Neighbors Face More Years Under South Africa’s Boot

In the debate concerning the future of South Africa, sanctions are not the key issue. War is. Sanctions won’t win majority power. War will, as it did in Zimbabwe. But how long will it take? This is the big question, in danger of being obscured by the current obsession with political hairsplitting on the degree of sanctions to be applied.

Undoubtedly, at the moment, white South Africa is winning the war. The loss of foreign investment, the drying up of bank loans, the outflow of skilled manpower and the gradual closing of foreign markets are all hurting. But in the military campaign South Africa has the upper hand on all four of its fronts--in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and internally, dealing with the guerrilla forces of the African National Congress.

Angola. South Africa has had the Angolan government on the defensive since February, 1984, when it pressured Angola to sign a cease-fire accord. Angola thus was ignominiously forced to jointly patrol the border area to limit infiltration by the guerrilla army of the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), which is trying to wrest control of neighboring Namibia from South Africa. When this agreement ended in May, 1985, South Africa stepped up its support of UNITA, the dissident Angolan movement. The Angolan government is constantly locked in costly battles with both UNITA and the South African army. Without 20,000 Cuban troops at its rear, it would collapse. Economically, the country is in wrack and ruin.

Mozambique. In 1983 Mozambique was riven by the effects of drought, economic mismanagement and the constant sabotage caused by the dissident movement, Renamo, funded mainly by South Africa. In March, 1984, President Samora Machel signed the Nkomati peace accord with South African President Pieter W. Botha. Mozambique has kept its side of the bargain--to close down the operation of the African National Congress. But the South African defense force broke the agreement, continuing to supply Renamo, which--along with unofficial aid from Portugal, West Germany and Oman--succeeds in keeping Machel on the ropes. Meanwhile, in order to keep Machel pliable, South Africa helps Mozambique guard the power lines of its mighty Caborra Bassa dam.

Lesotho. The landlocked enclave state surrounded by South Africa was given short shrift when it continued to defy South Africa, harboring African National Congress members and deciding to open diplomatic relations with communist states. In January this year--after South Africa blockaded Lesotho, resulting in a coup--the new government agreed to expel all members of the ANC.

The African National Congress. Undoubtedly its military reach increased during the 1980s. Even after the Nkomati accord, the ANC continued to step up its bombings inside South Africa. However, the attacks are less sophisticated and more random than in the past, partly because the organization no longer has centers of operation in nearby countries.

As the South African hand has strengthened, the Soviet Union and its allies have become increasingly cautious. While 20,000 Cuban troops remain in Angola, they do not engage in combat with either UNITA or the South African forces. In Mozambique, Machel has been all but deserted by the Soviet Union. It has given barely any economic aid, and only after an appeal for help by Machel in 1981 did it send some cruise ships on a port call. That was a long time ago.

Could the equation change? Certainly. Angola has been strengthening its defenses with surface-to-air missiles. Late last year its air force bought some Western helicopters in an attempt to wrest air supremacy from South Africa. South Africa has taken more casualties in its raids into Angola.

But, overall, the correlation of forces continues to favor South Africa. The South African arms industry--although still seriously deficient in some areas, particularly aircraft--is becoming more self-sufficient. Renamo and UNITA are tearing the life out of Mozambique and Angola. SWAPO is making little headway militarily (although politically it is strong), and the African National Congress only appears potent because of the disturbances, self-generated for the most part, inside the South African townships. Bloody though the riots are, on their own they do not threaten the stability of the state.

White South Africa is strong enough to defend itself indefinitely. The ANC guerrillas can give South Africa hell, but only at an enormous cost to themselves.

The blood will continue to flow. Unless Fidel Castro unleashes his troops, there is not likely to be in the foreseeable future enough firepower to psychologically, if not militarily, tip the balance. This may well be one of those tragedies of human conflict that limp on from decade to decade without a clear solution. Sanctions or no sanctions, this, sadly, is how it is likely to go.