Soviets Play the Euromissile Card : Would Removal of SS-20s Turn Allies Against ‘Star Wars’?

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s dramatic call for the abolition of nuclear weapons by the end of this century should not be allowed to obscure the more immediate implications of the proposal.

Moscow’s extension of its moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing offers continued hope for a permanent halt to nuclear explosions. And the willingness to discuss cooperative measures to verify arms-control treaties suggests that the Soviets may be prepared to sacrifice their mania for secrecy in order to reach new agreements.

The proposal for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe is the most significant component of the latest package of Soviet arms-control initiatives.

On negotiations concerning the highly controversial European missile deployments, the Soviets seem to have reversed field, now accepting the so-called zero option that was the centerpiece of President Reagan’s arms-control policy during his first term. The President had called for the elimination of Soviet SS-20 missiles in return for a pledge by the United States not to deploy the new Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missiles on European soil. But the Soviets had until now been adamant in their rejection of the zero option.

The new call for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons should be seen for what it is--a public-relations response to the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative. While Reagan proposes to eliminate the nuclear weapons by intercepting them in space, Gorbachev proposes to go to the source and eliminate nuclear weapons by mutual agreement. Both proposals are visionary responses to the universal dread of nuclear holocaust. But both are equally unlikely to be realized, though it must be admitted that Gorbachev’s notion seems a somewhat more direct and certainly less expensive way of approaching the problem.

The current preoccupation with “Star Wars” has eclipsed the public visibility of the Euromissile issue. But it has not gone away. Both sides traded proposals for handling these systems in the months leading up to the November summit.

In Moscow’s comprehensive proposal of last October, American Euromissiles (the Pershing 2s and cruise missiles) were to be counted as part of the overall total of U.S. strategic forces. But the SS-20s would not count as part of Moscow’s total, since these missiles could not reach the United States. Despite its inequitable treatment of intermediate-range forces, the proposal had the positive feature of acceding to the deployment of American missiles in Europe.

The United States responded by offering a freeze, at the current level of 140, on the number of American Euromissile launchers if the Soviets would reduce their SS-20s to a similar number. This would represent a move away from Zero Option and toward the Soviet notion of equal numbers. Until this week that’s where things stood.

What has not changed with Gorbachev’s proposal is the Soviet insistence on the linkage of progress in various arms-control talks. When the first Pershing 2s arrived in Europe in November, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the strategic arms reduction talks, saying that no agreement on any arms-control matter was possible. And when the Soviets returned to the bargaining table last January, they insisted that agreement on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces would first require restrictions on the Star Wars anti-missile program. Despite some hints that a separate deal might be possible, there is little ground for optimism.

The Soviet strategy seems to be one of making the Western Europeans an offer on Euromissiles that is too good to pass up, in the hope that our allies will persuade the Reagan Administration to come to terms on limiting the Star Wars program.

Despite widespread public opposition in several countries, the original decision to deploy the Pershing 2s and cruise missiles was widely supported by Western European governments. But the Star Wars plan has little attraction for Europeans. However well it might protect the American population, Star Wars would do little to protect European cities from short-range Soviet missiles. And the removal of the nuclear threat would leave Europe vulnerable to Soviet conventional forces.

The Reagan Administration has tried to enlist Western European support for Star Wars by promising large contracts for European companies to work on the program. But this is no second Marshall Plan to boost European high-tech industry. Tentative support for Star Wars may turn to increased frustration with the lack of progress on arms control.

So the Soviets now seem to be agreeing with Reagan’s original Zero Option proposal in a package of approaches to arms control seemingly rather well tuned to European sensibilities. The real question is whether Reagan is prepared to compromise his long-term vision of a perfect anti-missile system in return for real progress toward the reduction of the nuclear threat.