THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT : Gates’ Confirmation Appears Jeopardized

Senate confirmation of Robert M. Gates as director of the Central Intelligence Agency appeared to be in jeopardy Thursday because the Tower Commission found he permitted the White House to influence an intelligence report analyzing the political situation in Iran.

Members of the Senate Intelligence Committee said Gates, whose nomination already has been challenged by some senators, will be questioned intensely by the panel in a closed hearing next week about the Tower Commission report and other new disclosures, including his alleged role last November in drafting a false White House chronology of the Iran arms sales.

Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), both members of the Intelligence Committee, which must approve the nomination before it goes to the Senate floor for a vote, predicted that these new developments would make Gates’ confirmation even more uncertain than it was before the Tower Commission released its report.

Cites ‘Pyramiding Effect’

“It is building,” Specter said, referring to the opposition to Gates’ nomination in the Senate. The new disclosures have had a “pyramiding effect,” he said, predicting that a “fair number” of Senate Intelligence Committee members would oppose the nomination by the time the panel meets next week.

The Tower Commission report shows “a whole pattern of concealment” on the part of the CIA, Specter said, and “Gates is involved in the middle of it,” while he was a high-level official at the agency. He added that “all of these failures by the director of the CIA (William J. Casey) bear directly on Mr. Gates.”

In May, 1985, according to the commission, White House officials were “actively involved” in the CIA’s preparation of a document known as a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which concluded that the Soviet Union was in a position to capitalize on the instability of the Tehran regime after the death of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Although the commission does not mention his name in connection with the document, Gates at the time was primarily responsible for all intelligence estimates produced by the CIA.

Evidence of Influence

According to the Tower Commission, the evidence suggests that the CIA permitted the views of White House policy-makers to influence the judgment of the agency professionals who prepared the report. Under normal procedures, intelligence reports are the raw material from which policy decisions are made, and the policy-makers have no role in preparing them.

In addition, the commission noted that the intelligence report contains what it described as “the hint that the United States should change its existing policy and encourage its allies to provide arms to Iran.” Intelligence estimates prepared by the CIA usually make no policy recommendations.

This mixture of policy and intelligence functions, which normally is prohibited, was viewed with alarm by the Tower Commission.

“It is critical that the line between intelligence and advocacy of a particular policy be preserved if intelligence is to retain its integrity and perform its proper function,” the report said. “In this instance, the CIA came close enough to the line to warrant concern.”

Question by Bradley

In testimony before the Intelligence Committee on Feb. 17, Gates was asked by Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) whether the CIA in May, 1985, had produced its report “to suit the policy-makers?”

Gates replied: “Not true.”

But Bradley appeared unconvinced by Gates’ answer and noted that a subsequent document produced by the agency on the situation in Iran was less positive about the ability of the Soviets to make inroads in the Persian Gulf state.

On Thursday, after reading the Tower Commission report, Bradley issued a statement noting that the board had contradicted Gates’ testimony. “This confirms the concerns I’ve had all along that I expressed to Mr. Gates last week that the CIA tailored its intelligence assessment on Iran to fit the needs of the policy-makers at the White House,” he said.

The commission’s report also suggested that Gates, after being promoted to deputy CIA director in April, 1986, was more familiar with White House efforts to privately fund the Nicaraguan rebels than he indicated in committee testimony. The commission quotes then-National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter as saying in July that he had told Gates that the private supply effort should be “phased out” after Congress provided new funding later in the year.

Adamant About No Involvement

In testimony Feb. 17, Gates insisted that the CIA had studiously avoided gathering any knowledge about the private funding of the contras because the agency was prohibited by law from involvement with the rebels.

Although Gates has made no public statements since his testimony before the committee concluded on Feb. 18, the panel’s members Thursday made public a statement that he submitted to them to answer allegations that he had participated last November in the drafting of a false chronology of the Iran affair.

The chronology, which contained many errors, was judged by the Tower Commission as evidence that some Administration officials apparently sought to cover up the President’s involvement, as well as their own role, in the Iran-contra affair when it first became public knowledge.

Gates acknowledged that he had at least four conversations with NSC aide Oliver L. North at the time the erroneous chronology was being prepared, but he could not recall what was discussed.