Teeth for the Tiger

Just how strong, militarily, does the United States want China to be? A glib answer would be that China should be strong enough to stand up against political and military intimidation by the Soviet Union, but not strong enough to be a source of major concern to America’s friends and allies along the periphery of China.

That, of course, is a contradiction in terms--which means that the United States must walk a delicate line as it helps China modernize its antiquated military forces.

According to word circulating in Washington and Peking, the United States will soon announce the conclusion of the largest sale yet of American military equipment to China. The hardware involved is apparently defensive--radar, fire direction equipment and other hardware needed to modernize China’s F-8 interceptor aircraft. The deal could be worth anywhere from $200 million to $1 billion to U.S. defense contractors.

China has some weapons that are associated with big power status--two nuclear-powered, missile-firing submarines, for example, and more than 100 land-based missiles of medium and intermediate range and a half-dozen more capable of hitting targets 5,000 to 8,000 miles away.

Mostly though, the armed forces are equipped with old weapons copied from Soviet arms supplied in the 1950s. The ground forces are short of tanks and anti-tank weapons. The navy lags in torpedo technology, radar for fire control and navigation, sonar and minesweepers. The air force is short on bombers and military transports, and its fighter-interceptors lack modern avionics.

Despite a preference for making their own arms, the Chinese have purchased weapons and related equipment and technology from Western suppliers. Peking and Washington have held off-and-on talks about arms purchases since 1979;the United States has indicated a general willingness to sell defensive arms. Until now, however, the only government-to-government arms deal consummated was the $98 million sale last September of equipment and technology for an artillery munitions factory.

The interested onlookers include not only the Soviet Union, but other countries in East Asia. Taiwan obviously worries that, 10 or 15 years down the road, a better-armed China might be tempted to bring the island into the family fold by force of arms. Taiwan aside, a stronger China might use its powers of intimidation to assert control over oil rights in seas claimed by Indonesia and the Philippines.

Fortunately, all such concerns are premature. China’s defense budget is actually shrinking as a share of total government spending. It remains a small fraction of the military outlays by both superpowers. Unlike the Soviet Union, China assigns a secondary priority to military spending.

Understandably, however, this country’s Asian allies are not sanguine. Sale of strictly defensive arms to China is in this country’s strategic interest. But so are good relations with the non-Communist countries of Asia. Arms negotiations with China must always be conducted with due regard for the sensitivities of the countries not only on China’s borders but also in China’s neighborhood.