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COMMENTARY : Rooting for the Other Side in ’96 Election : In a political paradox, either party could win by losing its bid for the White House.

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<i> John J. Pitney Jr. is an associate professor of government at Claremont McKenna College. His e-mail address is jpitney@benson.mckenna.edu</i>

Now that members of Congress are enjoying their recess, they finally have time to muse about the 1996 elections. Their daydreams might surprise us. Congressional Democrats may be looking forward to President Clinton’s defeat, just as Republicans may be secretly smiling at the prospect of his reelection.

To understand this paradox, consider the recent past. If George Bush had won in 1992, would the Republicans still have taken control of the House in 1994? Of course not. In 32 of the previous 33 midterm elections, the party holding the White House had lost ground to the out party. And the losses tended to run especially deep during the sixth year of a presidential Administration, when the voters had really become sick of the in party.

In the middle of a second Bush term, voters would have recoiled from the GOP label and the party would have sunk even deeper into “permanent minority” status. Tom Foley would still be Speaker and Newt Gingrich would be one very unhappy minority leader.

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Congressional Democrats know that Bill Clinton helped cost them the House in 1994. They also know that if he wins a second term, they will lose a substantial number of seats in 1998. In that case, their only hope for regaining a permanent grip on the House lies in winning atleast 40 seats in 1996--enough not only to get a majority but to absorb the losses they would surely suffer two years later.

The Democrats cannot win those seats without powerfully long coattails from their presidential nominee. But Clinton will win a landslide only if the Republicans run a ticket of Bob Packwood and Woody Allen. In trial heats with more likely GOP contenders, the polls indicate a very close race. A Clinton squeaker would leave the Democrats with meager congressional gains--if any--opening the prospect that Republicans could build an insurmountable House majority in 1998.

So given a choice between a narrow Clinton victory and a narrow Clinton defeat, congressional Democrats would probably prefer defeat. When contemplating this possibility, they might feel a twinge of guilt for their disloyal thoughts, but don’t count on it. Clinton came to office with little personal support among congressional Democrats, and his standing dropped further with the 1994 disaster. Now his political guru, Dick Morris, is talking about a “triangulation” strategy in which the President simultaneously fights congressional Republicans and holds congressional Democrats at arm’s length. From their corner of the triangle, congressional Democrats would be happy to see Clinton go.

Republicans face a harder conflict. Winning the White House in 1996 would give them unified control of the federal government for the first time since the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration. They would have a window of opportunity to accomplish goals they’ve cherished for decades. But open windows may let in ill winds. Without a Democratic Congress or President to criticize, they would have to answer for the bad as well as the good. The Democrats, freed of any responsibility for governing, could attack as gleefully as the Republicans did during the first two years of the Clinton Administration.

With control of the White House, the Republicans would lose House seats in 1998, but their calculations would differ a bit from those of the Democrats. Because they already have a majority, even a modest pickup of seats in 1996 might give them the cushion they need to survive the midterm.

Therefore, Gingrich might continue as Speaker during the second two years of a Republican Administration. But would he want to? Under a Republican President, he would have to labor in the shadow of someone else’s agenda and spend most of his time playing defense instead of offense. During a second Clinton Administration, by contrast, he would retain enormous leeway in shaping GOP policy and in deciding when to support or fight the Administration. In 1998, the Republicans could win enough House seats to lock in the GOP for a generation. And two years later, he could seriously entertain a run for the White House.

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If you were Newt Gingrich, which prospect would you find more attractive?

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