Aquino Tries a Fresh Start With Shake-Up, Cease-Fire

The jubilant reactions here to the discharge of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile last Sunday left no doubt about the popularity of President Corazon Aquino--or the public weariness with Enrile’s antics. But the question remains: Where does the nation go from here?

Aquino’s decisive action in sacking Enrile and starting a Cabinet shake-up went a long way to counter the image of her administration as weak and indecisive. Her policy of reconciliation, at a time when the nation’s political institutions were fragile, had threatened to let loose a Pandora’s box of conflicting interest groups. Extremists of right and left had been moving toward a showdown. From the right: die-hard loyalists of deposed strongman Ferdinand E. Marcos, and the military with Enrile their spokesman. From the left: the communist-led New Peoples Army and its allies.

Enrile’s removal, coupled with the announcement last Wednesday of a cease-fire agreement between the government and the communist-dominated National Democratic Front, should avert such a showdown. But in the meantime, some intractable problems remain.

One of the anomalies in the post-Marcos era is that the only crony of the former president to have seen the inside of a prison since the February revolution did so not in the Philippines but in Italy: He is Marcos’ former ambassador to that country, who served several months for illegal possession of firearms.

The delay in locating and prosecuting those still at large and even active in Philippine public life who had a part in the crimes of the Marcos regime is a reflection of an old reality. The former political, military and judicial structures remain intact, and those who staff them may not be ready for drastic action against “people like us.” Absence of prosecution may be one of the costs of a bloodless revolution.

This leniency has been reinforced under Aquino’s policy of reconciliation; witness such examples as her refusal to prosecute Arturo Tolentino and his supporters for their unsuccessful coup attempt last July, and her insistence on exhausting all peaceful means for dealing with the communist-led insurgency. In recent months she adopted the same approach in dealing with her troublesome minister of defense. Her strategy was to ignore Enrile’s criticisms along with attacks from other directions, to ride out the storm and look forward to a resounding vindication of her leadership in the February plebiscite on the draft constitution.

Another weakness in Aquino’s administration has been her choice of Cabinet ministers: Not all were happy choices, and some have given grounds for Enrile’s accusations that the government was indecisive in dealing with the insurgency, unable to “get its act together,” inefficient and in some cases corrupt. Thus things came to a head: Gen. Fidel W. Ramos found it necessary to preempt Enrile’s arguments for a stronger anti-insurgency posture and the replacement of inefficient or corrupt ministers in order to assure himself of the loyalty of key military officers. And the president had to give in to some extent on these points, in order to retain Ramos’ support.

As it turned out, that support was decisive in the face of the attempted coup last weekend. Whether Enrile was personally involved is not clear; he is intelligent enough to realize that even a successful grab for power would leave him with an ungovernable country on his hands, and it is possible that decisions were being made by some would-be dictators among his “boys.” In any case, it appears that the earlier moves by Ramos to assure himself of obedience from the military, and the “preventive measures” he took, prevented the attempt from getting off the ground.

Enrile himself accepted dismissal with outward grace and dignity. Many expect that he will eventually reappear in the political arena. The main body of the military seems consolidated under the control of Ramos and the new minister of defense, Gen. Rafael Ileto. Enrile’s supporters appear isolated and their military careers are probably at an end, although more vigorous action against them is not certain. There are some troops maintained by provincial warlords who are loyal to Marcos or Enrile but they pose no immediate threat.

At the end of last week, the president fired two more members of her Cabinet, moves seen as a concession to the military. The removal of Enrile was one of the main demands of the left, and contributed to reaching the cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire, to take effect Dec. 10 and to last 60 days, will give Aquino more room to maneuver on other fronts. “Middle groups,” which played a major role in the February events but have more recently been upstaged by the military and the left, are mobilizing for a massive effort to support “Cory” in the February plebiscite.

Aquino’s personal popularity, and the threat of destabilizing consequences from a negative vote, will work strongly in her favor; indeed no political group other than die-hard Marcos loyalists is campaigning for a rejection of the draft for the new constitution. Hence those who dream of a larger share of power than they can expect under the new constitution--and this includes Enrile and his colonels as well as the underground left and the Marcos forces--have regarded the past few months as open season for power politics. They have tried psychological warfare, pressure tactics and destabilization, with an eye either to seizing power or forcing concessions.

Continued church support for the president came in the form of a pastoral letter from the Philippine bishops on Nov. 21, affirming their agreement with the principals enunciated in the draft constitution. The link with the church was dramatized last Sunday when, immediately after announcing on television her acceptance of Enrile’s resignation, Aquino proceeded to an open-air Mass where she read a prayer for the nation and repeated her announcement.

The president now has an opportunity and a challenge: to begin again with a new set of ministers, without the threats to her regime that have tended to paralyze and immobilize her in recent months; and to address herself, during the cease-fire, to fundamental problems of poverty and inequality that lie at the root of most of the nation’s ills.

History offers many examples of moderate reformers who failed because they remained too tied to the structures of the past; their successors usually have less concern for human rights and human values. Aquino has not yet demonstrated a willingness to attack those structures, and even the new names suggested last week for her Cabinet were middle-of-the-road or right-of-center individuals. Until the government, the church and, in particular, the middle classes face up to this challenge, polarization and conflict will be endemic and Philippine democracy will remain a house built on sand.