‘Does Something for Everybody’ : W. German Move--Each Side Can Claim a Success

West Germany’s decision to dismantle 72 aging short-range missiles gives the United States and the Soviet Union an opportunity to end a negotiating impasse on terms each side can call a success, clearing the way for the first superpower arms control agreement in eight years.

The action by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl seems to give Moscow everything it has asked for in terms of substance but stops far short of what the Soviets demanded as a matter of form. From Washington’s standpoint, it amounts to a victory in form but a concession in substance.

In the arcane world of nuclear arms control, however, sometimes style and precedent are every bit as important as substance. Washington accepted the compromise at once, but Moscow avoided any immediate formal reaction to it, although the official news agency Tass was mildly critical.

In Los Angeles, President Reagan praised Kohl for removing an “artificial obstacle” from the path to a U.S.-Soviet treaty banning short- and medium-range nuclear missiles worldwide. He said that the treaty can be completed “promptly” if Moscow sincerely wants an arms control pact.

Kohl told a Bonn press conference Wednesday that West Germany will cancel plans to modernize its virtually obsolete Pershing 1-A missiles and will destroy them once the United States and the Soviet Union implement a treaty to scrap all other nuclear missiles with ranges of between 300 and 3,000 miles. These missiles, referred to in arms control terminology as intermediate-range, include two categories, medium- and short-range. The remaining missile categories are tactical, or under 300 miles, and strategic, or over 3,000 miles.

West Germany purchased the Pershing 1-As from the United States a decade ago. But because Bonn is not a nuclear power, the United States retained control of the nuclear warheads. In the latest U.S.-Soviet negotiations, Moscow insisted that Washington agree as part of any treaty to remove the warheads from the Pershing 1-As, in effect leaving them useless. The United States refused to do so, insisting that the missiles were the property of the West German government, which was not a party to the talks.

Precedent Undisturbed

If all sides now accept Kohl’s gesture, it will result in elimination of the missiles as the Soviets demanded but will not disturb the precedent that excludes “third-country” systems from U.S.-Soviet arms control talks, a position Washington has long defended. U.S. officials have said that the precedent is much more important than the aging West German missiles.

“This does something for everybody,” said Jack Mendelsohn, a former U.S. arms control negotiator who is now deputy director of the private Arms Control Assn. “It gives the Soviets a commitment that the missiles will become obsolete and useless. It gets us out of having to cut out an ally. Everybody seems to have taken a little bit of the cake on this one. This protects our bottom line that we would not undercut the Germans.”

Mendelsohn predicted that Moscow will ultimately go along. But other experts said that Soviet acceptance is not yet certain.

“The next question is whether the Soviets will accept this or demand another gallon of blood,” said Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a former State Department official now on the staff of the Brookings Institution in Washington. “The Germans are saying they will do this but not as part of a U.S.-Soviet agreement. If the Russians come along and say, ‘That’s not good enough; it has to be part of the agreement,’ we will get another blood-letting. The story isn’t finished yet--it depends on how greedy the Russians are.”

Arnold L. Horelick, a former CIA official who is now director of the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, predicted that the Soviets “may carp a little” about terms but ultimately will accept the plan.

Horelick said that Kohl’s action could make him vulnerable to right-wing criticism at home. Bonn offered only reluctant support to the U.S. plan to remove American intermediate-range missiles from Europe and had shown no enthusiasm for eliminating its own rockets.

“Kohl was caught between cross pressures,” Horelick said. “He didn’t want West Germany to be the obstacle preventing an agreement. But the real question is whether the combination of ‘double zero’ (the elimination of both medium- and shorter-range weapons on both sides) plus the Pershing 1-As does any damage to the concept of allied unity. My guess is the United States really left it up to Kohl, but it probably will not be depicted that way in some political circles in Germany.”

James T. Hackett, a former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official now with the conservative Heritage Foundation, said: “The arms control train is moving pretty fast down the track. I don’t think the Pershing 1-As are a significant issue in themselves because they are aging weapons and not all that militarily significant. The more significant issue is the almost total inability to verify an intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement.”

Kohl’s announcement was the second move by the West in as many days to clear away Soviet objections to an intermediate-range missile treaty. The United States on Tuesday proposed what it called “simplified” verification procedures that would sharply reduce the number of on-site inspections that the United States had demanded earlier. The Soviets have not given a formal response to that plan yet.