What Will the Neighbors Think? : Weigh Aid to ‘Freedom Fighters’ Against Regional Impact

Increasing attention is being focused on the Reagan Doctrine, the Administration’s determination to compete against the Soviets in the Third World by supporting resistance groups variously described as freedom fighters, anti-communist insurgents or friends of America. These include the contras in Nicaragua, the Afghans and Kampucheans resisting Soviet and Vietnamese invaders, and most prominently of late, the forces of Jonas Savimbi who are contesting against the Marxist, Cuban-supported regime in Angola.

As doctrines go, this one has quite a bit to recommend it.

It is hard to argue against supporting people who are opposed to the Soviets and their allies; certainly Moscow has no compunction about lending aid to anti-American resistance groups the world over. And there is little to be said in favor of the regimes that these groups are opposing; neither the Sandinistas nor the Angolan Marxists have proven themselves to be models of governance, and the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese in Kampuchea are simply aggressors who should not be allowed to hold onto their gains.

There are certainly questions as to the merits and the objectives of some of these groups. The resistance forces in Nicaragua and Kampuchea are tainted by the presence of the Somocistas and Pol Pot; Savimbi’s and the Afghans’ dedication to democracy is questionable.

Granted, there is a strong argument to be made for tolerance in these cases, for one cannot expect all of the pots to glisten when in the company of such grubby kettles. We do, however, have to look more closely at those whom we are supporting.

An equally fundamental question has to do with the chances of success. Simply supporting any group that declares itself to be anti-Soviet is poor policy, for there is nothing to be gained by becoming involved in situations where the cards are stacked heavily against us.

In applying the Reagan Doctrine, we need some guide beyond nostalgia for the days when we could pretty much impose our will anywhere in the world.

One of the criteria that Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.) has suggested is particularly useful at a time when Soviet strength has grown and Third World countries themselves are increasingly demanding a right to have a say in what goes on in their neighborhoods. Solarz would have us ask what the countries around Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea and Nicaragua think about the anti-communist resistance groups.

This is a sensible place to start, for nearby nations are the ones most intimately concerned and may be able to judge better than we both the political acceptability of the insurgents and their strengths.

In both the Afghan and Kampuchean cases, we are acting in support of regional sentiment. India aside, opinion in Southwest Asia is solidly opposed to the Soviet aggression. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN (the grouping of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Brunei) has provided the impetus and framework for American assistance to the Kampuchean resistance.

ASEAN and the Muslim states of West Asia have taken the lead in mobilizing international opinion, and Kampuchea and Afghanistan are among those welcome, but unfortunately rare, issues where we find ourselves in the majority in the United Nations and alongside the bulk of opinion among the nonaligned.

Support for Savimbi’s UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) would be quite a different case. Whatever the relative merits of Savimbi and the government in Luanda, African opinion will not rally behind a leader who has such close ties to South Africa. If we support Savimbi, we can expect opposition from the neighboring African states and their reluctant acquiescence should the Cubans and Soviets decide to up the ante. This is exactly what happened in 1975, when Angola achieved independence; it is not often that history offers us such an unambiguous lesson.

In Nicaragua the problem is more complex, but here, too, a regional effort is at work. The so-called Contadora group--Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela--has the support of all the major Latin American democracies. To the extent that we are able to follow the Contadora powers’ lead, the chances of a lasting, positive outcome will be increased.

In the last analysis, we have to make our own decisions in applying the Reagan Doctrine, but we cannot afford to alienate unnecessarily the nations that are the near neighbors to the scene of the contest. On all counts, it makes sense to listen to their views and act in accordance with them, as much as our own interests allow. They are the ones that have to live with the outcome at close quarters, and in all likelihood they have a better understanding of the local realities than we do.

Contesting against the Soviets is a vitally important part of our policy’s challenge in the Third World, but it is not the only one. Our ultimate objective must be the understanding and cooperation of the Third World states themselves.