On Lebanon, the Best Action Is Inaction

It is an engaging trait of the American psyche that, faced with a crisis, the average person strongly wants to “do something” about it. With eight Americans--and 17 other foreigners--now being held hostage in Lebanon, some people are calling for military action, and the U.S. Navy is strengthening its presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Sometimes, though, it is best to hold back on action. After all, previous U.S. efforts, both peaceful and warlike, have not reduced the number of individuals held hostage in Lebanon. A period of inaction, while the West Germans ploddingly consider the U.S. request to extradite the TWA hijacking suspect, can allow decision-makers here time to consider why it is that Lebanon has become so chaotic and hostile. Without such understanding, any attempt to “do something” will likely be in vain.

I first visited Beirut in 1970. At that time, although it was in the eye of the Arab-Israeli storm, it was one of the most hospitable Third World cities that any Westerner could visit. It had attracted numerous Americans, who lived in a large community spreading out from the respected American University, its well-equipped teaching hospital and other U.S.-based educational and charitable institutions.

From 1974 to 1981 I lived and worked in Beirut as a correspondent. They were stormy years as successive waves of violence broke upon the city, carving a gruesome wasteland through its previously colorful downtown, killing thousands and leaving the population split by bloody resentment.

Nevertheless, throughout that period there was still very little violence aimed specifically against Westerners. Americans and Europeans alike, we would go about our jobs and freely roam the lively and urbane streets of West Beirut in our spare time. We could lunch in the Smugglers’ Inn on Makhoul Street, spend all afternoon combing the antique stores on Basta and, down on the shores of the Mediterranean, enjoy fresh fish and the tangy, award-winning white wines from the Bekaa Valley.

All that has changed. And two specific political acts of the Reagan Administration in particular helped to cause that change.

The first action was the vote cast at the U.N. Security Council by Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick on June 8, 1982, two days after Israel invaded Lebanon. Her vote vetoed a resolution that would have prepared the United Nations to send an international observer force to Beirut to monitor compliance with a cease-fire. With the plan for an observer force thus stymied, Israel kept up the bombardment of the city, earning a formal but toothless reprimand from the Security Council. Israel’s American-made weapons tore into apartment high-rises and shanties alike, killing many thousands more Beirutis. For a while in early 1984 it was the U.S. Navy itself that fired 16-inch shells into the hills around the city.

The second Administration action that made life unsafe for Americans in Beirut was its sponsorship of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s evacuation from the city. Ever since U.S. Ambassador Francis E. Meloy Jr. was killed by gunmen in 1976, the American Embassy had relied on Yasser Arafat’s security services to ensure the safety of its buildings and personnel. From 1976 until the PLO left in 1982, that is what they did. There were no abductions, no car bombs--just the occasional news filtering through to the embassy that Arafat’s men had headed off such or such an attack. Oh, and the embassy flagpole was hit once by a bazooka. After August, 1982, nobody in the city could provide such security. The main U.S. Embassy was attacked. The Marines’ base was attacked. The embassy annex was attacked. Hundreds of Americans died. American citizens throughout the city became fair game for gunmen and hostage-takers.

What is the lesson of all this? Clearly no one can turn back the clock to the pre-1982 situation. But this Administration--all U.S. Administrations--should realize that its policy positions have consequences. They affect real people: Lebanese, Palestinians, Israelis and ultimately even Americans.

For now there is probably not a lot that the Reagan Administration can do to bring peace to Lebanon. What it can do, it should do quietly. Signal to the Syrians that it recognizes that they are the only outsiders who can guide Lebanon back to normalcy. Hold back the Israelis from further destabilizing raids in the south. Inform the Lebanese that they should use their presidential votes in 1988 to restore their own national unity. And, meanwhile, study how a stable peace could be brought to the whole region.

After all, the next brush fire in Lebanon could bring a nuclear-armed Israel into war with a Soviet-backed Syria.