Copters Change Nicaragua War : Soviet Equipment Puts Contras on the Defensive

Emilio Rojas, 20, a Sandinista soldier with a baby face and a downy wisp of a mustache, used to hike for days in pursuit of U.S.-backed guerrillas.

In recent months, however, helicopters have made it easier for Rojas and other soldiers to engage the contras , as the rebels are known.

“When the enemy is out there in the mountains, and we can’t get there by truck, they take us in helicopters to make contact faster,” Rojas told a reporter.

He and other members of his counterinsurgency battalion had come to a government farm near Matagalpa for a reunion with relatives. Part of the trip from the war zone was by helicopter.

Soviet-supplied helicopters are changing the war in Nicaragua, giving the Sandinista People’s Army a big logistical lift and a tough new edge in its campaign against the contras.

Since August, the Sandinista forces have been attacking rebel forces with MI-24 assault helicopters. This is a swift and effective gunship that has been used extensively by the Soviet Union against rebels in Afghanistan. Heavily armed and armored, the MI-24 can carry rocket pods or missiles under its stubby winglets.

The Soviet Union shipped at least six MI-24s to leftist Nicaragua last year, but the first verified report of their use in combat did not come until August of this year, at La Trinidad. Hundreds of contras carried out a daring attack on the town, on the Pan American Highway about 85 miles north of Managua, but were routed within hours by the Sandinista forces.

Rebels ‘Losing Initiative’

La Trinidad has come to be seen as something of a watershed in the Nicaraguan war. Cmdr. Joaquin Cuadra, the country’s vice minister of defense, said in a mid-October press conference that, before La Trinidad, the contras did not foresee “the great possibilities” that modern attack helicopters would give the army. Now, Cuadra said, the rebels “are completely losing the initiative.”

Cmdr. Javier Carrion, recently promoted to deputy chief of staff, said the MI-24s have been used in about a dozen operations since La Trinidad.

The army also has begun making frequent use of MI-8 transport helicopters in the last three months, Carrion said in an interview at his headquarters in Matagalpa, a provincial capital about 80 miles from Managua, the nation’s capital. He said Nicaragua has 12 MI-8s, which carry troops into battle, resupply them and evacuate wounded. They also serve as gunships, Carrion said.

Another military source said the army actually has 16 to 18 MI-8s. The contras say they have shot down several MI-8s and MI-24s, but Carrion said none have been lost in combat.

Since August, he said, government forces have broken up concentrations of contras attempting to mount a major offensive in the interior, starting with the attack at La Trinidad. “The importance of helicopters in this operation has been vital,” Carrion said.

Specially Trained Units

Also important have been the firepower of Soviet-made artillery and the fighting skills of specially trained counterinsurgency units called BLIs--the abbreviation, in Spanish, for Irregular Warfare Battalions.

A military source said the Sandinistas have at least 24 pieces each of 122-millimeter artillery, with a range of 14 miles, and 152-millimeter artillery, with a range of 7.5 miles. They also have 24 MB-21 rocket launchers, formidable truck-mounted weapons that fire from 40 barrels, the source said. He said the number of fully operational counterinsurgency battalions has increased from seven late last year to at least 13.

Carrion said the increased use of helicopters, artillery and Irregular Warfare Battalions has radically changed the nature of the four-year-old war.

“It is a different war, definitely a different war, with a big advantage for us,” he said. The Sandinista advantage, he added, has become irreversible. “The contras may achieve some partial military successes, but they can’t change the general situation.”

One Advantage for Contras

The only important advantage the contras have, according to Carrion, is intelligence information received from U.S. spy planes that fly over Nicaragua.

A foreign military analyst agreed that the Sandinistas clearly have the upper hand.

“They have been able to identify where the contra forces are and get units in to break them up before they can hit in force,” the analyst said, asking not to be further identified. “The contras have been on the strategic defensive.”

But he noted that the contras have just begun to benefit from $27 million in U.S. non-lethal aid approved by Congress in June. “The next six months are going to be pretty important in terms of what the contras can do with this new support they are getting,” he said.

Although the Sandinistas may be ahead, they are not coasting. Sources in Managua and Washington say they have been bringing in large shipments of new Soviet weapons--possibly including SA-6 medium-range missiles designed to shoot down jet fighters.

Anti-Rebel Units Formed

And Carrion said the army has begun to form new anti-guerrilla units that are smaller and more specialized than the Irregular Warfare Battalions--the latter usually have up to 1,200 members--and will be more experienced and more agile.

