Syria Wary of Beirut’s Violent Bog : Iran-Backed Militia May Be Key Test for Occupying Army

An old Lebanese proverb holds that one who does not keep moving through the swamp is condemned to sink into the muck.

More than six weeks after Syria sent thousands of troops to maintain order in West Beirut, the government in Damascus must be wondering if it will suffer a similar fate.

Not long ago, a car bomb killed eight people and wounded 10 in the seaside quarter of Ramlat el Baida, not far from the hotel taken over by the Syrians for their headquarters in Beirut.

Once again, Lebanese anarchy threatens to entangle a foreign power as it did the United States and its Marines in October, 1983, and the withdrawing Israeli forces two years later.

Most political analysts here agree that by occupying West Beirut, Syria brought on a major new problem even while solving an old one.

When about 7,000 Syrian soldiers moved into Beirut in February, joining more than 2,000 already there, Muslim gunmen affiliated with a variety of militia groups vanished from the streets. The intervention followed two weeks of fighting described as the worst in several years.

But, in the case of militant group Hezbollah (Party of God), which is closely affiliated with Iran, the gunmen merely moved into Beirut’s southern suburbs, where Syrian troops have not yet been deployed.

Gunmen Take Refuge

Those suburbs contain two Palestinian refugee camps in which thousands of gunmen loyal to Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and an enemy of Syria’s President Hafez Assad, have taken refuge.

The combined challenges of Hezbollah and the PLO at the doorstep of Beirut have led many observers to believe that Syria must act soon to pacify the southern suburbs militarily, a step that entails considerable risk.

“The Syrians have enough military muscle to march down the street, but holding and securing the area is a different thing,” one Western military analyst said. “The Syrians are as afraid of getting sucked back into Beirut as anyone else.”

Syrian forces have had one major confrontation with Hezbollah: Two days after entering West Beirut in February, Syrian soldiers killed 23 Hezbollah gunmen in a raid on a party headquarters.

The raid was believed to be partial retaliation for Hezbollah’s detaining a number of Syrian troops and humiliating them by shaving their heads. But it gave everyone a taste of the kind of trouble that might ensue if Syria decides to tackle Hezbollah head-on.

Hezbollah’s demands for revenge for the 23 deaths were finally quieted by the direct intervention of Iran’s supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

How far and how quickly Syria moves against Hezbollah’s strongholds will depend largely on the condition of Syria’s relationship with Iran. So far, Syria has been one of the few Arab countries to support Iran, a Persian country, in its war with Arab Iraq, and it has benefited in turn by the delivery of large quantities of subsidized oil from Iran, which is desperate for allies in the region.

For its part, the Khomeini government has made Lebanon something of a showcase for the Iranian-style Islamic revolution, sending about 1,500 Revolutionary Guards into the country--mostly to the eastern Bekaa Valley and the south--as well as providing an estimated $50 million in assistance to Hezbollah.

Any defeat for Hezbollah would be viewed as a defeat for Iran’s cause in Lebanon, since the other major Shia Muslim militia, Amal, is regarded as more secular and hews closely to the Syrian line.

Some analysts in Lebanon say they believe that Syria’s Assad now thinks he made a mistake when he allowed Iranian fundamentalism to take root in Lebanon, since Syria’s own secular government could be threatened by its spread.

Others think that Assad, who is respected as a crafty wielder of power, may regard the fundamentalists as a strategic advantage in the fight against Israel, particularly in southern Lebanon, where pro-Israel has established a security zone along its northern border.

There are signs that the Syrians intend to try dealing with the problems by quiet reasoning, at least at first.

One clear indication of this was last month’s arrival in Beirut of a new Iranian ambassador. Received like a proconsul by the jubilant masses in the southern suburbs, the new envoy had traveled from Iran through Syria, indicating that he had Syria’s blessing.

“One can assume he is there to pacify the southern suburbs,” one diplomat said.

It is widely believed that Syria decided to enter West Beirut largely to help the faltering Amal militia survive an onslaught from an alliance of other Muslim militias.

Indirect Attack on Arafat

The Syrians also moved to support non-Arafat elements in the Palestinian camps, leading toward an erosion of the PLO leader’s influence rather than his military defeat. Military confrontations tend to unite the disparate Palestinian factions rather than divide them.

This has led many diplomats to conclude that Syrian forces will enter the southern suburbs in the next two months, but at the invitation of a variety of groups such as Amal and the Palestinians. That would put the Syrians in a strategic position, but without the need for a potentially explosive confrontation.

“I’m not sure the Syrians can wait forever,” one Western diplomat said. “The longer they wait, the more they build up the prestige of Hezbollah, (giving the impression) that Hezbollah is something they cannot handle, that Syria can no longer handle Iran.”

One military analyst, referring to the looming confrontation between Syrian troops and Hezbollah’s guerrillas, said: “The prospects are not good for the future. They can’t even see the tunnel, let alone the light at the end.”

Charles P. Wallace was recently on assignment in Beirut.