U.S. Funnels Billions to Science to Defend Against Terrorism

The Bush administration, banking on science to protect the nation from a catastrophic terrorist attack, has launched a vast research and development enterprise that will span many years and possibly decades.

On the drawing boards is one of the most ambitious and far-reaching U.S. research projects in recent history, involving more than a dozen federal agencies that are managing work by thousands of scientists at hundreds of institutions and laboratories across the nation.

At least $7 billion this year is slated for high-tech efforts to shore up defenses against a terrorist attack using biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. Federal agencies are investing $3.5 billion in research and development and as much as $3.4 billion in high-tech spending for vaccine supplies and improvements to the public health system, an analysis of the federal budget shows.

“Science is the big advantage the West has over these people who would throw us back to the Stone Age,” said Dr. Penrose “Parney” Albright, assistant secretary for science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security. “We will have a research establishment devoted to our priorities ... to stay ahead of the threat.”

Scientists envision far more sophisticated sensors at the nation’s ports that would detect attempts to smuggle nuclear weapons. They see major population centers continuously monitored by remote detectors for evidence of a biological or chemical attack, and the nation’s healthcare system equipped to handle mass epidemics spread by terrorists. Advanced research would deal with threats that don’t even exist yet, such as biologically engineered diseases.

Some terrorism experts, however, are questioning the Bush administration’s approach, saying the technology effort is poorly organized and may ultimately result in a massive waste of money -- “a huge new public trough” in the words of one defense official.

Other critics say that the investment is needed, but that scientists have promised too much.

“I am not convinced that technology is the solution to many of these problems,” said Mark Gerencser, who leads the global security practice at the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton. “The current research is very important, but in and of itself the technology is not going to solve the problem.”

Dennis J. Reimer, former Army chief of staff who now runs the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism headquartered in Oklahoma City, said so far the effort’s priorities remain unclear. But Reimer added, “It is unfair to say they have had ample time to do their work.”

Inside federal laboratories, however, scientists are brimming with optimism that they can provide the nation with a bulwark against attacks potentially more devastating than the Sept. 11 disaster.

A smallpox attack by terrorists, for example, could infect tens of thousands of Americans before the first victim would even fall ill and cause millions of painful deaths. Such an attack could come in any number of ways, experts say: the virus sprayed from airplanes, dispersed in restaurant salad bars or introduced into building ventilation systems.

The challenge involves determining who to treat and who to quarantine, before the disease spreads. Scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory now believe they have found a way to identify victims of smallpox and other infectious diseases within hours of exposure, using a sophisticated new analysis of blood molecules.

“It is an immense undertaking,” said Fred P. Milanovich, one of the nation’s top bioterrorism experts who launched the Livermore research project with a consortium of mathematicians, chemists, biologists and computer scientists.

Milanovich began to pioneer many of the current programs nearly a decade ago, so when the Sept. 11 attacks occurred, Livermore was ready to deploy some key systems -- such as rudimentary biological sensors.

The fiscal 2005 budget, which President Bush released last month, underscored the commitment to technology -- tapping the research establishment created to deal with 20th century problems to address 21st century security risks.

Almost every federal agency has a role, but a handful are taking the lead.

* The Department of Homeland Security, which was formed last year by combining 22 agencies, would get $1 billion for research in fiscal 2005. One of the department’s far-reaching visions for technology is a national sensor system that could monitor the air continuously for pathogens, dangerous chemicals or other public hazards. The sensors would all be linked to central control centers, resembling the military’s worldwide surveillance for a missile attack.

* The National Institutes of Health has a $1.7-billion bioterrorism research budget, the largest part of which is run by the National Institute for Allergies and Infectious Diseases. It supports roughly 2,000 researchers at universities and private companies across the country, according to Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, director of the institute.

Fauci said the funding growth represents the sharpest increase for any discipline in the history of NIH. “There is enough potential for massive impact from the release of biotoxins that we have to be prepared,” he said. Just outside Fauci’s office in Bethesda, Md., giant cranes are building a $186-million biological containment laboratory for bioterrorism research, one of five such facilities under construction from Texas to Massachusetts. Nine other regional laboratories are envisioned.

* The military is spending $706 million on research to counter weapons of mass destruction this year and another $500 million on buying equipment.

* The Energy Department has $232 million allocated to researching ways to detect signs of nuclear weapons production, part of $1.4 billion for controlling foreign nuclear weapons.

* The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is spending $1.1 billion this year to upgrade state and local capability to detect and contain an attack.

* The Federal Emergency Management Agency is spending $3.4 billion in 2004 and 2005 to stockpile vaccines around the country in case of a bioterrorism event. The effort has already produced enough smallpox vaccine to inoculate every American.

All this research and the overall $40 billion in homeland security activity is overseen in the White House by the Homeland Security Council, with a staff of 66.

The council does not attempt to strictly control the homeland security research program because it involves so much money, such a diverse set of projects and such a broad range of agencies, a senior White House official said.

