‘72 Memo Told of Nicotine’s Narcotic Effect

In an unusually candid assessment, a Philip Morris executive wrote in an internal memo more than 20 years ago that most people “smoke for the narcotic value that comes from the nicotine,” a position that counters the company’s legal attack on federal regulation of tobacco products as drugs.

The blunt remark, among the most provocative ever to surface in internal industry documents, was part of a May 24, 1972, memo by Philip Morris marketing executive Al Udow. The memo concerned the company’s efforts to develop a menthol cigarette to compete with rival Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.’s hugely successful Kool brand--48 billion of which were sold in 1972.

In the memo, Udow discussed a “widely held theory . . . that most people smoke for the narcotic effect [relaxing, sedative] that comes from the nicotine.”

He added: “Although more people talk about ‘taste,’ it is likely that greater numbers smoke for the narcotic value that comes from the nicotine.”

In another revealing passage, the memo noted that focus group interviews and other sources “suggest that Kool is considered to be good for ‘after marijuana’ to maintain the ‘high’ or for mixing with marijuana, or ‘instead.’ ”

Lawyers suing the tobacco industry obtained the memo during pretrial discovery in Mississippi. Because of its provocative language, the document provides new ammunition for industry critics, and plaintiffs’ lawyers are sure to try to use it in trials.

Even hardened industry critics said they were stunned by the memo’s language.

“I keep thinking nothing can shock me, but they keep doing it,” said Richard A. Daynard, who heads the Tobacco Products Liability Project at Boston’s Northeastern Law School. “Here they are talking about cigarettes as a narcotic; in this memo, Udow abandons all the euphemisms.”

Philip Morris attorney Michael York said that the memo is not as damning as critics contend. He stressed that other company officials responded skeptically to Udow’s observations at the time.

In the memo, Udow stressed that “King-sized Kool has the highest nicotine delivery of all the king-size cigarettes available today--menthol or non-menthol.” Udow also said the ratio of nicotine yield to tar in Kool is among the highest in the market, meaning that the cigarette would have a relatively mild taste while delivering a substantial nicotine kick.

Company executive Robert Seligman wrote a memo in response stating that there was more to Kool’s success than its nicotine-to-tar ratios. Nonetheless, he approved further testing.

Kool was a strong seller to African American smokers and, another Philip Morris official, in a follow-up memo to Udow, asked him to design a test that “will also give us some insight as to the effects of increased nicotine on black smoker menthol product preference. Hopefully, this portion of the research could help us design a product to appeal to current black and white smokers of the Kool brand.”

The Philip Morris memos, and analyses similar to Udow’s by rival tobacco companies, reveal the cigarette companies’ strong interest in nicotine yields as they studied the success of competitors’ brands.

Previously disclosed memos from R.J. Reynolds and Brown & Williamson revealed their efforts to understand the chemistry and particularly the nicotine impact of Philip Morris’ juggernaut Marlboro brand, which became the world’s best selling cigarette in the 1970s.

For example, in 1973 R.J. Reynolds officials conducted secret research that concluded that the rapid rise of Marlboro was because of “deliberate and controlled” nicotine-enhancing methods, according to Reynolds documents that were made public in May as part of a massive lawsuit against the tobacco industry by the state of Minnesota.

Along the same line, in 1992, Brown & Williamson conducted a detailed assessment of Marlboro, concluding that Philip Morris added ammonia to enhance nicotine delivery, according to B&W; documents quoted last year in a Wall Street Journal article. Philip Morris said that it does not use ammonia to increase the nicotine kick.

Cigarette company officials have consistently denied that they manipulate nicotine or that smoking is addictive.

New Food and Drug Administration regulations announced in August are based on the premise that nicotine is a “drug” and that tobacco products are “drug delivery” devices and therefore subject to regulation.

The tobacco companies have strenuously disputed these contentions in a sweeping legal motion filed in federal court in North Carolina last week. The companies assert that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not authorize the FDA to treat cigarettes and smokeless tobacco as “drugs,” “medical devices,” or “restricted devices.” A hearing is scheduled for February.

In Udow’s memo, he states that Philip Morris psychologist William L. Dunn Jr., who joined the company in 1961, “set me off on this [research] track.”

In 1972, Dunn wrote another memo that stated: “Think of the cigarette pack as a storage container for a day’s supply of nicotine. Think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine.”

Reached at his Richmond, Va., home Tuesday, Dunn declined to discuss the memo, saying that Philip Morris attorneys had instructed him not to talk to the media because of pending legal proceedings. He did say that Udow had been trained as a psychologist and then went into consumer research. Udow could not be reached for comment.

Philip Morris attorney York said there is no indication that the company followed through with product designs tailored to Udow’s suggestions:

“Testing is one thing. Producing is something else. I am aware of no production specifications for a tar/nicotine ratio.”

Asked about Udow’s marijuana comment, York responded, “I don’t know what he was talking about.”