From Worse to Bad

The French have a saying that fits the growing debate over pulling Soviet and American medium-range nuclear missiles out of Europe: “The usual choice is not between the good and the bad but the bad and the worse.”

Former President Richard M. Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger pushed the debate to new levels over the weekend, arguing for bundling the issues of Euromissiles, cuts in Soviet ground and air forces and reductions in intercontinental missiles. They would also banish all medium-range missiles rather than allowing the Soviets to keep 100 in Asia and the United States a like number on its own territory. They would have the White House agree to nothing until there is agreement on everything.

Such an arrangement would be better than good, but it is not a choice. The choice for now is between no reductions in missiles and a first step toward negotiated agreements on the other elements of their package. The White House clearly leans toward signing a treaty on Euromissiles at a summit meeting in Washington this year, and addressing the other issues later. It seems to believe that not having any agreement would be worse than the bargain that Nixon and Kissinger think is bad.

At the heart of the debate is the theory of “coupling.” The theory is that if U.S. medium-range missiles are based on the Continent, Europe’s leaders would be reassured that the United States would not let the Continent be overrun by Soviet troops if the choice were between losing Europe and risking a major nuclear war that would kill millions of Soviets and Americans.

Coupling dictates that the United States would fire its nuclear missiles at advancing Soviet troops rather than take a chance on having them captured --use them or lose them. The concept comforts Europe, although it is not always clear why, inasmuch as using the missiles would almost certainly result in nuclear warfare on the Continent, even if it did not spread to an exchange of intercontinental missiles between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Most analysts agree that in purely military terms it does not matter whether there are medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe or not. Coupling is a political concept, designed to show Europe that the United States would stick with it under fire. Withdrawing the smaller missiles still would leave hundreds of other nuclear weapons in and around Europe as well as 350,000 American servicemen committed to joining other North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in fighting to turn back any Soviet invasion.

Forcing a prolonged debate over the wisdom of withdrawing medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe can lead to a stalemate in all directions. If the concept of coupling becomes the central issue and diverts attention from the military utility of the missiles, Europe could get a case of the jitters that would lead it to challenging any change at all in nuclear weapons. The challenge would necessarily include waving away an opportunity to get rid of Soviet SS-20s and SS-4s, whose warheads outnumber those of the allies by nearly 3 to 1. It is a debate best ended early so that negotiators can turn to the other unfinished business in arms control and troop reductions.