Clinton Learns the Art of Using Force

Saddam Hussein has an amazing sense of timing. In 1990, he was in the midst of becoming a power broker in the Middle East and amassing one of the region’s most formidable military machines. He then invaded Kuwait, inviting a U.S.-led coalition to cut his stature and armed forces down to size.

This year, Hussein finally reached an agreement with the United Nations to ease the economic sanctions imposed on his country. Then he dispatched his crack troops to the off-limits Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. So much for a relaxation of sanctions. And it served as another open invitation for military retaliation--especially with President Bill Clinton entering the home stretch of his bid for reelection.

Election-year politics aside, Clinton was right to respond with force to Hussein’s provocations. Back-to-back cruise-missile attacks not only made clear that the United States will not tolerate Hussein’s violation of the rules established to contain his ambition, but also sent a more generic message that the Clinton administration is prepared to stare down rogue states. The absence of broader support from allies was unfortunate, but Clinton was justified in proceeding with the retaliatory attack on his own. Indeed, if Clinton deserves any criticism, it is for not having responded with more potent military force.

Since his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Hussein has demonstrated, time and again, that his appetite for power can be contained only through tit-for-tat retaliation. If not boxed in and punished every time he challenges the limits imposed on his regime by the international community, Hussein will seek to increase his strength at the expense of his own citizens and neighboring states.

Clinton’s decision to punish Hussein for sending his troops to Irbil was only the most recent episode of the president’s successful implementation of the strategy of coercive diplomacy put in place by the previous administration. President George Bush acted prudently in stopping the war against Iraq before coalition forces reached Baghdad. To have done otherwise, and destroyed Hussein and his regime, would have left the United States with the onerous and costly task of occupation and reconstruction. And even if the Bush administration had accepted this responsibility, a successor regime might have proved neither stable nor more palatable than Hussein’s.

Living with rogue states might not be pleasant, but it is preferable to running the risks associated with seeking to destroy them. Responsibility has thus fallen to Clinton to be patient, yet firm and watchful, giving Hussein sufficient breathing room should he decide to pursue a path of reconciliation with the international community. But prepared to respond with appropriate vigor when he attempts to break out.

In adeptly carrying out this balancing act, Clinton is not just responding appropriately to the challenges posed by Hussein. He is also helping adapt U.S. policy and the country’s military establishment to the challenges posed by rogue states.

Since the Vietnam War, aversion to limited war has reached phobic proportions; politicians and military commanders alike have taken an all-or-nothing approach to the use of force. Containing dangerous regional powers, however, entails playing a game of cat and mouse and, when necessary, resorting to the limited and proportional application of military power. Step by step, Clinton is preparing the country for a 21st century--when challenges to national security will no longer be black and white. The U.S. military, as well as the public that fills its ranks and pays its bills, must be prepared for a new array of threats that, if less grave than those of the Cold War era, still require sacrifice and steadiness.

In light of the merits of Clinton’s decision to launch retaliatory strikes, it is not surprising that his action won strong bipartisan support. Clinton’s critics have not challenged the need for a military response. Instead, they questioned both the absence of stronger backing from U.S. allies and the military utility of striking back in southern Iraq when Hussein’s offending actions took place in the north.

Clinton apparently spent much of last weekend seeking to build allied support for military action. He succeeded in securing the enthusiastic backing of only a handful of states. Clinton’s decision to act, nonetheless, demonstrates that he has found his bearings, however, not that he lacks diplomatic skill. For three reasons, Clinton was right to act unilaterally.

* Hussein’s actions in Irbil warranted a punishing surgical strike, not a prolonged campaign of the type required to drive his forces from Kuwait. The United States uniquely possesses the appropriate military technology for such a limited strike. There was no need for a broader coalition of forces.

* Those countries that grumbled the most did so for specious reasons. France and Russia have potential business ties to the region and are smarting at being left out of the limelight. The Arab countries that joined the United States in the 1991 war against Iraq publicly distanced themselves from last week’s attack. But beneath the public posturing was support for U.S. resolve; Iraq’s neighbors continue to fear Hussein and still resent the web of lies spun to prepare his invasion of Kuwait. Especially because states in the Middle East stand to suffer most if Iraqi aggression goes unchecked, they have no excuse for failing to stand firmly behind U.S. action.

* As demonstrated in Bosnia, U.S. unilateralism is still needed to catalyze multilateral cooperation. Had U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke not stepped in and used U.S. military power and influence to bring the warring parties to the table, there would be no Dayton accords and no peace in Bosnia. Some of America’s friends may object to Clinton’s decision to seize the initiative in Iraq. But had he failed to do so, the coalition needed to box in Hussein would have lost momentum and been put at risk.

That Clinton acted without the hand-holding of allies or the blessing of a new U.N. resolution makes clear that he is coming of age as a strong and sure leader--not that the presidency has been overtaken by cowboy tendencies or American hubris.

Charges that Clinton should have exacted greater cost on Hussein are more telling. The administration responded to Iraq’s aggression by expanding the “no-fly” zone in southern Iraq and taking out military installations in the south that could threaten allied aircraft patrolling the enlarged zone. Though this approach did punish Hussein for his actions, it did little to redress Iraq’s gains in the north. Indeed, Hussein achieved his aim of enabling the Kurdish faction allied with Iraq to best its Iran-backed rival. The deal looks good from Baghdad: Consolidating Hussein’s influence in the north is well worth the loss of a few replaceable air-defense installations.

Striking directly at Iraqi troops operating in the north would have been a more fitting and effective response. Even if not successful in thwarting Hussein’s objectives, air attacks on Iraq’s notorious Republican Guard units would have sent a clearer message, imposed costs on those forces engaged in the fighting and degraded Hussein’s ability to carry out future offensives.

The administration defended its choice of targets by claiming it did not want to take sides in the Kurdish rivalry and sought to avoid the civilian casualties likely to accompany attacks on ground troops. But U.S. forces could have attacked Iraqi tanks and artillery outside Irbil and targeted the depots and supply lines needed to support Iraqi troops, which would have avoided direct involvement in the fighting between Kurds and minimizing civilian risk.

That attacks on mobile Iraqi troops in the north would have have required piloted aircraft rather than pilotless cruise missiles is perhaps the main reason Clinton focused on the south. Even a limited air campaign against Iraq’s forces would have exposed U.S. pilots to defensive fire, raising the risks of U.S. retaliation. Clinton chose the safer course--but at the expense of the potency of the message he sent to Hussein.

The same trade-off bedevils Clinton in Bosnia. U.S. forces, alongside those of many allies, are keeping the peace in Bosnia. But they have abstained from apprehending the likes of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and other indicted war criminals, in part because of fear of reprisal against U.S. forces. Those orchestrating the worst bouts of ethnic cleansing still hold sway, fueling continued ethnic rivalry as the Bosnian elections draw near. If the administration is serious about reconstructing a multiethnic Bosnia, it must do more to neutralize the purveyors of virulent nationalism--even at greater risk to U.S. forces.

Hussein’s next steps will tell whether Clinton was right to opt for a more moderate military response to Iraq’s latest bout of aggression. Clinton’s choice was not without its merits. Limiting the risk to U.S. personnel is always a priority--but especially important as the public prepares to pass judgment on his first term. In addition, U.S. attacks on troops in the north would probably have required flying missions from air bases in Turkey or Saudi Arabia, complicating the politics of effective retaliation.

On balance, a harsher response was worth the risks. But if Clinton’s overall handling of this crisis and his impressive learning curve on foreign policy are any indication, he is likely to take advantage of the political latitude afforded by a second term to go after rogue states with the vigor that is warranted.