Fear of Iran’s Dominating Entire Gulf Region Is Seen as Motive for U.S. Action

Iran, driven by ancient ethnic and religious hatreds, has embarked on a campaign of intimidation against its rich but vulnerable Arab neighbors, and U.S. officials fear it could lead to Iranian domination of the entire strategic Persian Gulf region if American military protection is removed.

It is that fear--more than concern about the short-term flow of oil--that has spurred President Reagan to adopt his controversial, high-profile policy of protecting Kuwaiti tankers with an increasing concentration of U.S. military power.

So far, Iran, with its army bogged down in the nearly seven-year-old war with Iraq, has relied on terrorism, sabotage and subversion in attempting to destabilize the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The Iranian pressure has had some effect, but the gulf states have not knuckled under, American analysts say.

If Iraq’s resistance were to crumble, however, Iran could turn its full attention to the sparsely populated gulf states, the analysts say.

With a population of 45 million and a regular military force of at least 700,000, supplemented by fanatical Revolutionary Guards, Iran dwarfs the Arab states, which have a combined population of about 16 million and a combined military force of fewer than 100,000. The numbers give Iran a tremendous advantage despite the billions of dollars worth of military equipment that Saudi Arabia has bought in the last decade.

Some non-government experts give high marks to the Saudi air force, but there is general agreement that without U.S. military support, the Arab states in the gulf would be at a tremendous disadvantage. Iran might be able to force concessions, some specialists believe, just by threatening to use military force.

Such a danger may be hypothetical now because the Iran-Iraq War shows no signs of ending. But the Reagan Administration considers even the remote prospect of Iranian domination of the oil-producing region to be extremely dangerous to Western interests.

Present stockpiles of oil could supply the industrialized nations if gulf shipments are temporarily disrupted, but the region’s oil is vital in the long run. Moreover, the United States is opposed in principle to the use of military force by one state to dominate another.

Richard W. Murphy, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, spelled out the U.S. concern clearly in a press conference early this summer.

In explaining the reasons behind Washington’s plan to re-register 11 Kuwaiti tankers in order to provide them with U.S. Navy protection, Murphy said, “The intimidation that we are watching directed primarily against Kuwait today . . . is part of Iran’s hegemonistic plans for the gulf.”

Most experts, both in and out of government, agree that Iran could not mount a military strike across the gulf as long as elements of the U.S. Navy are deployed there. Arab officials have made it clear that they share this view.

However, many Arabs, especially the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, have expressed concern that the United States might eventually pull out, as it did from Lebanon after the terrorist bombing of the Marine headquarters there in October, 1983. A U.S. withdrawal would leave the Arab states to face an enraged Iran.

William B. Quandt, a former National Security Council expert on the Middle East and now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said: “You hear that from a number of Arabs, not just in the gulf. They call it the ‘Lebanon syndrome.’ They are concerned that we come charging in, face some problems and leave. Those that can’t leave will be faced with even greater problems after we go.

Some Truth to It

“There is some truth to that. On the other hand, the Kuwaitis, who were instrumental in getting us in, should have thought of that from the outset.”

Anthony H. Cordesman, a military consultant, said the U.S. force has checked Iranian expansion so far.

“If the United States now should withdraw from the gulf, it would virtually concede domination of the region to Iran,” Cordesman said.

“There are very powerful factions that have already sought to accommodate Iran, especially in the United Arab Emirates. The message from an American withdrawal would be brutally clear to Saudi Arabia. You can assume that Kuwait would stop aiding Iraq and would try to find an accommodation with Iran.”

Many members of Congress question the Administration’s strategy because they fear it could involve the United States in the Iran-Iraq War. Some have expressed concern that the Administration does not have a full appreciation of the risks or a coherent plan of action should its warships become involved in a shooting war.

The Administration is convinced, however, that U.S. interests in the gulf region outweigh the concern about the possibility of an Iranian military response.

Cordesman commented: “The domestic political climate and the dialogue between the White House and Congress is a very dangerous impediment to American capabilities. We put our forces in harm’s way to achieve strategic objectives. Because they are in harm’s way, sometimes they are harmed. We can’t guarantee to the American people 100% protection of our military forces.”

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other gulf states have been very reluctant to give U.S. forces base rights on their territory, although the Saudis have reportedly expanded their permission for U.S. aircraft to land on their territory for refueling and emergency purposes.

Both Administration officials and non-government experts say the Arab states believe that U.S. bases would be provocative to Iran and unpopular with large segments of their populations.

Quandt said Arab leaders “believe American bases ultimately would be detrimental to internal security, and when they are forced to choose between an internal and an external threat, they opt for the internal because it seems more real.”

“It’s tricky to second-guess them on this,” he said. “If we push them too hard for bases and there is a dramatic deterioration in the political situation in Saudi Arabia or the other countries, we probably would look back and wonder how we could have been so stupid.”

Administration officials and non-government experts agree that Iranian control--either direct or indirect--of the gulf region’s oil resources would give Tehran’s radical regime a stranglehold on Western economies.

Although the United States gets only about 5% of its petroleum from the region, it would not escape the impact of Iranian domination because the U.S. supply is sensitive to changes in the overall world oil market.

No Common Land Borders

Some experts believe that Iran lacks the military sophistication--especially in its navy and air force--to mount an attack across the gulf. And unlike its situation with Iraq, Iran has no common land border with the Arab gulf states.

“I don’t think the Iranians would use conventional armed force,” said Nadav Safran, a Middle East specialist at Harvard University. “They have means that are much more effective than armed force--subversion, terrorism, sabotage. They already are using these tactics.”

Safran said the U.S. military presence is counterproductive because it provokes Iran without providing the Arab states with any defense against terrorism and subversion.

He added: “I think that if the Kuwaitis had to do it all over (the re-registering of their tankers), knowing what has happened so far, they probably would not do it.”