A Policy for Peace in Angola : U.S. Headed Opposite Way

There are few universally valid prescriptions in foreign affairs. Attempting to base policy on slogans rather than on discrete analysis usually leads to trouble. So will it be with the so-called Reagan Doctrine if the United States tries to use it as a global plan of action. There are, to be sure, situations when the provision of aid to rebels fighting against communist governments, or governments we consider on the way to communism, would not only advance U.S. interest but be morally and legally defensible. Helping the moujahedeen in Afghanistan is a case in point. But there are other situations when such aid would undermine broader U.S. interests and brand Americans as international scofflaws.

All these pitfalls are present in Angola, yet aid for Jonas Savimbi has become a new rallying cry of the right in the United States. To hear them tell it, Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA, by its Portuguese initials) stands alone and without assistance in the face of an offensive mounted by the Marxist government with its Soviet and Cuban allies. Savimbi, however, is already receiving considerable assistance from his allies, the South Africans. They have not only supplied money and war materiel during his ten-year guerrilla war against the government in Luanda, but also frequently bombed, invaded or carried out commando raids in his support.

The only way the United States could increase the level of assistance to Savimbi would be to provide support in addition to South Africa’s. Thus, what advocates of such aid are talking about, though they avoid saying so, is a joint U.S.-South African enterprise. Nothing could be more likely to destroy U.S. relations with black Africa for years to come--or more undermine any residual impression that there is a moral basis to the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy.

As for the right’s contention that we must help Savimbi because he is a democrat, forget it; he isn’t. His recent claims are directly tied to his quest for U.S. support and are not born out by the record. During the national liberation struggle against the Portuguese in the 1970s, Savimbi proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist and professed great admiration for Mao Tse-tung. His party is still organized along classic Marxist-Leninist lines, central committee and all. Though he may be charismatic and effective, those qualities should not be confused with democratic credentials.

Nor would the provision of aid to Savimbi, overt or covert, achieve U.S. objectives in Angola. The United States should certainly want to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military personnel and to create conditions under which U.S. influence in that country might be increased at Moscow and Havana’s expense. This is entirely feasible. The Angolan government says it wants closer relations with the United States. The West, and the United States in particular, has far stronger economic cards to play in Angola than does the East. The United States is already Angola’s principal trading partner. But it is difficult to turn those economic cards into political influence as long as there are some 30,000 Cuban troops in the country.

The best way to get those troops out is not by aiding Savimbi. That, on the contrary, will result in Angola calling for more Cuban and Soviet assistance--exactly what happened after last year’s stepped up South African attacks. The surest way to to bring about the withdrawal of those troops is to resolve the status of Namibia, the vast territory on Angola’s southern frontier that South Africa rules in defiance of United Nations Resolution 435 calling for Namibian independence. Both Angola and Havana have promised Cuban withdrawal at the time of a settlement in Namibia.

For the past four years, a few lonely diplomats in the State Department, led by Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker, have continued the efforts made during the Carter Administration to produce just such a settlement, and to have a commitment for the withdrawal of Cuban troops as part of the package deal. Crocker may still be trying, as evidenced by his recent trip to Angola. The right in the United States, suspicious of any outcome that would diminish South Africa’s pre-eminence in the region, belittles such attempts. In a recent article, for example, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick claimed “there is nothing to show for their efforts.”

Kirkpatrick’s assertion is factually correct. But why? In 1984, things did look more promising. American diplomats had convinced Angola and South Africa to accept a cease-fire. South Africa grudgingly agreed to pull its troops out of Angola--and keep them out. Angola and Cuba presented a timetable for the withdrawal of Cuban forces to the north of Angola and, eventually, back to Cuba. Skeptical observers were just beginning to ask themselves if it could really be true that South Africa intended to give up Namibia and permit peace to break out in the region.

The answer came in May, 1985, when South Africa deliberately--and without provocation--violated the cease-fire with a commando raid into Angola. And to emphasize their disdain for U.S. diplomacy, the South Africans targeted a Gulf Oil facility. Their commandos were moving to blow it up when they were spotted and repulsed. Since then, South Africa has repeatedly violated the cease-fire.

In private conversations, South African officials acknowledge that they have no intention of giving up Namibia; rather, they intend to hang on, taking any military measure they deem necessary.

The logical response of the United States would be to exert increased pressure against Pretoria. It , after all, is the transgressor. Instead, the American right wants to join Pretoria in exerting military pressure against Luanda, the victim. It would hardly have been more illogical to have called for sanctions against Czechoslovakia because of Hitler’s seizure of the Sudetenland. Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration, seems to like the idea and is actively considering aid for Savimbi. That would make us South Africa’s ally, and remove any pressures we might have exerted on Pretoria for internal reform. It will also make us an accessory to the continued non-observance of U.N. Resolution 435. That is no position for the United States to be in.

The most compelling weapon the United States has, the one that sets it apart from the Soviet Union, is the moral force of its example. It is this, not ICBMs, that gives the United States some claim to be the portent of a better future. But what sort of example would be set by assisting white supremacist South Africa maintain Namibia in subjugation and fuel the civil war in Angola? And what, in the long run, could be accomplished by doing so, other than helping create conditions for a catastrophic explosion in Southern Africa--an explosion that will benefit no one, except, perhaps, the Soviet Union.