than blindly at whites.

As elder statesman, Mandela enjoys enormous respect among the various anti-apartheid factions. This places him in the crucial position of being able to convince them of the important need for unity. At the same time, it is clear that Mandela is useful only as a prisoner to black extremists who are averse to any reconciliation with Buthelezi or any compromise with Pretoria. His release is likely to put them in the awkward and dangerous position of having to oppose an extremely popular, almost messianic, leader, or openly break ranks with him. This is especially true if Mandela succeeds in getting the apartheid movement to resolve its differences from within as well as with Buthelezi. If Mandela could do that, it would be easier to commit the black majority fully to a negotiated democratic alternative.

Moderates and pragmatists in the ruling National Party are aware of the decisive role Mandela can play in uniting blacks under a moderate agenda. They are also aware of the possibility that his release could further splinter the black opposition, should his call for black unity and reconciliation go unheeded. In either case, whites stand to benefit. Either they’ll end up negotiating a blueprint for South Africa’s future with black leaders who are willing to compromise, or blacks will be so divided that they’ll pose little threat to white power and the status quo will continue.

One hopes that a liberated Mandela would be able to unite the various black factions--for the sake of all South Africans.