Aid to Pakistan, Not Zia, Should Go On

The departures from power of “Baby Doc” Duvalier in Haiti and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines have encouraged some to nominate Pakistan’s President Zia ul-Haq as the next dictator who should be cut loose from U.S. support. A $4-billion economic- and military-aid package for Pakistan is pending in Congress. But this is precisely the wrong time to pull the rug out from under Zia, for in so doing we would pull the rug out from under Pakistan. And that would undermine larger U.S. goals of strengthening democracy and curbing nuclear proliferation.

Pakistan faces serious security threats regardless of who is in power. The most obvious is the continued presence of Soviet troops across the border in Afghanistan. It must be remembered that Pakistan is assisting the policy goals of the United States and a number of Western states by refusing to accept the Soviet presence as an unpleasant but irreversible fact of life.

When I discussed this question with Agha Shahi, the former foreign-affairs adviser to both Zia and his predecessor, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he quite correctly noted that Pakistan could long ago have accommodated the Soviets--and still could. Yet the Pakistan regime continues to insist on a timetable for a Soviet troop withdrawal before it will negotiate directly with Afghanistan. U.S. military aid to Pakistan is an important element supporting that position. A declaration by Congress that we were no longer prepared to provide that support would send a clear message to Pakistan: You’re on your own. Accommodation at that point would be a tempting, reasonable policy for Islamabad to follow. But accommodation would be a mistake.

Pakistan is vulnerable internally as well. It is divided by ethnic Baluch, Sindhi and Punjabi loyalties that have in the past threatened the stability of the state. The Sikh problem faced by India is symptomatic of the discord that has wracked both countries since independence in 1947. Zia has not made notable progress in integrating the state (justified accusations are regularly made of Punjabi domination of the military and the government), but has held the state together in relative peace under extreme stress for longer than any other Pakistani leader. Although Zia has ruled by force rather than by consent, he has within the past few years ended martial law, transferred some responsibility to a civilian prime minister and instituted a Constituent Assembly. This gradual return to democracy is clearly too slow to satisfy many, but it is salutary and has been encouraged by the United States.

An end to or a substantial drop-off in U.S. aid would make it difficult for Zia to continue this process. What would be seen in Islamabad as U.S. abandonment would encourage a garrison mentality, a renewed sense that Pakistan is alone in a hostile sea. The movement toward democracy would be reversed, not continued. Not only would that be contrary to the interests of those who favor democracy over authoritarianism, it would at the same time exacerbate Pakistan’s existing divisive tendencies. Without an outlet through democratic participation, Pakistan could explode underneath Zia. Such an explosion could well tempt the Soviets to exploit Baluchi frustrations; a prominent Baluch leader, Khair Bux Marri, now lives in Moscow and could conceivably fill the same role that Babrak Karmal did in Afghanistan in 1979. Thus, if the United States cares about democracy in Pakistan, aid should be continued. Without it we can expect at best a tightening of authoritarian rule, at worst the breakup of the Pakistani state.

Even if that worst-case scenario is averted, a further problem looms if the United States cuts off aid. Pakistan is now very close to developing nuclear weapons, restrained so far to a large degree by U.S. influence. If aid were cut off, Pakistan would likely take the final steps, and India would respond in kind. A nuclear-arms race in South Asia would have extremely dangerous consequences--not only for India and Pakistan but for the United States, the Soviet Union and China as well.

In his memoirs former President Richard M. Nixon made it clear that at the end of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war the United States “came close” to nuclear war. If China had entered that war on Pakistan’s side and if the Soviets had then opposed China (as they were bound to do under the terms of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty), Nixon was prepared to commit the United States to China’s defense. A nuclear-armed Pakistan might be in a position to catalyze a nuclear war in a similar crisis in the future.

From a regional point of view, nuclear weapons in the hands of two states that have fought three wars in 40 years creates a danger unlike any other nuclear confrontation in the world. With unsophisticated command and control capabilities, and without a secure second-strike capability, the threshold for nuclear use in a crisis would be dangerously low.

Regional strategic instabilities aside, the example of a nuclear competition in South Asia could well open the proliferation floodgates. States such as South Africa, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, Iraq, Iran, Taiwan and South Korea, which now are refraining from publicizing or developing their capabilities, may be inspired to follow suit. The subsequent proliferation scramble could double or triple the members of the nuclear club by the end of the century.

So long as the United States helps to ameliorate Pakistan’s insecurities through military assistance and through reinforcing Pakistani legitimacy in the international community, we can hope to keep the nuclear lid on. Congress should therefore think long and think hard about these critical issues before drawing mistaken analogies between the Philippines or Haiti and Pakistan.