Air Crash Raises Questions

The crash of a Northwest Airlines jet at Detroit Sunday night that killed more than 150 people was the second worst air disaster in the nation’s history. The traveling public has a right to know what caused the tragedy and what can be done to minimize the danger of other crashes in the future. What federal investigators have come up with so far is not reassuring.

The plane, bound for Phoenix and Orange County, had just taken off when it settled back to the ground and crashed in a fiery ball. An on-board recorder shows that an automatic stall-warning device put the pilots on notice that the airspeed was too low.

Engine failure was immediately suspected--even a partial power loss could have been fatal under the wind and weather conditions that existed at the time of the crash--but was then discounted. Investigators are now concentrating their attention on the discovery that the pilots may have neglected to set the flaps properly for takeoff. Further investigation will be required to determine whether pilot error was involved or whether the flap controls gave a false reading. But if the flaps were indeed in the “up” position, the aircraft would have required more runway and greater airspeed for a safe liftoff.

An erroneous flap setting would have been especially dangerous under the conditions that existed in the Detroit area at the time.

The Northwest jet was fully loaded--every seat was occupied--but should nevertheless have been able to lift off the 8,500-foot runway under normal atmospheric conditions. But the weather was warm, and the plane reportedly had a tailwind--both factors that increase the amount of runway needed. Wind shears, a phenomenon in which sudden changes in wind direction can rob a plane of flying speed, also had been reported in the area a little earlier.

So far it isn’t clear that any changes in federal air-safety regulations are needed. But some questions plainly do have to be answered.

Why, for example, was a longer parallel runway not used that would have provided an extra 2,000 feet of takeoff roll? Was weight properly distributed on the MD-80? If it is true that Northwest had eliminated the critical question of flap setting from the mandatory pre-takeoff check list, why was the change made? In the cost-conscious environment of deregulation, do pilots at Northwest and other airlines feel inhibited from delaying takeoff when hazardous winds or weather conditions exist? Have Northwest’s labor problems, which have coincided with acts of vandalism, had any effect on safety?

Although Northwest is second only to Continental Airlines in passenger complaints about service, it has one of the industry’s best safety records. But history is neither guide nor comfort when tragedy strikes as it did in Detroit. Air travelers are entitled to the maximum possible assurance that the causes are found and corrected.