Border Changes That Frighten

The weekend’s voting in Lithuania surprised no one. The Soviet Union’s first multiparty election in more than seven decades saw most Communist Party candidates, particularly those who urged keeping strong ties with Moscow, repudiated. The parliamentary candidates backed by the nationalist independence movement Sajudis won 72 of the 90 contests that were decided. Runoff voting scheduled soon in 51 remaining parliamentary districts will probably see similar Sajudis gains. Then will begin one of the more momentous processes in recent Soviet history.

With the political and moral authority of a sweeping electoral mandate behind it, Lithuania is preparing to claim its national independence, 50 years after its forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Soviet constitution guarantees, without saying how, that any of the nation’s 15 republics may secede. But until just a short time ago anyone foolish enough to advocate such a step would have been clapped into prison, and any movement organized to promote it would have been crushed. Now, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev abjures the use of force to block Lithuania’s move toward independence. His only recourse is to try to delay matters. To that end he argues, rather weakly, that Lithuania’s assertion of independence must be reviewed by the other republics. More effectively, he can try to drag out the negotiations about Lithuania’s future economic and military relations with the Soviet Union.

But Lithuanians who have never accepted the legitimacy of Soviet rule are unlikely to remain passive in the face of endless delays. Gorbachev surely understands that. He also understands the encouragement that a breakaway Lithuania could give the Soviet Union’s other restive republics. From the Baltic states to Central Asia, tens of millions of non-Slavic Soviet citizens have never been comfortable within the Soviet empire. They will watch with the greatest interest what Lithuania is allowed to do.

The rest of Europe will be watching as well, with mixed emotions. While no one who supports democracy can readily oppose self-determination for those so long denied a voice in their own destiny, no European familiar with the Continent’s tortured history of conquest, ethnic hatreds and territorial claims can be wholly at ease with the prospect that border changes may loom once again. That’s why many Europeans have become fed up with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s continued weasling on the question of recognizing Germany’s border with Poland. For good reason, any unresolved boundary issue is seen as threatening.

The key difference in Lithuania, of course, is that restoring the Baltic state’s pre-1939 border with the Soviet Union would not be seen as a danger to anyone’s security. But Lithuania isn’t Germany, which is why Kohl’s coy equivocations are making people exceedingly nervous.