“Our idea is to organize them more or less like the special American troops--the Rangers,” Carrion said.

The core of the new units will be combat veterans of Irregular Warfare Battalions with additional training, he said.

Specialized counterinsurgency troops have become a key element in Sandinista army tactics. For example, when the army detects concentrations of contra troops in mountainous terrain, it attacks with a combination of artillery, helicopters and fixed-wing planes plus ground troops spearheaded by Irregular Warfare Battalions.

“We use the tactic of hitting them with the air force and with artillery that we have stationed at different points of the terrain,” Carrion said. “That forces the contras to abandon the area and mobilize themselves in smaller groups. During that movement by the contras, we send in troops to ambush them, pursue them and move out in front of them.”

Contra Movement Stalled

As a result, he said, the contras have been unable to mass troops for an attack in the interior since the operation at La Trinidad.

In recent weeks, the contras’ main efforts have been in the eastern province of Zelaya and in the central province of Chontales, Carrion said.

In Chontales, a mountainous province south of Matagalpa, Carrion said, about 400 contras are trying to establish a permanent presence. The army is starting a drive against them.

Smaller contra forces, in roving bands of five to 30 men, operate in parts of Matagalpa province, to the north in Nueva Segovia and Jinotega provinces and to the south in Boaco province, Carrion said.

In the past few weeks, he said, the army has been concentrating its campaign against about 1,500 contras in the remote reaches of central Zelaya, where government troops have rarely operated in the past.

“Helicopters are a very important element in this kind of theater,” he said. “It is a swampy theater, where the enemy utilizes rivers and streams with reed rafts and shallow-draft boats.”

Flights From Honduras

The contras receive supply drops from C-47 transport planes flying at night from Honduras, according to Carrion, and the army has been unable to stop the flights because it does not have jet fighters. But, he said, the government’s helicopter-supported offensive is gradually driving the contras north toward the Honduran border.

The Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the main contra army, has bases on the Honduran side of the border. Contra leaders say the force, known by the Spanish initials FDN, has 17,000 troops and is growing rapidly.

Carrion, however, put total Democratic Force strength at about 10,000 and estimated that only 3,000 of them are in Nicaragua.

He estimated that in August, there were up to 6,000 Democratic Force guerrillas in Nicaragua, preparing for the offensive that he said has been “neutralized and aborted.”

Troops on the Frontier

But he predicted that the contras will soon try to filter back in across the border. To stop them, he said, the army has stationed several battalions along the mountainous frontier.

Helicopters are helping the army maintain troops in some rugged border areas that previously were unguarded, Carrion said.

On Nicaragua’s southern border with Costa Rica, the Sandinista army has all but neutralized a smaller rebel army called the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, or ARDE, headed by Eden Pastora.

The ARDE force, without the U.S. support given to the contras in the north, has been severely weakened by a shortage of supplies. Sandinista troops with helicopter support have overrun several of Pastora’s bases on the San Juan River, which defines part of the border.

The rival Democratic Force, in an attempt to create a new southern front, is said to be recruiting from Pastora’s disintegrating ranks.

Fighting by Indian rebels along the Caribbean coast has subsided this year because some of the Indian guerrilla leaders are seeking a peaceful settlement with the Sandinistas.

The Sandinistas have made peace offerings to the Indians but say they will never negotiate with the Nicaraguan Democratic Force.

The Nicaraguan army reported an average of about five combat clashes a day with the Democratic Force in October. President Daniel Ortega said in July that 12,000 Nicaraguans had been killed in the four years of war.

Draft Efforts Redoubled

Both the contras and the army are increasing their manpower for more war. Contra leaders say they hope to double their forces in the coming months. The Sandinistas have redoubled draft efforts and instituted mandatory registration for the army reserve.

In the next three or four months, about 4,000 draftees are to be released from the army after completing two years of service, but they will be replaced by new men now being inducted. The veterans will be required under a new law to stay in the reserve.

The law also requires all men between the ages of 25 and 40 to register for the reserve. Sandinista officials have indicated that perhaps 40% of those registered will be enrolled in reserve units, which will receive 30 days of training a year. The reserve units will be subject to active-duty mobilization when needed.

The Sandinista army does not publicize figures on its troop strength, but foreign military analysts estimate that it has 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers. An estimated 15,000 are draftees, and 30,000 to 50,000 others are reservists and militiamen on active duty.