Make Terrorism Too Costly for Syria : Rather Than War, Israel Would Prefer That West Apply Heat

For the past few days, Israeli leaders have been busy denying American press reports about an imminent military clash with Syria. These reports are apparently based on the revelation that Syrian officials in London ordered the attempt last month to blow up an El Al plane in midair and the assumption that Israel will not allow such a provocation to go unanswered.

This assumption is erroneous. Israel sees the Syrian involvement in the El Al affair as an escalation of Damascus’ support of terrorist activities. But it is highly unlikely that Jerusalem will be moved to military retaliation. Given the complexity of Israeli-Syrian relations, there are a number of reasons for this restraint.

First, Syrian terrorism is an old story to Israel. Americans have recently become sensitized to the threat of Arab political violence but Israelis have been living with it for decades. And while most Americans consider Libya’s Moammar Kadafi to be public enemy No. 1, Jerusalem has long known that the real godfather of Islamic radicalism is Syria’s Hafez Assad.

In the past few years Assad has turned his country into a terrorist haven. According to Israeli sources, the Palestinian gunmen who attacked the Rome and Vienna airports last December were trained at Abu Nidal’s bases in northern Syria. Palestinian radicals Abu Moussa, Ahmed Jibril and George Habash are headquartered in Damascus. And Hezbollah, the fanatical Shia gang responsible for the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, is based in the Syrian-controlled eastern part of Lebanon.

Yet despite the protection the Damask Curtain affords terrorists, Israel is concerned primarily with the conventional military threat that Syria poses. Damascus has a 500,000-man army that the Soviet Union has equipped with 4,000 tanks, sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles and an unknown number of MIG-29 aircraft. The Syrians have not yet achieved their goal of military parity with Israel, but they might be tempted to stage a limited operation on the Golan Heights, aimed at seizing a part of that disputed territory. Israel would then be faced with the choice of accepting a fait accompli or going to war.

This is something that Israeli leaders want very much to avoid. Jerusalem is aware that the Syrian-Soviet mutual defense agreement could involve a confrontation with Moscow’s forces. Israel could never accept a limited Syrian victory on the Golan front--the cost to national morale, not to mention strategic deterrent capability, would be too great--but a war with Syria, even without direct Soviet intervention, would be extremely expensive.

This explains Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s recent observation that “there is no necessary connection between the imperative to fight against terror fomented by Syria in Lebanon and Europe and the risk of a possible military confrontation between Israel and Syria.” Implicit in Rabin’s approach is the idea that the West, having finally awakened to the dangers of Arab terrorism, will shoulder a large part of the battle to counter it.

This is not to say that Israeli leaders favor an American attack on Syria. Unlike Libya, Syria is a Soviet client, and an American action could well lead to a superpower confrontation that would inevitably involve Israel. Moreover, a limited U.S. military strike could not logically be expected to cause Syria to abandon its support for terrorism. That can be achieved only if the United States and its allies use economic and diplomatic means to make terror counterproductive from Assad’s own point of view.

The Syrian economy is in a shambles because of the drastic reduction in aid from once oil-rich Arab neighbors. This in turn has created fertile ground for internal opposition to the Assad dictatorship. Recent car bombings in Damascus are only one indication that the regime’s opponents are growing more active. Western governments should encourage them by imposing economic sanctions on Syria that would feed general dissatisfaction with the government.

Western economic measures can be painful but it is Syria’s patron that can bring decisive pressure to bear on Damascus. The United States should inform Moscow that anti-Western terrorism by its client is no longer tolerable and that its patronage of outlaw governments, including Syria’s, will have serious implications for overall East-West relations.

Hafez Assad is an enemy of the West and its values. But he is also a shrewd dictator, capable of caution and restraint. In the past decade he has avoided a direct military confrontation with Israel. Presumably, if he believes that international terrorism does not pay, he will not be so eager to sponsor it. The United States and its allies should use every diplomatic and economic tool at their disposal to make him understand that the price for his continued sponsorship of international terror will be prohibitive.