Soviets Appear Serious in Afghan Peace Moves : But Moscow, Like U.S. in Vietnam, Could Have Considerable Difficulty in Pulling Out Troops

After a month of unprecedented Soviet peace gestures in Afghanistan, U.S. policy-makers and some private analysts believe that the Kremlin is actually serious about trying to bring home the 115,000 troops who have occupied that country since 1979 and fought a costly guerrilla war against a stubborn resistance movement.

But like the United States in Vietnam 15 years earlier, Moscow will find it extremely difficult to disengage.

The recent overtures to the rebels by the Afghan regime, a puppet of the Soviet Union, include an offer of a cease-fire, a promise of amnesty for resistance leaders, a call for national elections and even the possibility of a broad coalition government. Top Soviet officials visited the Afghan capital of Kabul early this month for the first time in many years.

Possible Propaganda Ploy

Specialists in the United States do not rule out the possibility that the apparent softening of the Soviet position is nothing more than a propaganda sham, designed for advantage at the next round of U.N.-sponsored talks on Afghanistan scheduled for next month in Geneva. But they note two significant new aspects of the Soviet posture:

--For the first time, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has become personally identified with the search for a solution. This represents a “qualitative change” from his previous practice of merely mouthing policy statements, according to State Department officials. His efforts have already upset the client regime in Kabul. Rumors persist that the Soviets are negotiating with Afghan resistance figures, Islamic leaders and even Afghan monarchists.

--Through their overtures, the Soviets have already given Afghanistan’s moujahedeen rebels greater international visibility. A senior Reagan Administration official said the steps toward ending the Soviet occupation could increase cohesion and morale among the seven resistance groups and provide them with a stronger public voice.

‘Vietnamization’ Seen

Several experts see the Soviet predicament as strikingly reminiscent of the “Vietnamization” program--”a real feeling of deja vu, “ said one of them--that the United States pursued as it attempted to extricate itself gradually from the Southeast Asian war while leaving a friendly regime behind.

“Sure, the Soviets are serious,” said Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who was a senior national security official in the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations. “But serious about what? They’d like to get out and leave a stable, friendly regime so they won’t have to go back in again.

“They talk about a neutral Afghanistan, but they want it to remain a member, or at least a semi-member, of the pro-Soviet bloc. Neither is feasible. The resistance won’t stop fighting and the refugees won’t go back under such circumstances.”

About 3 million Afghans, perhaps 20% of the population, have fled in the seven years since the Soviets moved in. Most refugees are in Pakistan, but many are also in Iran.

Harry Gelman, a senior Rand Corp. analyst and former CIA official, said he sees the Soviet maneuvers as aimed mainly at “providing a fig leaf for the Pakistanis to cave in” to an Afghan settlement that would leave a Soviet regime in Kabul.

“I don’t think the Paks will cave,” he added, “but that’s a nearer possibility than that Gorbachev will really put the essence (continued Soviet control of Afghanistan) on the bargaining table” in his search for a way out of the country.

Ignoring Lesson of Vietnam

A State Department official added, “The Soviets won’t get to the exit door until they take the fundamental decision to pull out regardless of the chaos left behind, regardless of the world image of themselves that will be created.”

And the senior Administration official said the Soviets learned nothing from the U.S. experience in Vietnam.

“We resisted until too late setting a deadline for leaving Vietnam because of the psychological burden it places on the client--to make a deal by the deadline or else,” he said. “We resisted, and we had a lot more reason to think the Saigon government had a more solid base of support among the people than the Kabul government has.”

If the Soviets seriously want to leave behind a coalition government in Afghanistan, this official added, its hopes will be dashed. “It has often been said that no civil war in history has ended with a coalition government,” he said, “and it won’t start in Afghanistan.”

Soviet troops marched into Afghanistan in December, 1979, a year and a half after a leftist coup had brought Marxists to power in Kabul. The new regime, beset by guerrilla resistance and internal divisions, was disintegrating when the Soviets crossed the border into the mountainous, backward nation.

