U.S. Hands Remain Tied as Terrorist Savagery Resumes

Within 48 hours last week the moratorium on major Middle East terrorism ended in carnage at Karachi’s airport and in a synagogue in Istanbul. Since the U.S. raid on Libya in April there had been no mass terrorist killings with obvious ties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Now the savagery has resumed, and with it the problem of what to do.

During last year’s wave of terror it became apparent that the United States has few easy choices in combating shadowy individuals who, in the words of Mao Tse-tung, find a sea to swim in. If no one claims responsibility, the guessing game can extend to dozens of groups. Even if Western intelligence pinpoints the guilty parties, revenge is rarely simple. With mobility through many countries, with shelter among sympathetic peoples at hand, the Middle East terrorist is hard to attack without putting innocents in harm’s way.

There is irony in last week’s grisly events. The Reagan Administration was ready for one form of terrorism and one perpetrator. It had already punished Col. Moammar Kadafi’s Libya once, and was fixing to do so again. It had issued the warnings, assembled the forces and begun diplomacy to try lining up support in advance from anxious European allies.

But in Karachi and Istanbul there was no “smoking gun” readily available to justify retribution against Libya. Confusion clouded the allegiance of the terrorists, their goals, their sponsors. As so often happened before the United States singled out Kadafi, the most powerful nation in the world is at a loss over what to do.

We have become accustomed to almost immediate television coverage via satellite of the most distant disasters, and more than ever before we expect the U.S. government to act on our behalf wherever Americans are in peril. We demand the protection in a modern version of the ancient cry, Civis Romanus Sum --I am a Roman citizen, at the very time that the writ of American authority is increasingly limited. No government in Washington would be able to produce the results that Americans are demanding. None could build a solid bridge between the fantasy of popular expectations--”standing tall”--and the real world of possibilities.

The problem is compounded when leaders fail to level with the American people, when they do not distinguish between what the United States can achieve and what it cannot. They give hostages to fortune when, perhaps fearing the fate of Jimmy Carter with his candor, they do not educate the American people about the nature of the outside world. There is risk in singling out Kadafi without telling the American people that he is only one villain among many, that terrorism will continue even if this snake were scotched.

There is thus a continual gap between what this Administration promises, for domestic purposes, and what it can deliver. Pretending that it can do all, the government looks impotent when it can do little or nothing. This plays into the hands of every would-be terrorist in the Middle East.

Last week Secretary of State George P. Shultz furthered the fantasy. Referring to the Karachi hijacking, he argued that “history will show that American resolve, backed by our power, tipped the balance in favor of peace and security.” Neither his personal desire to end terrorism nor U.S. military power can be doubted. But he has invoked the wrong tools to do the job.

For four decades the United States has built unprecedented military power able to deter nuclear conflict or, if need be, to defend the nation and its allies against their most potent enemies. Yet it has found that power insufficient or ineffective on many occasions when it has sought to protect individual citizens abroad or to achieve other worthy but limited goals.

There is no sin in admitting that military power designed to prevent mankind’s final war cannot also make us the arbiter of every event in the world. Nor is it a sin to admit that sometimes power is neither enough nor even relevant. To combat terrorism, America must have the right tools. But they are not aircraft carriers or fighter-bombers. The Administration is rightly trying to develop airport security, better intelligence, police work with other nations. Specially trained commandos can sometimes play a role. But most clearly missing is a willingness also to deal with the causes of Middle East terrorism.

A few years ago U.S. leaders understood that a commitment to Arab-Israeli peacemaking was the surest way to protect America’s interests in the region. By contrast, the Reagan Administration has stood largely aloof. It declares itself prepared to follow, but not to lead. As in other places --Southern Africa, Central America--it does not see that national resolve can sometimes best be shown by negotiating, by taking a strong moral stance, by building alliances and allegiances.

Today the influence and authority of the United States in the Middle East are declining. We are sufficiently involved to be targeted by terrorism, but not enough to do something about it. Friend and enemy alike are mystified.

Gravity in statecraft, a firm display of the right tools for the right tasks, is precious to every great nation. But gravity is lacking in U.S. policy toward the Middle East. And, beyond the reach of Administration rhetoric, that lack is apparent to all.