CENTRAL AMERICA BY CENTRAL AMERICANS : Baedeker Covering a Chaotic Region

With several new Nicaragua peace initiatives now added to the potpourri of guerrilla groups, conflictive governments and previous diplomatic efforts in Central America, it has become even more difficult to tell the players without a program. Here, then, is a sort of who’s who and what’s what of the region’s people and places:

-- The Reagan Administration. The Administration says its objective in Central America is to assure democratic government, but it has operated on the assumption that it must get rid of the Sandinista government to do that and also to prevent the consolidation of a Soviet foothold on the Central American land mass. Since its aim has been to bring down the Sandinistas rather than deal with them, the Administration had been unwilling to cooperate with diplomatic efforts such as the Contadora process--which addressed all major U.S. concerns and those of the Central American countries but left the Sandinistas in power.

The Administration’s policy instrument has been the contras , a guerrilla force of about 15,000 men bitterly opposed to the Sandinista government. Even Administration spokesmen acknowledge the contras do not have the capability to defeat the Sandinistas. The argument, rather, has been that they exert military pressure on the government and so are vital to bringing about any solution. Opponents of contra aid, however, point out that such pressure leads nowhere unless the Administration is prepared to negotiate, which until now it has not been.

-- The Contadora Process. An effort at comprehensive regional negotiations launched in 1983 by the presidents of Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia. The final draft of a proposed Contadora treaty, presented in June, 1986, provided almost everything the United States wanted: prohibition of foreign bases, withdrawal of foreign military personnel, termination of any aid one country might be giving to guerrillas in another and democratization. It also provided for a verification process to monitor compliance. It did not, however, call for the Sandinistas to step down.

-- The Arias Plan. A peace plan presented by Costa Rica President Oscar Arias Sanchez early this year in an effort to salvage a diplomatic solution after the Contadora process broke down. Less comprehensive than the Contadora effort, it called for a cease-fire, termination of all aid to guerrillas, national reconciliation, democratization and limits on military establishments--but did not prohibit foreign bases or call for withdrawal of foreign military personnel. The Arias plan was more acceptable to Central American governments because it was perceived as a solution of their own rather than as one imposed upon them by extra-regional powers. The Contadora governments also embraced it as an intermediate step toward the broader treaty they hoped eventually to put in place.

For the Reagan Administration, however, the Arias plan was even less acceptable than Contadora, for it did not specifically address Nicaragua’s military ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Administration spokesmen indicated weeks ago that the United States would not halt contra aid as called for by the Arias proposal and, on July 9, U.S. Special Envoy Philip C. Habib (who resigned of Friday) told a congressional committee that the Central Americans certainly would not sign anything without prior U.S. endorsement. The Arias Plan therefore seemed destined to founder on the same rock of U.S. non-cooperation as the Contadora effort had.

-- The Reagan-Wright Plan. Meanwhile, however, the Reagan Administration figured out that Congress was unlikely to approve more aid to the contras unless it gave diplomacy a try--or at least appeared to do so. The White House thus signaled its interest in a peace plan to Rep. Jim Wright (D-Tex.), the influential Speaker of the House. Many Democrats believed this was only another ploy, a feint at diplomacy which the Administration would make certain failed and then could point to as proof that there was no alternative to renewed contra aid. If that was the Administration’s intention, it did not work, for Wright immediately seized the initiative and drafted a plan for the first time committing the United States to halt aid to the contras in return for steps on Nicaragua’s part.

Then influential conservatives personally lobbied the President and senior officials talked Thursday about asking Congress for stopgap contra funding . But by Friday the Administration spokesmen affirmed that it would not seek any aid before Sept. 30.

-- The Central American presidents’ plan. Some indication of a shift in U.S. policy was all the Central American presidents needed. Yet the agreement they signed on Aug. 7 is only the first step. The whole process could break down quickly if the contras, encouraged by the Administration, refuse to abide by a cease-fire; if the Nicaraguans fail, say, to restore press freedoms, or if the other countries balk at one or another of the agreement’s provisions. For the moment, however, the emphasis is on diplomacy rather than continued fighting.

-- The Sandinistas. The Sandinistas may indeed be Marxist in persuasion and more interested in carrying out their revolutionary reform programs than in democratic processes. At the same time, they appear to understand that their isolated position leaves them no alternative but to compromise and get along with their fellow Latin Americans. They are likely to stick with a mixed economy and to return at least to the forms of democracy even while trying to limit its substance.

Managua’s special relationship with Havana and Moscow is cause for legitimate concern on the part of the Reagan Administration. The Sandinistas, however, have indicated their willingness to address this U.S. concern--to prohibit Soviet and Cuban bases and send their military personnel home.

--Costa Rica. Costa Rica has long been one of the most democratic countries in Latin America. Though highly suspicious of the Sandinistas, Costa Ricans oppose the U.S. contra policy as ineffective and offensive to Latin American sensitivities.

--Guatemala. Guatemala has suffered its full share of repressive military governments and right-wing death squads. Democratically-elected President Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo is walking a thin line between the need to restore democratic guarantees and the fact that he rules only at the sufferance of the right-wing military.

To make this balancing act easier, and to encourage left-wing guerrillas in his own country to lay down arms, Cerezo needs peace. He has been a firm supporter of the Arias plan and, before that, of the Contadora process. Like Arias, he opposes the U.S. policy of aiding the contras . Cerezo is helped because the Guatemala’s military is more independent-minded than other Central American forces and, although it doesn’t like the Sandinistas, it supports his efforts to follow a road not necessarily approved in Washington.

--Honduras. The poorest of all Central American countries, Honduras is caught between the Sandinistas, whose military capabilities it fears, and the United States, which uses Honduras as an advance base for its own military forces and as a contra staging area . Honduras’ civilian government has come to resent the high-handed U.S. approach as much as it fears the Sandinistas. But because it needs U.S. economic aid, and because the Honduran military insists on close U.S. relations, it has been powerless to go a more independent route. It therefore publicly accedes to U.S. demands while privately indicating its disagreement. Honduras will support the Arias plan to the extent that the United States permits.

-- El Salvador. The eight-year civil war rolls on in El Salvador. The United States had hoped the election of President Jose Napoleon Duarte would consolidate democracy. It did not. Duarte has been unable to bring about needed reforms. With his political capital expended and his popularity at an all-time low, Duarte is increasingly the prisoner of the military, the right wing and the Reagan Administration. What comes after Duarte is anyone’s guess. Actions by left-wing guerrillas are on the rise. It will be even more difficult for the Arias plan to work in El Salvador than in Nicaragua. Meanwhile, Duarte will do what Washington orders.

Given this mosaic, one cannot be optimistic about peace breaking out in Central America. What would change the pattern completely would be for the Reagan Administration to become directly involved in the negotiating process--and to back up compliance with the power and honor of the United States. Unfortunately, there is as yet no indication that the Administration intends to go that far.