Sharp Discord Marks Justices’ Rulings on Race

In decisions that touched off an unusually bitter clash among the justices over race, the state Supreme Court on Wednesday sharply limited the ability of defendants to challenge jury selection procedures in Los Angeles County as discriminatory.

The court ruled 5 to 2 that the jury panel need reflect only the racial composition of the judicial district where the case is tried. The justices rejected claims by a black defendant, accused of murdering a white victim, that he was entitled to a jury representative of the county as a whole, where blacks make up a larger portion of the population.

In a second case, the court held by the same vote that a defendant has no constitutional right to a trial in the district where the crime is committed--but may be tried anywhere in the 4,000-square-mile county if a court so orders. As a result, a defendant may stand trial in a district with a racial mix far different from the one where the crime occurred.

The justices--like judges on other courts--have often voiced strong disagreements on legal issues. But Wednesday’s opinions contained surprisingly strong and personal language. The exchanges were even more unusual in that they came from a newly-aligned court whose members have often publicly spoken with pride on their ability to work together in harmony.

The two decisions sparked an impassioned dissent from Justice Allen E. Broussard, the court’s only black member, who said the rulings “threaten to eviscerate” the right of defendants to a representative jury.

Broussard accused the majority of failing to show “any awareness” of the impact of these and other recent rulings on jury selection and race bias.

“None show any sensitivity for the minority defendant facing trial before a predominantly white jury,” said Broussard. “To the contrary, the decisions simply seem to assume that judges, jurors, jury commissioners and prosecutors lack any feelings of racial bias. They erect procedural barriers to make it difficult or impossible to prove subtle forms of bias.”

Justice Stanley Mosk, the other member of the court’s liberal minority, said he agreed “in principle” with Broussard’s dissent.

Justice Marcus M. Kaufman, who joined the majority in the two rulings, shot back at Broussard with a vigorous and outspoken defense of the court, denying the justices were insensitive to race and castigating Broussard for implying the court intended to limit the constitutional rights of minorities.

“His frustration may be understandable, but his attack on the motives and integrity of the other members of the court is unjustified, improvident and wholly unworthy of him,” Kaufman wrote in a separate opinion.

Kaufman said he was “pained” that Broussard apparently had abandoned the judicial tradition of avoiding personal attacks on other judges. “Forceful and reasoned dissents are, of course, valuable tools in shaping of the law,” he said. “But attacks on the purposes and assumed intent of one’s colleagues destroy the collegiality essential to the proper functioning of an appellate court. . . .”

The justice added that in his view, any preference of one race over another--no matter how well-intentioned--would tend to perpetuate racial hostility, not end it.

The rulings were criticized by Los Angeles Deputy Public Defender Albert J. Menaster as increasing the chances that black defendants would face all-white juries. “How would a white person from the Valley feel being tried before an all-black jury in Watts?” he asked.

Menaster said the decision on trial transfers conflicted with the historic American legal tradition of trying cases in the community where a crime occurred--giving the defendant a trial by peers and the immediate community a direct role in the case. “The colonists wanted local juries,” he said. “They didn’t want to be shipped back to England for trial.”

However, Los Angeles Deputy Dist. Atty. George M. Palmer welcomed the rulings as a vindication of jury selection procedures in the county and denied they would substantially increase the likelihood of black defendants being tried by all-white juries.

“I don’t think anyone is going to be short-changed here,” Palmer said. “The prosecution is not going to make any effort to see that any particular defendant is tried by a particular jury, as far as race goes.”

Palmer said further that while trials are sometimes transferred among the county’s 11 judicial districts, such action was usually taken only in relatively few instances where courtrooms became overcrowded and defendants refused to waive their right to a speedy trial.

In the first case before the court, Edward Williams, charged with the first-degree murder of businessman Bruce Horton in 1980, was set to go on trial in Santa Monica Superior Court. Williams challenged jury selection procedures as denying him his constitutional right to a jury reflecting a fair cross-section of the community. He noted that only 4.5% of the prospective jurors appearing for duty there over a three-month period were black, compared to 11.4% of the countywide population. In Williams’ own case, 8.6% of the jurors summoned for duty were black.

The justices, in a majority opinion by Justice Edward A. Panelli, upheld the prosecution’s claim that the panel of prospective jurors need only reflect the racial composition of the district. Panelli noted that the Legislature had created separate judicial districts within the county because of its geographical expanse and need for efficiency--and that the lawmakers must have intended that each district serve as a “community” for jury selection purposes.

“The districts were to become microcosms of an entity--the Los Angeles Superior Court--that had become unmanageable and inefficient as a single unit,” Panelli observed.

The opinion was joined by Kaufman, Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas, Justice David N. Eagleson and retired Justice John A. Arguelles, participating by special assignment.

In the other case, Daniel Hernandez, charged with drunk driving in the Watts area of Los Angeles, challenged transfer of his trial to a courthouse in San Fernando 30 miles away, saying he had a constitutional right to be tried by a jury selected from the area where the crime occurred.

The high court, in another opinion by Panelli, rejected Hernandez’s contention and overturned a contrary 1973 ruling it said had conflicted with other state and federal rulings on the issue. Hernandez, the court said, was entitled to a trial only within the same county where the crime occurred.

Broussard and Mosk again dissented, with Broussard saying the court’s action meant that a defendant’s rights will be reduced “to a mere formality.”

“(They) will mean no more than a right to be tried before a jury representative of someplace or other--the place to be chosen by the state,” Broussard wrote.