THE SUMMIT AT GENEVA : W. Europe View--Solid NATO Support but Public Is Wary

In the weeks leading up to the U.S.-Soviet summit conference, the role of the Europeans has been like that of tennis spectators--watching volleys from left and right in the first set of what is going to be a long match, and with the score tied at deuce.

On the eve of the conference, all the recent propaganda exchanges notwithstanding, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has gained an advantage in European public opinion.

The new, more innovative, more open style of Soviet leadership under Mikhail S. Gorbachev has certainly made an impression. Still, no one in the West puts much trust in the Soviet call for a return to the detente of a decade ago, a call that has yet to be backed up with deeds that reflect any change in the Soviet attitude that derailed the last era of detente.

Neither is there any great confidence among Europeans in the sincerity of the United States in the search for a new arms control agreement. The sudden disclosure three weeks ago that the Reagan Administration might reconsider its interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty--to allow development and testing of the proposed space-based defense system, nicknamed “Star Wars”--came close to torpedoing even what limited confidence there was. However, that cork was hastily pushed back into the bottle by Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

Clover Outside, Worried Inside

Christoph Bertram, political editor of the influential Hamburg weekly Die Zeit and a former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, commented recently:

“It would be foolish of the allies to pretend that they are not behind President Reagan, and it would be fundamentally wrong to say right now that we have a different view, and say it out in the open. But I think there are anxieties that the chance that a new Soviet leader may offer may not be grasped by the President at this stage of his career, this stage of his responsibilities and this stage of Soviet development. So, I think that this is a worry the allies have. But to the outside world they have to pretend that everything is clover.”

Britain’s Lord Carrington, secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, told an audience recently:

“I would have to be deaf, blind and impenetrably stupid not to be aware of European concerns about the American Strategic Defense Initiative, and it is an important part of my job to ensure that these are understood and taken account of in Washington. It is important that Allies on both sides of the Atlantic should be aware of the divisive potential of the SDI and take steps necessary to avoid the danger.”

Pierre Lellouche of the French Institute for Foreign Policy Studies in Paris, a specialist on nuclear and strategic questions, observed:

“I am concerned that in the nine months that Gorbachev has been in power, he has managed to reverse the respective positions of the Soviet Union and the United States in the public image. A year ago, it was the Soviet Union which was cornered, boycotting negotiations and trying desperately to find a face-saving way to return to the table. It was the Americans who looked very good, multiplying negotiating offers with President Reagan just reelected.

“It is no longer the case today. It is the Soviets who look good and Reagan is on the defensive--and all that was done in nine months. Soviet strategy is basically aimed at influencing our public opinion, but we cannot do the same to theirs. The propaganda war is as important, if not more important, than the negotiation itself.”

So Reagan goes to Geneva with all the predictable official backing of NATO governments in Europe, the ringing declarations of full support and solid backing for American policies and negotiating positions--but with apprehension and uncertainty not far below the surface. Europeans are more concerned about what happens over the long haul than about what happens at the conference itself.

“A lot of expectations have been raised, and people want to hear that Reagan and Gorbachev are finally getting along together, that the arms race is under control,” Lellouche said. “But that won’t come from Geneva and it won’t come from the negotiations after the summit. Therefore, there is the great danger that the Soviets will continue to exploit this frustration, and I cannot exclude the possibility for a new peace movement in Europe, a shifting of the center of gravity toward a more extreme kind of unilateral disarmament, such as we have seen in the left of the Labor Party in Britain or in some of the debates in the (West) German Social Democratic Party. This is the main danger.”

So far, despite the undoubted public relations impact of Gorbachev in Western Europe, with his recent visit to Paris, and the sense of dynamism he brings after years of geriatric Soviet leadership, neither government nor public opinion in Western Europe has been swept overboard by some mirage of a “new Soviet Union.”

“There will be no return to the detente atmosphere of the mid-1970s,” a senior official of the French Ministry of External Relations said in a recent discussion of Gorbachev’s visit to Paris early last month. “That was the product of a long period of negotiations following the Cuban missile crisis and the Soviet occupation of Prague (in 1968). We had the Berlin agreement, your 1972 ABM (anti-ballistic missile) treaty and then of course the Helsinki agreements in 1975. But since then, too much has happened for any return to that kind of detente. There is a far different attitude toward the Soviet Union in Western Europe today, skepticism and disbelief and rejection, which is simply a political fact in the West.”

In summary then, there are two trends in public opinion on the eve of the summit conference--realism and skepticism, along with hope and expectation. Regardless of whatever expectation Gorbachev has been able to stir, it has not stopped the Belgian and Dutch governments from moving ahead on deployment of American cruise missiles. The Belgian government accepted a first contingent of the missiles in April, then went on to win an election in October.

So far, the Gorbachev public relations pattern has had almost no effect on government actions or policies in Western Europe, or on voting patterns. In fact, the Communists’ share of votes, as well as their political influence, continues to decline everywhere in Western Europe.

All this gives the Reagan Administration every justification for considering that it has a “position of strength” in the Atlantic Alliance as it goes into the summit meeting. However, how will it come out of a meeting that produces no tangible results?

“If you look at the relationship between Europeans and Americans over the past few years, the Europeans have generally tended to underestimate the influence they could have on American decisions,” Die Zeit’s Bertram said. “Therefore, they have been more moderate and passive in their positions than would have been justified. I think that this is a situation that should not continue--must not continue--because I do not see impulses for new directions coming from Washington.”

When the summit is over, the key problem will still be the arms control negotiations--and, within that, what Carrington has called “the divisive potential of SDI.” Reagan made an effort in his speech to the United Nations to shift the focus away from arms control to political issues and regional points of tension but, not surprisingly, the Soviet Union has now waved these issues to one side.

Europeans tend to agree with the Soviet Union on this score, because they do not feel that they are much involved in the regional questions of Nicaragua, Cambodia or Angola. They do feel deeply involved in the nuclear confrontation.

In London, the Financial Times called the President’s U.N. speech “a profound letdown,” and went on to say:

“As far as the world is concerned, the central issue for the summit is nuclear arms control. The hard fact is that there can be no deal on offensive nuclear weapons unless there is also an agreement on the future of defensive systems. If there is to be a deal, SDI must in some sense be on the table for negotiation. At this moment it is unnecessary and probably undesirable for the U.S. to state publicly in what sense. But it is pointless to go on repeating that SDI will not be on the table.

‘Praiseworthy but Scarcely Reliable’

“By contrast, President Reagan’s proposal for negotiations to end conflicts in five Third World countries, in which the Soviet Union or its allies are involved, may seem praiseworthy but is scarcely realistic. The Ethiopian government is not likely to negotiate with the Eritreans nor the Angola government with UNITA, just because Mr. Reagan suggests it; and it is far from clear that the Russians could bring about such negotiations even if they agreed with the Reagan proposal. If there is to be any chance of a new chapter in East-West relations, these conflicts need to be discussed between the superpowers. But the starting point for any improvement in East-West relations must be the neuralgic issue, nuclear arms control.”

In approaching Geneva, the Reagan Administration has taken far more time and trouble listening to and consulting with its NATO allies than it has ever done in the past.

Gone are the days of the trans-Siberian gas pipeline dispute, when the Reagan Administration sought to block European participation in the Soviet-sponsored project. And nobody hears the Pentagon theorizing any longer about shifting strategic emphasis from Europe to some “island defense” strategy, with U.S. strong points scattered around the globe, as was discussed in the early days of the Reagan Administration.

Europe’s minimal hope now is that the Geneva conference will mark a new beginning in East-West relations. Whether this will be a good beginning or a bad beginning is still a big question.