It is headed by John Gordon, a former deputy director of the CIA, who has seldom been quoted in the press. Gordon’s predecessor, retired Army Gen. Wayne Downing, left the White House in frustration in 2002, according to sources familiar with his decision.

“It is obvious we don’t have a government administrative system for spending our research money wisely,” said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a think tank in Alexandria, Va. “The monster under the bed is a view that we can’t talk about threats because that would tell terrorists how to attack us. The research is important and the threat is real, but we need a full and frank exchange of views on this point.”

Even some insiders see trouble. One senior defense official cautioned: “What we will have in two or three years is a huge new public trough. The funding going into this is way overblown. When you throw this kind of money around, even well-intentioned people can’t control it.”

Efforts to build national networks of sensors “makes Star Wars look easy,” the defense official said, referring to the 20-year drive to build a missile defense system. The official agreed to speak on condition of anonymity. As government offices, universities and contractors establish dozens of homeland security research centers, he added, “What you hear is the thundering of the herd rushing to the money.”

Meanwhile, the General Accounting Office, the congressional investigating agency, has begun to question how the administration is setting the overall agenda for such research.

“They are still trying to determine a strategy,” said Ryan Coles, a GAO investigator.

Four months into the current fiscal year, some key federal laboratories are still uncertain of their research funding from the Department of Homeland Security, although Congress had appropriated $913 million last year. The budget documents lack detailed financial breakdowns that are standard for many government agencies.

The complex job of building the new research establishment is just starting and “obviously there are growing pains,” acknowledged Albright of Homeland Security.

The mission of making the nation more secure requires many more diverse agencies working together than ever before -- everything from border agents to firefighters and public health officials to nuclear weapons scientists.

“We have stitched together money to create programs that are broader than what any single agency could do,” said Wayne J. Shotts, director of Livermore’s center for homeland security.

One line of defense already in place is a Livermore-designed system monitoring the air in 30 U.S. cities for a biological attack. But the system is slow to provide warning and requires workers to collect filters each day. At a Livermore lab, John M. Dzenitis, a chemical engineer, is working on a better approach: a machine about the size of a compact refrigerator that can detect airborne pathogens automatically.

“We can run it for a week at a time, and it reports once every hour, 24 hours a day, said Dzenitis, the principal investigator who has helped build three of the devices with federal funding. One is testing the air in the Bay Area.

In another lab, Robert H. Dunlop, program leader for prevention of nuclear proliferation, is working on better ways to find possible nuclear weapons inside shipping containers. “This is not as simple as you might expect,” Dunlop said.

Among other things, Dunlop envisions creating smart shipping containers that would carry sensors with wireless transmitters and global positioning system locators. Each container coming into U.S. ports would radio its position and provide warning of an unauthorized intrusion or the presence of radiation. The cost target is $100 per container.

Robert C. Bonner, commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, said such smart containers would help his agency do its job. “Today’s containers are dumber than a fencepost,” he said.

On average, 5.4% of incoming containers nationally are inspected through some imaging or physical method, but officials anticipate that technology rather than more manpower will be what improves security. Since Sept. 11, Bonner said, his agency has already deployed 300 radiation sensors at ports of entry, and the devices being designed at Livermore will be even better.

Despite fears of nuclear bombs, the government is putting its biggest investments into defending against a biological attack. Albright, the technology chief at Homeland Security, said casualties from a biological attack “are not that much different than from a nuclear weapon.”

Even with improvements since Sept. 11, the public health system can handle a bioterrorism attack involving no more than 1,000 casualties, according to Joseph Henderson, director of terrorism preparedness and emergency response at the CDC. Such limitations worry Henderson.

“If you look at the Spanish flu outbreak in 1918, where globally 15 million people died ... are we ready for an event like that in our country if it were an organism or chemical introduced by a terrorist group? We are still not ready for those types of catastrophes,” he said.

With smallpox and anthrax, both listed as Class A bioterror weapons, it is usually too late to treat individuals by the time they become sick. Moreover, experts worry that in the future terrorists will have biologically engineered diseases that might be even more deadly or contagious.

Livermore’s program, which includes the University of Texas and the University of New Mexico, would theoretically allow doctors to identify who has contracted any kind of infectious disease within hours of exposure. It would mean healthy people could return to their jobs and the sick could be saved or quarantined, according to Ken Turteltaub, head of Livermore’s biodefense division.

Already, the team has been able to detect a lung infection with cowpox (a surrogate of smallpox) in mice within hours that would not normally be apparent for eight days, said Stephen Johnson, a consortium member who heads the University of Texas’ center for biomedical inventions.

Although no research project or other measure can ever ensure absolute protection, the Bush administration argues that every defensive move has long-term importance.

“The consequences are so huge that you can’t wait around for some evidence that an attack is being planned,” Albright said. “So, we have to prepare.”