Building Confidence in Europe

The Stockholm conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe resumed this week on a note of cautious hope that, with Moscow and Washington again on speaking terms, something worthwhile may yet come of it.

The 35-nation conference, which began a year ago, is attended by all European nations except Albania--neutrals as well as members of opposing alliances--plus Canada and the United States. It is an attempt to go beyond provisions of a 1975 Helsinki agreement to exchange advance notice of large-scale maneuvers.

One aspect of “confidence-building” is a regular exchange of information that might make war-by-miscalculation less likely. Such exchanges, in turn, presumably would build confidence on each side that it would know well in advance of a planned attack. The Helsinki agreement on advance notice of maneuvers has worked reasonably well, as far as it goes, but it exempts what goes on in most of the European part of the Soviet Union and needs better verification procedures.

The United States and its allies want to expand coverage of the agreement from the European coastline to the Ural Mountains. They want to include alerts, amphibious operations and mobilization. And they want on-site inspections to verify compliance.

Last year the Soviet Union shrugged off these concrete proposals, preferring to repeat demands for a mutual renunciation of force on the continent, a pledge against first use of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe. Few European nations are willing to let their security depend on Soviet good intentions.

This week, however, Western diplomats were encouraged by a “very mild” Soviet response to their submission of a document elaborating on the first of six confidence-building proposals.

The document, which was backed by the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, calls for each nation to provide information annually on its command organization, its non-nuclear ground forces and its land-based air forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Soviets have previously resisted proposals to exchange precise military information. This time they promised to take a careful look. Soviet chief delegate Oleg Grinevsky said publicly that any Stockholm-generated movement toward a better political climate in Europe would “be helpful in giving an impetus to other negotiations.” Presumably he meant the U.S.-Soviet missile negotiations that will begin in March.

The United States and other Western governments hope that he means it, but they cannot ignore the possibility that the Soviets view the Stockholm conference as nothing more than one more chance to block deployment of U.S.-made cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe as a counter to the Soviet buildup of SS-20 missiles aimed at the Western allies.

President Reagan, reflecting the general feeling within the Western alliance, has expressed a willingness to discuss the renunciation-of-force pledge demanded by Moscow if the Soviet Union would “negotiate seriously on concrete measures to give effect to that principle.”

Time and more talking will determine whether the mild Soviet demeanor this week signals an increased Soviet willingness to cooperate in the practical business of reducing the risk of a military confrontation in Europe.