ANALYSIS : Just Short of Success : Summit May Be Recalled as a Near Miss

The Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev may well be remembered as the summit that collapsed just short of success, the summit where the superpowers came tantalizingly close to agreeing on how to curb the most dangerous weapons of the nuclear age--but never quite attained the goal.

Whether the Soviets were sandbagging Reagan from the start--whether they were ever open to major arms control agreements--will long be debated by U.S. experts on Soviet affairs.

The first day saw great promise in the talks, with Administrationofficials privately predicting a major breakthrough on arms control.

But this made the failure all the more embarrassing when, in the final session Sunday, the Soviets made clear their insistence on blocking practical testing of the U.S. space-based missile defense program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, as the price of what chief U.S. arms control negotiator Max M. Kampelman called a “fabulous package” of arms reduction agreements.

Reagan and Gorbachev had tentatively agreed to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles from Europe, to give each side only 100 such missiles elsewhere (in Soviet East Asia and the United States) and ultimately get rid of those, too, and to substantially reduce the number of ballistic missiles in each country’s arsenal en route to their eventual elimination. Then, the agreement fell apart because of their differences over the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly called “Star Wars.”

The Soviets’ objective, Secretary of State George P. Shultz said, was “effectively to kill off the SDI program” by insisting that research and testing of missile defenses would have to be restricted to the laboratory for 10 years.

Gorbachev’s explanation differed, naturally; he charged that “the American Administration . . . is out to make a breakthrough via SDI to military superiority,” even if it means abandoning progress on other arms control fronts.

The contention that disagreements about SDI blocked progress on other issues came as a surprise to most arms control experts. The depth of the Soviets’ opposition to the program was well known, but in all their pre-summit communications they had emphasized the need for movement on nuclear testing and intermediate-range weapons without raising SDI.

Reversal of a Trend

Now, further mutual recriminations seem inevitable--even if the Soviets came in good faith, as Shultz seemed inclined to believe--and the result could be a reversal of what had seemed a trend toward improved relations.

After the failed summit in 1961 of President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, relations between the superpowers plunged toward confrontation for two years, which included the Cuban missile crisis. No one expects such a catastrophe after this meeting--Gorbachev and Reagan said, in fact, that they are not slamming any doors--but any meeting of heads of governments that fails so dismally to live up to expectations does risk a backward slide.

Gorbachev warned in a press conference here, after the summit broke up, that the world is approaching “a point of no return.” He raised the specter of a new arms race with “unpredictable consequences,” in what seemed an obvious effort to blame Reagan for the collapse of the talks and to bring pressure on him to compromise on “Star Wars.”

No Date for Summit

In this atmosphere, no date for a new summit could possibly be set, U.S. officials admitted, and Gorbachev said “it would be a scandal” to hold another summit without real prospects for success.

Anyone looking for a culprit for the failure of these talks could find culpability on both sides.

The Soviets could be accused of reneging both on a promise they made at the Geneva summit last November--to expedite an agreement on intermediate-range missiles--and on their subsequent promise to separate the issue of these missiles from the controversy over the Strategic Defense Initiative.

This criticism could be blunted if the Soviets return to the ongoing Geneva arms control talks in a spirit that will allow negotiators there to build upon the real progress toward agreement that was made here. Literally all the stumbling blocks to agreements were removed here, U.S. officials said.

Proposals on the Table

At his lengthy press conference, Gorbachev pledged that the Soviets would continue the Geneva talks and said all the proposals made here would be “on the table.”

Reagan may come in for severe criticism, too. Whether the Administration likes it or not, the image that has gone out from Reykjavik will be of an intransigent Reagan who appears to have rejected an extremely important and attractive set of agreements to cut offensive arms for the sake of his dream of an impenetrable missile shield that most reputable scientists believe cannot be achieved for at least a generation.

Shultz may get a sample of this fallout today, when he will brief the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels. With the exceptions of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, European leaders long have been skeptical about the viability and wisdom of “Star Wars.”

The political consequences of the failed summit on the midterm fortunes of Republican congressional candidates in next month’s elections, as well as on Reagan’s standing with Congress and the American public, are incalculable at this point.

With Little Preparation

But those conservatives who warned about the dangers of a “quickie” summit, which had minimal preparation, will be able to at least accuse the President of bad judgment in this case. The episode could reinforce the anti-Communist attitudes not only of the far right but of the President himself.

And congressional Democrats--who have long campaigned against “Star Wars,” arguing that it was the main obstacle to real arms control--may have been given proof to back their contentions. They probably will return with new strength to their efforts to cripple the program with funding restraints and to amend other legislation to force the President toward an accommodation with the Soviets.

Senior U.S. officials echoed Shultz’s praise for the President’s repeated and vigorous efforts to reach agreement with Gorbachev by modifying his offer on “Star Wars” as well as by searching for other avenues of compromise.

Free to Do Research

The President proposed to extend from six months to 10 years the “non-withdrawal” clause of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, so that both sides would be locked in for that period. During those 10 years, however, both sides would conduct research, development and testing of missile defenses, including those systems that use directed-energy weapons, such as lasers, to destroy enemy warheads. And, after that period ended, both sides would be free to deploy missile defenses. Previously, Reagan had offered a 7 1/2-year moratorium on deploying such defenses.

For that same 10-year period, the two superpowers would methodically dismantle and eliminate all the ballistic missiles in their arsenals--a goal so ambitious that it had not been discussed recently, as the two sides instead wrestled with proposals for 30% or 50% reductions.

The Soviets called for amending the ABM treaty, or concluding a new agreement, that would restrict work on missile defenses to the laboratory, thus barring development and testing and, in Shultz’s view, “killing off” the SDI program.

‘A Key Reason’

As Shultz explained, Reagan and his advisers are convinced that concern over SDI was “a key reason” that the Soviets were willing to move as far as they have toward deep cuts in offensive weapons. Moreover, the missile defense program would continue to be needed to protect the United States if the Soviets failed to reduce offensive arms, he added.

“Undoubtedly, it . . . would be the kind of program you need to ensure that agreements reached would be effectively carried out,” Shultz said.

To some degree, this argument carries some weight with arms control experts, although they also would argue that the “Star Wars” program might be curtailed somewhat without losing its insurance value, but in a way satisfactory to the Soviets.

Whether such a compromise can be found remains to be seen. Unless it is, the prospects for arms control and of improved U.S.-Soviet relations will seem to have foundered on Reagan’s scheme for a missile defense tomorrow at the expense of a safer world today.