Hopes for Kadafi’s Downfall Ride on Wishful Thinking

For pure drama, this week’s events in Libya have been extraordinary. On Tuesday morning, five targets were destroyed there in carefully planned bombing attacks by U.S. Air Force planes based in England and U.S. Navy aircraft based on carriers in the Mediterranean. On Wednesday, reports of an attempted coup in Tripoli suggested that the regime of Moammar Kadafi might be overthrown by elements of the regular Libyan army.

As the dust begins to settle, it is now time for a sober assessment of the consequences of the action. Such an assessment suggests that there has been much wishful thinking by policy-makers within the Reagan Administration and members of the Western news media.

A closer look at the alleged coup attempt illustrates this tendency. Apart from outbursts of gunfire at Kadafi’s compound, the precise details of what happened Wednesday remain murky. In the midst of this confusion, some Western media tantalized their audiences with reports that elements of the regular Libyan army were engaged in attacks on the Revolutionary Guards who protect Kadafi, and then that Kadafi was killed or had fled the country. It was Kadafi, however, who had the last word as he appeared on Libyan television to denounce the U.S. attack.

There are several good reasons why elements of the Libyan military would act to remove Kadafi by force. Indeed, there have been at least 10 such attempts since 1980. Some of these have involved assassination attempts; others have been more conventional military revolts. Disgruntlement among members of the Libyan military stems from their diminished importance since the early 1980s in relation to the Revolutionary Guards, the discrediting of Libya’s image abroad because of terrorist activities, the squandering of Libyan resources on expensive and extensive arms purchases and foreign adventures (such as in Chad), and the disruption and chaos in Libyan society and the economy wrought by Kadafi’s revolutionary domestic policies. Yet it is not likely, contrary to the desires of the Reagan Administration, that a U.S. attack would encourage the Libyan military to move against Kadafi.

The Reagan Administration hoped, among other things, that the bombing attacks would help to destabilize support for Kadafi within Libya. In the short term, at least, that hope is another example of wishful thinking. The most likely consequence of a U.S. military attack against Libya, especially one that inflicts casualties on civilians, is to rally support among large numbers of Libyans for the regime. It is normal for a society to rally behind a national leader at moments of crisis, and there is little reason to suspect that Libyans will do the opposite. In short, while this week’s bombing attacks were a great success on the American political front, they strengthened, rather than weakened, Kadafi’s domestic position.

It was also wishful thinking by the Administration that the bombing attacks would deter Libyan state-sponsored terrorism. This terrorism flows, ultimately, from Kadafi’s sense of the rightness of his cause--a conviction that, for him, justifies the use of violent means. Because of his background and upbringing in Bedouin society and the particular circumstances of his family and tribe, Kadafi has a very strong sense of self. When confronted with opposing views or facts, he does not bend. When he assumed power in Libya at age 27 after the revolution of September, 1969, Kadafi brought with him as a central part of his intellectual baggage an essentially confrontational view of the world. As a man who thrives on confrontation, he will not be deterred by acts of force. In the present instance Kadafi can be expected to react to the U.S. bombing attacks by increasing the level of Libyan-supported terrorist activities.

Terrorist activities sponsored, supported and directed by Libya will continue as long as Kadafi remains in power. He may be slowed by a cutoff of his oil revenues. But, given European reluctance to jeopardize economic relations with Libya, there is no prospect of an effective boycott of Libyanoil in the foreseeable future. The alternative, U.S. bombing attacks to destroy Libyan oil facilities, would have dire consequences for American relations with the Arab world and would certainly antagonize some of our European allies.

There are better ways to deal with Kadafi than frontal attacks with military force. These include the quiet encouragement of others who are anxious to see his removal from power, especially Egypt and the Libyan opposition groups in exile.

Kadafi’s international stature is enhanced by all the attention lavished on him by the Reagan Administration. While awaiting a decisive move by the Libyan military, a more effective U.S. policy would be to talk less and work quietly with others who are equally eager to see a new regime take power in Tripoli.