During the seven years of the occupation, Soviet casualties have totaled about 10,000 dead and 15,000 wounded, according to Pentagon intelligence estimates.

Past Withdrawals Derided

Over the years, the Soviets have periodically announced small troop withdrawals, but the West has dismissed all of them as phony.

Last July, for example, Gorbachev promised that six regiments with about 6,000 men would be withdrawn. The pullout took place in October, but U.S. intelligence reported that almost four of those units had been introduced just weeks earlier and were under-equipped; one mechanized infantry regiment, for example, used ordinary trucks instead of armored halftracks. The other two regiments were anti-aircraft units, which were useless in Afghanistan because the rebels have no air force.

But last May, Najib came to power in Kabul, and at the end of the year he appealed for a six-month cease-fire to take effect last Thursday. In another parallel to Vietnamization, Najib said that “the combat potential of the Afghan armed forces is being consolidated.” This suggested that as the Afghan government forces grew stronger, they would replace Soviets who could then depart, much as American troops were to leave Vietnam.

Moreover, Yuri Primakov, the head of a Soviet international affairs think tank, suggested to two Western correspondents that the Soviets plan to pull their troops out even if the U.N-sponsored talks on Afghanistan fail to find a settlement. His remarks implied Soviet pressure on the Kabul regime to find a solution to the rebellion.

“There will be a withdrawal (of Soviet forces) in any case,” Primakov was quoted as saying.

Visit by Top Diplomats

Then came the public visit to Kabul by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, former ambassador to the United States and now head of the Communist Party’s International Department in the Kremlin.

“That had all the earmarks of a fact-finding visit,” said Thane Gustafson, director of the Soviet program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “Dobrynin’s presence in particular indicated that Gorbachev has become personally involved in seeking an Afghan settlement.”

Not all the signals, however, point to significant Soviet policy shifts on Afghanistan. Gorbachev, for example, said in his most recent statement:

“The Soviet Union is seeking an immediate settlement of the situation and is strongly demanding an early termination and prevention of outside interference, which would expedite the return home of Soviet troops staying in that country at the request of its government.”

In addition, Yuri V. Dubinin, the current Soviet ambassador to the United States, declined here last week to endorse Primakov’s view on withdrawal.

“This is a bilateral question between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, and naturally it is connected to other elements,” he said at a news conference. That indicated that withdrawal will begin only after a political settlement in Kabul.

Specialists Cautious

For these reasons, all the specialists were cautious about what might come next. Among the possibilities:

--Some kind of counteroffer from the resistance groups to Najib’s cease-fire proposal, primarily to avoid an appearance of intransigence. Pakistan is reportedly exerting pressure for such a conciliatory public statement. India also supports a cease-fire, according to reports. Under Secretary of State Michael H. Armacost is going to Pakistan today to help coordinate a response to the truce call, which the rebels rejected as soon as it was made. The guerrilla leaders formally reaffirmed their rejection of the cease-fire offer at a rally of Afghan resistance groups Saturday in Peshawar, Pakistan, and vowed to continue their war. The guerrillas said a commission would prepare for formation of a provisional Islamic government.

--A greater role for the Afghan resistance in the indirect “reconciliation” talks in Geneva between Pakistani officials and representatives of the Kabul regime. The two sides keep to their separate floors, with the U.N. emissary moving between them. While Soviet officials are on the spot to counsel their clients, the Pakistanis have not allowed the Afghan rebels to be present in Geneva. Now the resistance forces insist on a voice in the talks, which resume Feb. 11.

--An Iranian attempt to sabotage the new progress, because the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Tehran opposes a pro-Soviet government in Kabul. Iran supplies the Afghan refugees inside its borders with food and some arms, and refugee camps in Iran have been attacked by Soviet-made planes from Afghanistan, much as the U.S.-aided refugees in Pakistan camps have also been attacked.

What none of the experts predicted was a speedy resolution of the war. When the eighth anniversary of the Soviet invasion comes next December, one U.S. official said, “odds are very high that the Soviets will still be in Kabul.”