MX Will Give Us Strength in Arms-Control Talks

There is an old saying that “nothing succeeds like success.” And as President Reagan begins his second term there is evidence that the reason for his success in getting the Soviets to return to the arms talks can be attributed to his drive for a modern strategic defense.

For four years the President has been suggesting to Congress and the American public that the only way to get the Soviets to negotiate seriously on arms reduction is to deal with them from a position of strength. To back up this philosophy he has proposed (and won) improvements in America’s land, sea and air triad strategic defense systems and our conventional forces. And, just as the President suggested all along, the Soviets suddenly seem ready to bargain seriously.

Now his policies are about to be put to a severe test in the form of an up-or-down vote by Congress on funding for 21 MX intercontinental ballistic missiles. If there is one lesson thus far to come out of Geneva, it is that the MX program should be continued--not only because it is needed strategically, but because it will give the President an essential tool for the arms-reduction talks that begin this month.

The MX is needed because the Soviets, with their 300-plus SS-18 ICBMs, already possess a capability to destroy a large portion of our lightly hardened ICBMs. We do not possess a similar capability. To me, this situation is destabilizing.

With respect to arms-reduction talks, history shows no precedent for unilateral disarmament by the Soviet Union. Indeed, every arms agreement that has been achieved to date has depended on a Soviet desire to respond to U.S. modernization, or the threat of it. For the past four years Congress and the American public have shown unusual unity and commitment toward modernizing our defenses. Now we need to send that same signal to the Soviet negotiators--a signal that we will not back down on MS.

The Scowcroft Commission report, which remains a landmark examination of our strategic options, correctly points out that “it is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployment in this decade.”

Some in Congress appear ready to dispute this, arguing that the MX is no longer the “bargaining chip” that it was once claimed to be, especially now that the Soviets are concentrating their criticism on the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”). But such an argument ignores the very heart of the Scowcroft recommendations--that we must continue to deploy the MX in order to give the Soviets a reason for seriously considering reductions in their own land-based ICBMs. Right now there is little or no incentive for the Soviets to do so, because our own land-based Minuteman poses a diminishing threat to the new generation of Soviet missiles.

Now, for what seems like the 10th time, the MX is at a crossroads. But, unlike most weapons programs, it is not being criticized for a development of schedule problems or a skyrocketing budget. Even most critics of the MX readily admit that the program is on schedule, within cost and preparing for a targeted deployment date of 1986.

The questions being asked about the MX today have to do with its basing--is it vulnerable/--and its usefulness in getting the Soviets to bargain seriously.

In terms of basing, the survivability of a land-based system, such as the MX in existing Minuteman silos, must be considered as part of the triad--our land, air and sea forces. There is “snyergism” among the three legs of the triad to ensure prompt retaliatory capability, and this factor is not well understood by some who debate the relative merits of strategic forces.

As the Scowcroft report noted, “Our bombers and ICBMs are more survivable together against Soviet attack than either would be alone. This illustrates that the different components of our strategic forces should be assessed collectively and not in isolation.”

Concerning arms-reduction talks, who can justifiably claim that the MX is no longer an important factor because of Soviet preoccupation with space weapons? Certainly not the Soviets, who probably hope that Congress unilaterally cancels the MX so that they do not have to negotiate away their SS-18s and SS-19s in Geneva.

As the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), said in a much-quoted speech last November: “The Soviets are not philanthropists; they don’t give up something for nothing. If we unilaterally cancel our weapon systems, like the MX, they are not likely to reduce their equivalent system.”

As Congress approaches its far-reaching decision on the MX, it would do well to consider the lessons of Geneva. The positive development on arms talks was not merely a result of good intentions by either side, but rather a result of a deliberate U.S. policy designed to spur realistic negotiations. If, in the course of those negotiations, Congress reverses course, those negotiations will be irreparably harmed.