Which Way Will Gorbachev Go? : Whatever Direction He Chooses, the Road Is All Uphill

Late this year two important things will happen in the Soviet Union: The Central Committee of the Communist Party will adopt a new five-year plan for the economy that will throw some light on the Kremlin’s guns-versus-butter priorities. And a party congress is expected to adopt a new party program that will set the ideological framework for Soviet policy over the next 10 or 20 years.

These occurrences, together with appointments to the ruling Politburo and key jobs in the bureaucracy, should begin to lift the veil of mystery as to what Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s ascension to the top job in the Kremlin may mean for the Soviet people and the world.

Meanwhile, the observable realities of Soviet life suggest that, whatever Gorbachev’s personal inclinations may be, economic pressures may ultimately push Moscow toward a grudging accommodation with Washington.

Up to now the signals admittedly have not been very encouraging.

The Soviet Union is back at the bargaining table in Geneva, but there is no evidence of change in the tough Soviet negotiating position. The new Soviet leader has used threatening language against Pakistan for helping the anti-Communist rebels in Afghanistan, and against the Belgians for allowing the deployment of American-made missiles.

Gorbachev has shown an interest in stronger trade ties with Western Europe, but has warned West Germany that support of President Reagan’s “Star Wars” program would damage relations. The Japanese have been abruptly told that there will be no change in the tough Soviet position on the Kurile Islands.

The anti-American rhetoric has subsided a bit (but only a bit), and there is clear evidence of an ongoing campaign to split the Western Alliance by encouraging neutralist, anti-American tendencies.

All of which means that, so far, Gorbachev is sticking pretty well with the established Soviet line. If there is a new and different Gorbachev approach, it has not surfaced.

Western Kremlinologists disagree on a lot of things, but on one point there is near unanimity: The making of foreign policy in the Soviet Union, as in the United States, reflects the imperatives and temptations of domestic politics and personal ambitions much more than it reflects cool assessments of national interest.

Thus, when trying to puzzle out what we can expect from Gorbachev, the place to start is in the Soviet domestic situation--which is dismal.

The traditional Soviet approach to economic development featured lopsided investment in heavy industry and the military-industrial complex (financed by a systematic squeeze on workers, consumers and farmers) and a run-everything-from-Moscow style of economic management. Low worker productivity was offset by a continuing flow of surplus labor from the countryside.

For a long time it worked, but no more. The system encourages resistance to innovation and new technology. The Soviet economy is failing to keep up with computer-age developments in the United States, Europe and Japan. Production of oil, the primary source of the export revenues that are used to purchase foreign grain and technology, has peaked and begun to decline. As a result of these and other factors, economic growth has been faltering since 1976.

The lackluster economic performance has had harmful social effects. Corruption and cynicism are rife. The shortage of decent and affordable consumer goods has left workers with little incentive to work either hard or well.

Alcoholism is rampant. (Per-capita consumption is estimated to be double that of the United States). Despite a seeming abundance of physicians and free medical care, the Soviet Union in the last 20 years has become the only industrialized country in the world where infant mortality rates have been going up and life expectancy for adult males has been going down.

About the only thing that the Soviet economy does well is produce an ever-growing mountain of military weapons. And Soviet military leaders show signs of worrying that even in this area technological lag is taking a dangerous toll.

Gorbachev has publicly indicated that making the economy perform more efficiently is far and away his No. 1 priority. So far, though, there is no evidence that he is really willing or able to undertake the sort of sweeping reforms that cannot occur without serious injury to the power and privileges of the ruling elite and the huge and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Yet if Soviet economic growth continues to stagnate, the Kremlin will face the unwelcome choice of squeezing consumers still more--an unappetizing prospect, given the example of worker revolt in Poland--or shifting national priorities at the expense of the military.

It would be surprising if Gorbachev the politician was ready at this stage to take on the military and its powerful allies within the ruling Establishment. Far more likely in the near term is an attempt to muddle through by trying to make the existing system work better, rather than by making basic changes in the system or in national priorities.

For muddling-through to work at all, however, requires a continuing infusion of Western, though not necessarily American, technology. The Soviets already appear to be nourishing trade with Western Europe while maintaining a basically confrontational relationship with the United States.

Unless this strategy of limited change and accommodation with the West gives the Soviet economy more of a boost than seems likely, however, the Kremlin will find it harder and harder to maintain the present growth in military spending--and to avoid an increasingly serious lag in weapons technology itself.

Under these circumstances a period of more relaxed relations with Washington, and an agreement trading reductions in Soviet missile strength for restraints on Star Wars and other elements of the U.S. military modernization program, may well become the “least bad” of the available choices, even in the eyes of the Soviet military and Kremlin ideologues. It would postpone the need for radical reform while allowing Moscow to moderate military spending without grievous damage to Soviet interests.

At best, however, such an evolution of Soviet policy will take time, and a flexible negotiating posture on the American side.

The West, as usual, has to be wary of confusing wish with reality. But, contrary to the teachings of Marx and Lenin, there is good reason to believe that time and the tide of history are no longer working for those fellows in Moscow.