To Kill and Keep Secret : Terrorist Scandal Tests Israel’s Morality, Security and Rule of Law

The security scandal now rocking Israel could be one of the most serious crises since the creation of the state. It has elements of a good Le Carre novel--murder, deceit and intrigue--plus some aspects of Watergate, including a cover-up that could reach to the top of the Israeli government.

It all began when one man, Atty. Gen. Yitzhak Zamir, took on the entire Cabinet and the prime minister in the name of law, order and democratic values. Zamir insisted on upholding the law and rooting out corruption even if it meant going after the highly respected head of the Shin Bet, Israel’s secret and extremely effective anti-terrorist agency--equivalent to the FBI.

Zamir wanted to investigate whether Avraham Shalom, the Shin Bet chief, had given orders to have two arrested Arab hijackers killed in 1984 after their attempt to hijack an Israeli bus was thwarted. More, he wanted to find out if, as evidence indicated, Shalom had subsequently ordered a cover-up, including suborning witnesses and producing false testimony before an official commission of inquiry.

The case turned out to involve more than Shalom. The question in the Israeli press last week was whether Shalom acted on his own or did he follow orders given to him by then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir?

Minister Ezer Weizman said: “No military action, whether an ordinary army type of operation or a covert action, is undertaken in Israel without the consent and approval of the civil authorities--the defense minister and the prime minister. Therefore, I assume if the allegations are true (that Shalom ordered both the killings and the subsequent cover-up), the actions must have been approved by the authorities responsible. The man responsible was Mr. Shamir. So I point my finger at the then-prime minister, and I want him to say if he was responsible or not.”

Shamir’s spokesman told me, “As Prime Minister Shamir gave his full backing to the head of the secret services . . . . He knew what a prime minister should know and acted accordingly.”

The leading daily newspaper, Yediot Aharonot, reported that Shamir approved the cover-up and that Peres learned about it and didn’t stop it. When Peres took office, according to reporter Ron Benyshai, Shamir told him about the approval he had given the Shin Bet in regard to the incident. But Peres claims that Shamir only hinted at it. Yet, according to Yediot, Shalom himself told Peres about the cover-up. Peres denied this, claiming that Shalom started to tell him but “I stopped him and said I didn’t want to hear the rest.”

Two years ago four terrorists hijacked a bus going from Tel Aviv to Ashkelon. A military unit, under the command of Gen. Yitzhak Mordechai, attacked the bus. Two terrorists were killed as well as one Israeli soldier, a 19-year-old woman. Two other terrorists were captured. A photographer was at the scene and took a picture of them being led away.

When the photograph was printed--the censor failed to prevent it from appearing--officials were asked about the fate of the two captured terrorists. The answer was: During an investigation that night they had died. The next questions were: How? Why?

Minister of Defense Moshe Arens set up a commission of inquiry under Gen. Meir Zorea, including a senior member of Shin Bet. Evidence was presented against Mordechai; he had been seen--indeed he admitted--hitting the terrorists to find out if they had left a bomb on the bus. Following the Zorea Commission hearings and those of a subsequent commission, Mordechai was court-martialed and charged with the death of the terrorists. After a grueling 18 months in court, with the press baiting him mercilessly, he was acquitted. Pathologists said the terrorists died from wounds received during the battle.

But six months ago, three Shin Bet agents went to the prime minister, claiming to have proof that their boss, Shalom, was responsible for the killing of the captured terrorists and the subsequent cover-up. They said he had told witnesses to lie to the commission and had also forged evidence. Peres dismissed the three, claiming then and now that they were out to get Shalom’s job.

The three Shin Bet defectors lost their jobs. But they didn’t give up. They took their claims to the attorney general. Zamir looked at the material and decided it was his duty to tell the prime minister that there was sufficient evidence against Shalom to bring a case. If the charges were correct, then the Shin Bet chief had broken the law.

Zamir had earlier decided, after seven years on the job, to resign his post. But confronted with the Shalom case, he felt he had to do something, not just leave the matter for his successor.

Peres told Zamir that he had checked the story and decided not to reopen an investigation. He advised Zamir to close the file. To reopen the case, he said, would damage Israel’s security.

The prime minister formed a troika--composed of himself, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Vice Premier Yitzhak Shamir--to deal secretly with the affair, without the knowledge of the rest of the Cabinet. The three men tried and failed to persuade Zamir to drop the case.

The dispute was unprecedented, according to Uriel Reichman, dean of the Tel Aviv Law School: “It’s a constitutional drama. Never before was the attorney general isolated, fighting the government.”

Zamir was sensitive about the security aspect of the affair but originally oblivious to its political implications. He was prepared to compromise, to drop the case if the prime minister would force Shalom to resign. Peres turned the deal down.

When the long negotiations reached a stalemate, Zamir decided to take the matter to the police. He believed that Israel’s long-term security lay in making sure that the Shin Bet abided by the law. After all, Shin Bet reports had enough legal weight to send a citizen to jail. As Reichman explained, “The only guarantee that such a secret organization won’t deteriorate is its truthfulness to the government because it is invested with enormous powers.”

Popular opinion was on the side of the government, against Zamir. Israelis, exposed to terrorism on a daily basis, feel understandable gratitude to Shin Bet for allowing them to sleep at night, work by day.

Zamir opponents argued that it is impossible to fight terrorism effectively within the framework of the law; covert actions and false passports were cited as examples of illegal but necessary tools to fight terrorism. Critics pointed out that the U.S. Congress had weakened the Central Intelligence Agency to the point of impotency through a series of laws.

“When you fight terror,” said one expert, “you must break the normal rules of democracy in the battle against merciless terrorists who come to kill civilians.’

Zamir believed that in time the public would come to understand that the state would lose its moral basis if no investigation was conducted. He believed that Israelis could and should be proud that the affair was being pursued.

Appointed by the Cabinet, the attorney general can be dismissed by the Cabinet. Zamir knew some ministers wanted his head, but he believed that Peres wouldn’t allow him to be fired. He was wrong. Last Sunday, Zamir was told that he was being replaced, that a successor had been found--but that the timing had nothing to do with the Shalom dispute. At the same time, Peres announced that only he--no other ministers--would speak with the media on the affair.

The firing of Zamir may prove a pyrrhic victory for Peres and the Cabinet. Zamir may have pushed the investigation too far to have it called off now. Reichman predicts that if the new attorney general, Yosef Harish, tries to sweep the affair under the rug, that will spark a government crisis and a public outcry.

If an independent inquiry is conducted, Zamir will have forced the government to adhere to the rule of law. And if investigation discovers what really happened--however unpleasant--Israel will have proved that democracy can survive, even in a state of siege.

Sharing the victory with Zamir will be the Israeli media. Day after day, in spite of censorship, they kept readers informed. Arabs may laugh and Shin Bet may suffer damage, but Zamir will have made his point: Security is not based on lies.