A Rush to Settlement in South Africa Could Imperil the Growth of Democracy : Negotiations: A murder and two deaths have raised pressures to compromise. But a new government must be able to end economic inequality.

With negotiations aimed at producing democracy again under way, South Africa appears to have survived a series of severe tests. The assassination of the South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani and the sudden death of Oliver R. Tambo, the national chairman of the African National Congress, have not, as might be expected, derailed the multiparty talks. But the real challenge--creating the economic and social base necessary for democracy to grow and thrive--lies ahead. Ironically, a rush to complete the negotiations could diminish the prospects of meeting that challenge.

Next to Nelson Mandela, Hani was the most popular black leader in the country. More than any other senior ANC leader, he spoke for the most brutalized, poor and marginalized segments of black society. It is unclear whether any other black leader, including Mandela, will be able to match Hani’s standing in the townships. One person who may try to fill the void is Winnie Mandela, who is now urging young militants to oust the current ANC leadership, abandon negotiations and seize power by revolutionary means.

In the months before his murder, Hani had become a strong proponent of an early settlement. Unless the pace of change increased, he warned, escalating violence and deteriorating economic conditions would soon make it nearly impossible to build a stable democratic society. But he continued to insist on a settlement that would serve the interests of the broad majority of blacks, most of whom are worse off now than they were three years ago. For example, joblessness in South Africa, which was 25% in 1980, is now 43%. In the second half of 1992, according to the Reserve Bank of South Africa, the economy produced only eight jobs for every 100 young people entering the labor market.

Meanwhile, the social and economic inequalities remain astonishing. In 1990, gross domestic product per capita for whites was $6,500 a year, $670 for blacks. Infant mortality for blacks was 57 per 1,000, 13 per 1000 for whites.

Hani’s presence at the bargaining table provided insurance against a compromise that would change the complexion, but not these underlying realities, of inequality. Unfortunately, his absence could now make such a compromise more likely--and if it does, South Africa’s future will at greater risk.

Last month, all the major South African parties, including those that had boycotted earlier negotiations, attended the first formal negotiating session in more than 10 months. Following the meeting, hopes were high that an agreement on a transitional government would be reached quickly. Still, many analysts worried that Hani’s murder would imperil progress. But the parties met again last week and agreed to hold elections by April, 1994.

As other transitions to democracy--in Angola, Kenya and Ethiopia--have shown, reaching agreement on elections and new constitutions is often the easiest step. The more difficult one is to establish a government that can perceptibly improve the economic and social conditions that most directly affect the lives of ordinary citizens--hence, the survival of democracy. In South Africa, this will mean providing houses, jobs and land for blacks, which will require whites to make more significant compromises than they already have agreed to.

A settlement that produces political equality but limits a new government’s ability to reduce economic inequality will fail. The compromises now under discussion in South Africa could produce this result, in three ways. First, political formulas that entrench the power of white constituencies for even a limited period of time could make it more difficult for a democratic government to enact tax legislation and other measures necessary to lessen the gross economic inequalities in South Africa. Second, agreements guaranteeing the jobs and pensions of white civil-service workers at current levels would create a tremendous fiscal burden for future leaders looking to cut and/or shift government spending. Finally, measures that would ensure white property rights could greatly increase the cost of programs to provide land to blacks.

If there is a rush to settlement, ANC leaders may be tempted to make these concessions. Hani would have almost certainly opposed such a Faustian bargain. Moreover, his assassination, coupled with last week’s death of Andries Treurnicht, the leader of the pro-apartheid Conservative Party, may put even more pressure on black leaders to accept potentially harmful proposals. Many fear that without Treurnicht to hold the line, white militants will be emboldened to step up violence unless there is a quick settlement.

In these circumstances, the Clinton Administration, now reviewing the African policies it inherited from George Bush, should become more directly involved in the South African negotiations. Its objective must be: first, to help persuade whites that the best and probably only way to guarantee the future security and welfare of their children and their children’s children is to give a new government the freedom and resources necessary to carry out the same kinds of interventionist measures that National Party governments used in the 1940s and 1950s to end poverty among Afrikaners; and, second, to mobilize the international community to make available the resources needed to assist the new government in providing housing, jobs and land to blacks.

To these ends, all remaining economic sanctions should be removed. Sanctions now serve no purpose. Quite the contrary. The linkage between a political settlement and lifting sanctions is almost certainly putting more pressure on the ANC to compromise than on President F.W. de Klerk and whites, because ANC leaders realize that something drastic must be done to fix the economy. Removing the sanctions and lifting restrictions on International Monetary Fund lending to South Africa are critical components of any solution to the country’s economic woes. Moreover, there is no longer any doubt that De Klerk needs a settlement.

Those who have urged black leaders to reassure whites by making concessions on power sharing and property rights must realize that it is impossible to lock in effective protections of white welfare in an agreement. For better or worse, the fate of whites will hinge on the ability of a future government to meet the rising expectations of the black majority. If it fails to do so, the security and welfare of all South Africans will be threatened.

Finally, the Clinton Administration must abandon its belief that parts of the world, like South Africa, can be put on hold. The longer it takes to shake U.S. policy toward Africa out of its stupor, the more difficult it’s going to be to restore U.S. influence on the continent.

DR, CATHERINE KANNER / For The Times