Thinking Small

U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf seems to be moving rapidly toward bringing the ships of many nations under naval protection, while using new means to deal with Iranian attacks. A probable change in the rules of engagement would extend American armed aid to neutral ships other than those flying the U.S. flag. And some of that protection could be provided by small Coast Guard vessels that are seen as particularly well suited to counter Iran’s fast little gunboats. Both of these ideas were considered before by the Reagan Administration and rejected. The new life they have now been given implies a decision to take a bolder, even more confrontational approach toward Iran.

Changing the orders under which U.S. ships may act to stop Iranian attacks isn’t intended to provide comprehensive protection throughout the gulf. Instead, reflecting the limits of American power, non-U.S. flag ships would be defended selectively and without prior public notice. This ad hoc approach is frankly explained as intended to keep Iran guessing about when its lawlessness may invite retribution. A sound policy? That all depends on whether its deliberate ambiguity gives Iran pause, or whether it could instead invite a miscalculation dangerous to both countries.

Calling in the Coast Guard to take over some patrolling duties from the Navy is not so much dangerous as ironic. After spending $91.2 billion on new ships since 1981, the Navy now possesses a splendid fleet of carrier battle groups, nuclear attack submarines and refurbished battleships. What it utterly lacks are precisely the kind of unglamorous vessels needed to deal most effectively with limited but still vicious threats from fifth-rate maritime powers like Iran. Last summer the Navy discovered it didn’t have minesweepers when it needed them. Now it’s fast and agile patrol boats, forcing the Defense Department to turn to the Coast Guard whose own budget--another irony--has been savaged in the last few years.

No doubt Coast Guard patrol boats would be more cost-effective in dealing with the Iranian gunboat problem. But there can’t be much doubt either that there are other countries with a vital stake in free navigation that also have the means to contribute small and agile patrol boats to the defense of shipping in the Persian Gulf. It can’t be emphasized too often that policing the gulf is an international, not a uniquely American, responsibility. If smaller boats are to become the policeman on the beat in the gulf they should fly the flags of many countries.