Weinberger Scuttles Sense

Fourteen years ago, after a series of dangerous incidents at sea, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to hold annual talks to define clearer rules of conduct whenever ships of their two navies are in proximity. Those talks have led to a major reduction in near collisions and other incidents, and are regarded as of considerable general value by high U.S. Navy officials. But this year’s talks, scheduled to begin two weeks ago in Washington, were canceled. The Soviets backed out after they were told, on Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger’s initiative, that the meetings would be strictly business, with social events and other usual informal activities dropped.

No official reason was given the Soviet Union for the unilateral change in the schedule. Weinberger subsequently let it be known that his purpose was to protest the murder last March 24 of U.S. Army Maj. Arthur D. Nicholson Jr. by a Soviet sentry in East Germany. Weinberger--who acted without consulting either Secretary of State George P. Shultz or Robert C. McFarlane, President Reagan’s natonal-security adviser--said that he didn’t think social activities were “appropriate,” given the Soviet Union’s failure to apologize or to pay compensation for the shooting. Further, he took his action over the protests of the Navy itself.

Continuing anger over the Nicholson case can be justified, but allowing that anger to jeopardize what by all accounts is one of the more useful areas of U.S.-Soviet contacts hardly makes sense. True, it was the Russians who huffily pulled out of the talks. Equally true, the Soviet reaction should have been anticipated by Weinberger when he deliberately moved to impose a chill on the meetings. It may well have been this anticipation of the Soviet response that led Weinberger to bypass Shultz and McFarlane and proceed by himself on a matter that clearly involves not just protocol but also national policy.

Plainly, nothing has been gained by linking the Nicholson case to the naval talks, though something that is of proven benefit to the Navy and the Defense Department has for now been lost. The fact that the Soviets are given to odious behavior doesn’t remove the need for the United States, in its own interests, to maintain established contacts, even when that may involve socializing with Soviet representatives. Had Weinberger listened to top Navy officers or sought the counsel of his President’s top foreign-policy advisers, he would have better understood why.